Exploring the Yogasūtra

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Exploring the Yogasūtra

Philosophy and Translation

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ABBREVIATIONS

BG:	Bhagavadgītā
DK:	Daya Krishna
KCB:	Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya
SK:	Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikā
TV:	Vācaspatimiśra's Tattvavaiśāradī
YS:	Patañjali's Yogasūtra
YSb:	Vyāsa's Yogasūtra-bhāṣya
YSbV:	Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa
YV:	Vijñānabhikṣu's Yogavārttika

TRANSLITERATION

Whenever I use a term or quote a phrase, sūtra, or paragraph in Sanskrit, they are transliterated into English (or Roman) letters. I follow the standard transliteration as (roughly) the following:

a as in c**u**t
ā as in c**a**r
i as in s**i**t
ī as in sw**ee**t
u as in f**u**ll
ū as in p**oo**l
ṛ pronounced ri as in **ri**ch
ṇ as in u**n**der or u**n**real
ñ as in i**n**ch or a**n**gel (both ṇ and ñ are different from n as in a**n**d or a**n**t)
c pronounced as ch as in **ch**ain
ś pronounced as sh as in **sh**eep
ṣ pronounced as sh as in **sh**y

ENTRÉE: TRANSLATING THE OTHER—REFLECTIONS ON A FICTIONAL DIALOGUE

Translation is a great necessity. Every language might not have a Valmiki, a Vyasa, a Homer, a Rumi, a Dante, a Shakespeare, a Hugo, a Tolstoy and a Dickens.

(S. D. TIRUMALA RAO)[1]

In every possible sense, translation is necessary but impossible.

(GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK)[2]

I would like to open with a short reflection on the activity of translation. Translation is the theme which binds together the chapters of this book. Translation not just from one language to another, but across cultures, eras, and textual approaches, translation from experience to language, translation as rereading a text which allegedly everything has already been said of, translation as a dialogue with "the other." My initial attempt is to examine the navigation instrument with which I am about to explore the Yogasūtra shortly, exploration which is all about translation in the multiple senses of the term just mentioned.

This preliminary reflection upon translation is carried out through a fictional dialogue between Alexander of Macedonia and an Indian ascetic (a sādhu or for our sake, a yogin), as imagined by Vikram Chandra in his novel *Red Earth and Pouring Rain* (2001). I will read Chandra's text closely, attempting to decipher the translator's role in the dialogue under discussion, as a mirror of the "role" which I have taken upon myself in writing the chapters of this book, and as an occasion to rethink the self–other encounter which stands at the center of every cross-cultural translation.

In the present study, the self–other encounter is twofold: first, between contemporary readers and the Yogasūtra, an old Indian text composed in

Sanskrit around the third or fourth century AD. Many of the paragraphs below are dedicated to the "otherness" of the Yogasūtra, to the fact that despite the easy availability of the text, translated as it is to almost every language, and in spite of numerous attempts to familiarize the text and adapt it to the expectations of contemporary readers, it remains foreign, often enigmatic and therefore intriguing and always inviting fresh readings. Another self–other encounter to be highlighted is between the "phenomenal I," that is what we commonly refer to as "me" and "I," and its "inner otherness," a metaphysical selfhood tentatively referred to by Patañjali as puruṣa. In this respect, I see the author of the Yogasūtra as a translator between these two dimensions of the human person, sthūla and sūkṣma, worldly and unworldly. His task, or at least this is my contention, is to translate the other, to verbalize a yogic experience which is beyond the capacity of words, fully aware as he is of the short-handedness of language. I would like to suggest that "inner otherness," be it Patañjali's puruṣa or Freud's unconscious, is as foreign as any "external otherness," and perhaps even more. Touching on layers of oneself unvisited before is Patañjali's challenge for his readers.

Chandra's fictional dialogue to be discussed here is between Alexander the Great and a sādhu, a man of the world and a renouncer. The dry historical facts tell of an alleged encounter between the emperor and naked ascetics during his invasion of the subcontinent. Apparently it was no other than Aristotle who has requested Alexander to bring along a wise man from India, implying an unexpected openness on the part of the famous philosopher toward other traditions of knowledge. We are further told that the sādhu taken by the emperor never reached Greece, having immolated himself somewhere along the journey. But the historical or semi-historical details are not the focus of my present discussion. Rather I am interested in Vikram Chandra's literary response to the anecdote about the king and the ascetic. I will not touch on the place of the dialogue in Chandra's novel, because I believe that the dialogue can stand on its own and can be discussed independently. I aspire to comment with and through Chandra's dialogue on the far wider self–other encounter, which underlies every instance of translation. Special attention will be given to translation in the contemporary encounter between India and the West. I am not restricting my reflection to any particular field. However, I reflect especially on the translation of philosophical texts. If S. D. Tirumala Rao rightly noted that not every language has a Vālmīki, a Vyāsa,[3] a Homer, a Rumi, a Dante, and a Shakespeare, then Patañjali, Śaṅkara, Confucius, Maimonides, Plato, and Kant can be easily added to the list.

As you will shortly discover, the "real" dialogue in Chandra's narrative is not between Alexander, or Sikander as he is called in India, and the sādhu, but actually between Sikander's translator and the ascetic. The emperor is present in the dialogue in his absence. A power-shift between the king and the translator takes place. The latter shifts to center-stage and

emerges as a mediator between two cultures, between altogether different ways of thinking. The translator's task, as the following paragraphs will demonstrate, is literally, to reconcile the irreconcilable. Here is the dialogue, then, with my own bhāṣya or "live-commentary" interwoven in Chandra's text.

Translator: He [Sikander] wants to know why you're naked.
Sādhu: Ask him why he's wearing clothes.

The fictional dialogue opens with a question. The king asks the sādhu why he is naked; or rather, the dressed householder ("dressed" in views and opinions, in fixed thinking-patterns), acknowledges the otherness of the naked ascetic. The twist lies in the fact that the sādhu demonstrates the reversibility of the self–other dialectic. The king is as much his other, as he is the other of the king. The sādhu refuses to accept his interlocutor's presupposition that one should wear clothes in order to be considered "normal," "civilized," or even "human." By turning the question back to Sikander, the sādhu refuses to be objectified, and insists on creating a dialogue between equals instead of a foretold monologue in which the other is but an excuse to listen again and again to me and myself.

Translator: He says he's asking the questions here.
Sādhu: Questions give birth only to other questions.

The sādhu breaks yet another convention. We are so used to thinking that questions give rise to answers, but suddenly we are faced with a person who suggests that questions simply raise other questions. Where do answers come from then? And what is the relation between questions and answers? Chandra leaves these questions open to the readers' reflection. At the narrative level it is clear that the emperor is not interested in an open dialogue with the sādhu. He insists on having control of the whole episode. For him, the so-called dialogue is all about domination, about appropriating "the other" rather than respecting his otherness. One cannot but wonder if such is also the case in the contemporary dialogue between India and the West (which the chapters to follow, in their own modest way, are a part of). Is it a real dialogue between equals, or again a power-game, a new form of colonialism?

Translator: He says people that get funny with him get executed.
Sādhu: Why?
Translator: Because he's the King of Kings. And he wants you to stop asking questions.
Sādhu: King of Kings?
Translator: He came all the way from a place called Greece, killing other kings, so he's King of Kings, see.

The sādhu continues to question each and every utterance of his interlocutor (Why? King of Kings?). The translator is no longer merely "Sikander's mouth," a bilingual-technician repeating the king's words in the ascetic's language as accurately as he can. My impression is that in this case, the translator provides his own answers without even translating the questions to the emperor. His answers are oversimplified or perhaps sarcastic, yet reveal an inescapable historical truth—when a king conquers and kills, he is considered "King of Kings."

Sādhu: Fool of Fools. Master-Clown of Clowns.
Mahā-Idiot of Idiots.
Translator: You want me to tell him that?

The sādhu ignores the translator's implied warning: the emperor kills whoever refuses to surrender, be it kings in the battlefield or sādhu-s who ask questions. His refusal to surrender or to accept the "logic" behind Sikander's definition as "King of Kings" reveals its futility. The translator becomes more and more independent. He explicitly states that Sikander need not necessarily know what is said in the dialogue. He suggests not to translate the ascetic's words, fearing their lethal consequence with regard to the sādhu and perhaps even to himself. In this respect, it is no longer a dialogue between the king and the ascetic, but between the latter and the translator. Furthermore, "the other" does not always say what we (Alexander in the narrative, the readers of a text in translation) want to hear. This is exactly what makes him "the other." The dilemma, as reflected here, is whether to translate his/her words or not. This point will be further discussed below. Finally, Chandra beautifully twists the word mahārāja which has become a standard English word (minus the diacritical marks which my computer has been programmed to automatically add). For the sādhu, an invader and a killer cannot be a mahā-rāja but rather a mahā-idiot. For him, Sikander is indeed Great (mahā) but not in the usual sense of the word. The idiom mahā-idiot which plays both with mahārāja and with "the Great" reveals Chandra's own position as a dvibhāṣī or translator between two cultures.

Sādhu: I said it, didn't I?
Translator: You are crazier than he is. He says he'll kill you. Right here, right now.
Sādhu: I'll have to die some day.
Translator: Listen, don't do this. He's demented, he doesn't realize who you are, he thinks naked people are poor savages. He'll really kill you.
Sādhu: I'll really have to die some day.

Now the dialogue is entirely between the sādhu and the translator. The latter still tries to prevent violence, reinforcing his independent position between the king and the ascetic. The sādhu embodies the yogic approach which sees

abhiniveśa, fear of death, as a kleśa or "cause of affliction" (as the discussion in Chapter 2 will explicate). He is more concerned with his freedom than with the length of his life span. Like the translator, he too secures his independent position. The independence of both of them is a precondition for a genuine dialogue to take place between them.

Translator: He wants to know why you aren't scared of dying.
Sādhu: That'd be silly.
Translator: He says that's not a satisfactory answer.
Sādhu: What sort of answer would he like?
Translator: He says you should tell him exactly what mystic path you followed to reach this sublime state of indifference. And he wishes you would stop asking questions. Really, this is incredible; I think you've got him hooked.
Sādhu: Mystic path?
Translator: Mystic path. Literal translation.

The emperor refuses to accept the sādhu's "unsatisfactory answer." The sādhu is intrigued to know what the king wants to hear. As I have suggested ealier, "the other" does not always say what we expect him to, or says something which we cannot digest or in some cases even understand. The first instance which comes into mind is Patañjali's narrative of yoga as world-renunciation, unfolding verse after verse in the Yogasūtra. This is definitely not what the majority of the Western readers of the text want to hear. Therefore Patañjali's radical approach is modified in translation after translation, to create an altogether different, "friendlier" yoga-picture, more digestible at least for a Western/Westernized stomach; to provide the readers (or the buyers) with what they want to hear, namely integration, harmony, God and Love with capital letters, and the like. Chandra's Sikander (like many of the readers of the Yogasūtra in translation) wants the "Eastern Wisdom." He will not buy the sādhu's profane, even vulgar answer ("That'd be silly"). Chandra's sādhu is not very mystic. His straightforward secularity (which is the last thing expected of him) is emphasized by Chandra's slangy language throughout the dialogue. Chandra's translator is caught in the gap between the king's unfulfilled expectations and the ascetic's sheer refusal to play the role intended for him. Overwhelmed by his incapacity to bridge the gap, the translator takes a step back to the seemingly safer zone of literal translation. Don't we all opt for literal translation when we have no idea what to do with the text? Literal translation indicates the limitedness of the translator and the dead ends one often encounters in the act of translation, especially translation as a cross-cultural dialogue. Let me now skip a few paragraphs and reach the final passage of the dialogue.

Translator: You're lucky. He's decided killing you would be bad for the campaign at this moment, he'd look cruel, and then nobody would

surrender. He's having his chroniclers strike this conversation from the record. Now history will state that Sikander the Great met some strange naked men under a tree, that's all.

Sādhu: Well, well. Good luck, friend.

Translator: Good luck to you too, or is that what one wishes people like you? Now I'm asking questions.

This passage shows that two dialogues have in fact taken place simultaneously in front of our eyes, one fictional, the other authentic. The fictional dialogue is between the king and the ascetic. It is fictional because they have not really met. The words could not bring them together. Each remained isolated in his own world. The barrenness of their meeting is emphasized by the fact that the conversation has been deleted from the record. In this case, the empty record reflects that which has actually taken, or more precisely that which has not taken place. Words have been exchanged; however, a real dialogue could not be established. Nevertheless, in between the lines of the emperor–sādhu fictional dialogue, an actual dialogue has taken place between the ascetic and the translator. Actual in the sense that friendship has been created; in the sense that like the sādhu, the translator takes the liberty to ask questions. Questions are the fuel of a dialogue. The translator in the episode under discussion first represents the emperor, then provides independent answers to the questions of the sādhu, and finally asks a question of his own. Perhaps this is the recipe of translation at large: first to be loyal, appreciative, even identified with the source-text; then to answer questions which arise in the target language/culture (the translator's answers or "solutions" are necessarily independent, as these questions/problems did not arise in the source language); and finally, to be aware of the fact that as a translator, one is an active participant in the cross-cultural dialogue. As such, the translator may raise questions and share with the reader not merely the "final product" but also the hardships and uncertainties of the translation-journey. The active role of the translator is transparent both in a "textual translation" from one language to another and in a two-way simultaneous translation. I do not see a fundamental difference between the two. In either case the translator has to be an insider/outsider in both languages and cultures: an insider to be able to feel the unique pulse of each language, to understand not merely the explicit but even the implicit; an outsider in order to be detached enough to cut—like a film director—scenes (or lines) of the original which do not fit the rhythm of the newly created translation-text, indispensable as they might seem to an insider. In other words, the translator establishes a "realm of between": between languages, cultures, loyalty, and betrayal.

Translation is a close encounter. Every encounter consists of two, self and other, be it two persons or two cultures; two who strive to meet each other. Each gives something of himself. Each holds something of the other. Translation is a "realm of between" in the sense that nothing gets lost. The "source" remains the "source"; the "target" is still the "target," but

at the same time a new sphere, where both are transformed, is disclosed. The Yogasūtra in English is not Patañjali's work, but a new creation. The translator facilitates the encounter between "source" and "target." Translation is necessary in order to become receptive to other thinking traditions, to appreciate new forms of creativity, and to transcend one's own circumstances through "the other." Translation is impossible if anyone is naïve enough to believe that he reads the source-text in the target-language, instead of a new composition authored by a translator who has read the source-text in the source-language. A flower in the open field is not the same as the "same" flower in my garden. Translation is possible merely as transformation: of a text, of the translator, and hopefully, even of the reader.

Notes

1 S. D. T. Rao (1998), p. 68.
2 G. C. Spivak (2000), p. 13.
3 Vyāsa mentioned here is not the composer of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya, on whom I will draw extensively in the following chapters, but the mythological author or "seer" of the Veda-s, the Purāṇa-s and the Mahābhārata.

Introduction: yoga, translation, the other

"Tell me of another city," Kublai insisted.

"Sire, I have told you about all the cities I know."

"There is still one of which you never speak."

Marco Polo bowed his head.

"Venice," the Khan said.

Marco smiled. "What else do you believe I have been talking to you about?"

"And yet I have never heard you mention that name."

Polo said: "Every time I describe a city I am saying something about Venice. To distinguish the other cities' qualities, I must speak of a first city that remains implicit. For me it is Venice."

"You should then begin each tale of your travels from the departure, describing Venice as it is, all of it, not omitting anything you remember of it."

"Memory images, once they are fixed in words, are erased," Polo said. "Perhaps I am afraid of losing Venice all at once, if I speak of it. Or perhaps, speaking of other cities, I have already lost it, little by little."

(ITALO CALVINO, *INVISIBLE CITIES*)[1]

1. Prelude

Everyone today speaks of yoga, everyone is interested in yoga, everyone practices yoga. Yoga, as a "word in English"—and I am sure that the word appears in new dictionaries, somewhere between yodel and yoghurt—refers primarily to āsana-s, that is yogic postures, to a practice which is primarily physical, or which works with body and breathing as its initial tools. Even though the flourishing yoga industry, especially in the West, focuses on body and physicality, one of its side effects is a growing interest in the historical and philosophical roots of "contemporary yoga." This is to say that the growing popularity of yoga arouses curiosity about its classic textual formulations and the relationship (if any) between yoga as reflected in the Indian literature of the old and yoga as practiced today, having become an inseparable ingredient of current Western lifestyles.

The present book attempts to quench, at least to a certain extent, the thirst to know more about yoga. However it is not an introductory book of yoga philosophy, defining basic concepts and providing general information about yoga at large or Pātañjala-yoga in particular. It rather consists of chapters in yoga philosophy, chapters dealing with questions that a close reading of Patañjali's Yogasūtra raises. I repeatedly use the word philosophy, to emphasize the fact that the following chapters will not provide a complementary "theory" to yoga "practice," nor weave a "yoga doctrine" of any kind. I am not a "yoga guru," and not only do I not possess the answers, but moreover, I am more interested in questions than answers. Therefore, I will not repeat slogans, clichés, and maxims reiterated in book after book. I do not have any agenda, nor do I belong to any yoga tradition. Instead, my sole attempt is to think with the Yogasūtra and its vast commentarial body. Daya Krishna once wrote that his basic philosophical tool is niḥsaṅga buddhi, a clear mind, neither attached nor committed to any credo whatsoever, a term which he employs as the equivalent of the Bhagavadgītā's famous niṣkāma karma, that is, action not driven by self-interest or undertaken for gain of any type.[2] I will adopt Daya Krishna's niḥsaṅga-buddhi approach as my "agenda-free agenda" in the following chapters.

So much has already been written on the Yogasūtra, from almost every angle, both in Sanskrit, within the tradition, and contemporarily as part of the yoga wave, paradoxically flowing from the West back to India (I am thinking for instance of the flourishing Baba Ramdev movement, as well as of the "āsana-choreography" in the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth Games in Delhi 2010). There are endless new-age materials on yoga, as well as a good amount of academic studies, that one may wonder about the possibility of saying anything new on Patañjali's famous text. The question of newness in philosophy, or even in thinking at large, is touched upon by Arindam Chakrabarti in his essay "New Stuff: On the Very Idea of Creativity in Philosophical Thinking."[3] He explores the feasibility of philosophical

creativity as opposed to the view which holds contemporary philosophy as nothing more than a footnote to the writings of mahā-philosophers of the past. In this respect, Chakrabarti recalls a conversation he once had with a poet, who told him that poetic creativity "is a constant battle against the staleness of words and thoughts. The battle is often lost by most poets [or philosophers], but sometimes it is won with those very stale words and thoughts."[4]

In the present case, I cannot expect "to win the battle of creativity" in the poetic sense of the word, but nevertheless my attempt is to highlight the philosophical strands of the Yogasūtra, conventionally perceived as too practical a text to be "really" philosophical, or as "belonging" to practitioners, not philosophers. In this respect, I am often asked by potential readers if I practice yoga (āsana-s? meditation? which type of meditation?) as a measure of my "yoga scholarship." Implied is the assumption that unless one is a proficient yoga practitioner, one is not in a position to grasp the depths of Patañjali's teaching. Those holding onto this assumption often go as far as to speculate who among Patañjali's classic commentators had been a "practitioner," rather than "just theoretician" or a śuṣka-tarka ("dry reasoning") scholar.[5] The present book is not of the same genre as Yogasūtra commentaries and translations authored by yogācārya-s (teachers and guru-s of yoga) past and present. It is not a book written by an "insider" who belongs and is committed to the yoga tradition, but an essay composed by an "outsider." A philosopher, or at least this is my contention, is always, necessarily, an "outsider," free as he is (or to my mind ought to be) to wander and wonder between perspectives and ideas, rather than be bound by a certain tradition, dogma, or agenda; that is to say that even a practitioner, when he "does" philosophy becomes (or ought to become) an "outsider." From another angle, it can be said that I do "belong" to the philosophical tradition, and that the following lines are written by a devoted disciple of "questionologists" from Socrates to the Vedic poet who wonders in the Nāsadīya Sūkta how everything was created, and is bold enough to conclude his famous hymn with the open statement,

> He who surveys it [the question of creation] in the highest heaven surely knows, or maybe even he does not know![6]

The first goal of the present book, then, is to take seriously the philosophy of Pātañjala-yoga, to spotlight the philosophical threads or sūtra-s in the text, often unnoticed or not fully emphasized, to ask the "unasked questions" of the Yogasūtra.

The second goal is to work with Daya Krishna's article "The Undeciphered Text: Anomalies, Problems and Paradoxes in the Yogasūtra." For me, Daya Krishna (1924–2007) is one of the most creative thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century. He is not a "yoga scholar," but however rethinks

the Yogasūtra as a part of his broader philosophical project, as I shall explain below. It was Daya Krishna's questioning approach, reflected in the very title of his paper, which encouraged me to "get on board" and try to think Pātañjala-yoga anew.

The third goal of the book is to reflect on the activity of translation apropos Patañjali's text. Translation is the subtext of the book. Subtexts are often as significant as the text itself. Take for example Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā-sūtra. The explicit aim of the text is to ascertain the "proper way" of performing a Vedic ritual, or in Mīmāṃsā terms (and a Heideggerian formulation) to answer the question "How is it with dharma?" (the term dharma referring here to the ritual). However, the subtext of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra is as intriguing. It is about reading and interpreting a text. Jaimini investigates the possible relationship between the word and the world, between language and action. In the same way, the present essay is about yoga philosophy, but simultaneously about translation. My intention is not merely to reflect on Yogasūtra translations and interpretations, classical and modern, or even to offer my own reading of the text in the form of a new translation; my attempt is not just to contemplate on the activity of translation, or more precisely philosophical translation, through my own work as a Yogasūtra translator, but rather, as implied above, I want to read Patañjali himself as a translator between experience and language. His attempt is to depict one's "inner selfhood" or "inner otherness," to provide a glimpse into and analysis of hardly known regions of the human consciousness. He aspires to translate the untranslatable, to verbalize yogic experience that transcends the scope of language. Through language which belongs to and which creates the phenomenal, worldly domain, Patañjali strives at pointing to that which is beyond phenomenality and worldliness. I therefore believe that reading the Yogasūtra with special reference to the question of translation is a fruitful undertaking.

2. A short historiography

We hardly know anything about Patañjali, the mythological or perhaps historical author of the Yogasūtra. Like other authors of classical Indian texts, he does not write anything about himself. It is astonishing that we know literally nothing or close to nothing, biography wise, of the greatest authors, artists, and spiritual masters in the Indian history, from the Vedic ṛṣi-s to the Buddha and Śaṅkara; from the composers of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata to the artists who painted the remarkable murals of Ajanta and carved the astounding rock temples of Ellora. "The question why Indians chose to remain anonymous," Mukund Lath writes, "is complex, almost metaphysical in its ramifications."[7] It is "almost metaphysical," since according to Patañjali and other mokṣa-thinkers one's "true selfhood"

transcends the phenomenal realm of nāma-rūpa (names and forms). If the purpose of an anuśāsana or handbook such as the Yogasūtra, just as the purpose of art (at least according to several prominent exponents of the rasa theory of aesthetic experience) is to facilitate transcendence of the mundane sphere, then not signing one's artwork with a "name," or not disclosing biographical details pertaining to one's "phenomenal selfhood" starts to make sense.

In legends, told and retold by the tradition in order to fill the biographical lacunas, Patañjali is often portrayed as a manifestation of Ādi Śeṣa, the serpent king, god Viṣṇu's assistant, who carries the world on his numerous hoods. As such, he is visually depicted as a nāga or serpent. Some identify the author of the Yogasūtra with a linguist by the same name, author of the Mahābhāṣya, "The Great Commentary" on some of the themes discussed by Pāṇini, the "forefather" of Indian linguistics. Among those for whom the linguist and the yogin are one and the same person, is Bhojarāja, a Yogasūtra commentator of whom I will write more below. The problem is that the former Patañjali (the linguist) is usually dated to the second or third century BC, whereas the latter (author of the Yogasūtra) is dated to the third or fourth century AD. Therefore most scholars prefer to distinguish between the yoga writer and his linguist namesake.

Patañjali's philosophy, to which the following chapters are dedicated, is not "pure" but rather "applied." It is "applied" in the sense that it aims at facilitating "silence within silence," a state of affairs in which the world shifts from center to periphery, and one discovers oneself as a metaphysical selfhood above and beyond body, mind, and even psychological content. As such, one is absolutely isolated from the world and worldliness. This, in my reading, is the existential position referred to by Patañjali as kaivalya, that is, "aloneness" or "freedom." Kaivalya is depicted in the Yogasūtra as at least one of the goals to be accomplished by the yogin, if not as his "ultimate goal." Other goals mentioned in the text are nirbīja samādhi (objectless meditation) and siddhi (attainment of powers). Here is a first philosophical problem: What is the connection (if any) between these three goals? Does objectless samādhi lead to kaivalya, or is it identical with kaivalya? And how do the siddhi-s, the yogic powers, fit in the picture?

Patañjali's philosophy is intended, then, to facilitate and justify a narrative of world-renunciation; a narrative of transition from the familiar formulae "I am so and so" to the naked formulae "I am," which conveys bare existence, ontologically preceding everything else. From a "kaivalya perspective," the phenomenal, worldly "I," who thinks, wills, imagines, and acts, is not more than a secondary, external, "voluntary" layer, which one can peel off anytime.

It is difficult to point out the origin of yoga in India. It is difficult to point out origins in general, in India as elsewhere. According to the conventional narrative of Indian history, "in the beginning" (until, say, the middle of the second millennium BC) nature was worshiped in "India" as sacred or

divine; or as Mukund Lath[8] beautifully puts it, "the world was perceived as consciousness." To a large extent, this is the case in India to this very day. However, the brief historic narrative which I convey here is not linear but vertical. This is to say that the new does not replace the old, but rather supplements it, like jigsaw-puzzle pieces which together constitute the larger picture. Hence (almost) no "historical piece" is lost, but instead, is shifted aside, hidden or overshadowed by a new historic trend, just to be later rediscovered or taken in a different direction.

Sometime in the middle of the second millennium BC, or so it is often speculated, tribes known as Ārya-s (or Aryan-s, literally noble), a term twisted and distorted by the Nazis, appeared in the South-Asian subcontinent. The Ārya-s brought with them a textual corpus known as the Veda (literally knowledge). I will not go into detail about the origin of the Āryan tribes or the features of the different Veda-s.[9] Instead, I will briefly and generally assert that the Veda consists of poems or hymns (sūkta-s), sang by ṛṣi-s and ṛṣikā-s (poets of both genders) and dedicated to certain deities (devatā-s). Interestingly, as Daya Krishna points out,[10] in some cases A (the ṛṣi) sings to B (the devatā), but later they "switch roles" and it is B (now as the ṛṣi) who sings to A (who has become the devatā). In other words, everyone or more precisely, everything can be treated as a "deity," given that it is properly addressed with a Vedic poem. A close reading of the Ṛgveda reveals that bow and arrow, pestle and mortar, and in a certain case, the kitchen, are all treated as devatā-s or "deities."[11]

What I am trying to suggest is that the Vedic culture creates a "sacred" world through poems, that is, through language. It is a significant point, because the "yogic culture" to be discussed below offers an alternative to the Vedic life-world. The Vedic narrative (VN) is about establishing a world; the Yoga counter-narrative (YCN) is about leaving this world behind. The VN is based on language; the YCN is rooted in silence. The VN is composed and maintained by Brahmins. The word brāhmaṇa, or "in English" Brahmin, can be analyzed as derived from the root √brū, denoting speech or production of sound.[12] The Brahmins, then, "empowered" by the etymology of the very word brāhmaṇa, are "in charge" of language and of the world created by language. Moreover, the VN refers to a dynamic world of plurality, corresponding with the plurality inherent in language. On the other hand, the YCN is hardly interested in the world. It concentrates merely on the human consciousness "in itself," regardless of worldly contents of whatever type. The YCN, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, visions an introvert, static, motionless, "empty" consciousness as its highest puruṣārtha or human ideal.

The Vedic texts mention a person, who in my reading is "the other" of the Vedic man, namely "the other" of the ṛṣi or the Brahmin. This person is referred to as muni (silent) or keśin (a person with matted hair). In Ṛgveda 10.136 he is depicted as a wanderer (rather than as a householder),[13] as "irrational as a result of austerity or prolonged silence" (unmaditā mauneyena), and as capable of levitation or "moving freely in the air" (antarikṣeṇa patati), which anticipate the siddhi-s or yogic powers of the third chapter of the

Yogasūtra.[14] He is further portrayed as "drinking the poison together with Rudra" (viṣasya pātreṇa yad rudreṇāpibat saha). Rudra can be seen as a prototype of Śiva, the divinity most identified with yoga. The "poison" (viṣa) reminds the Yogasūtra-reader of the oṣadhi of YS 4.1, a term which alludes to psychoactive substances. The use of such substances, even if mentioned by Patañjali as not belonging to his own yoga as samādhi (as implied by Vyāsa's commentary of YS 4.6), is prevalent in other types of yoga as part of the yogic experimentation with human consciousness. I would like to see the muni/keśin mentioned in the Veda as an ancestor, or at least one of the ancestors, of the yogin (or yogin-s in the plural)[15] depicted in the Yogasūtra.

There is a dispute among historians whether yoga (in the general sense of the abovementioned "Yoga counter narrative") has emerged out of the Vedic world, even the Vedic ritual, or developed independently? Whether the tradition "broke" into two, or there were two parallel traditions from "the very beginning"? I will not go into this historic rather than philosophical question, and leave it to the consideration of historians.[16]

Sometime in the middle of the first millennium BC, or so the historians of the Indian civilization speculate,[17] individuals started to leave their homes, families, and villages, to abandon the familiar ritualistic Vedic world, and opt for solitude wandering in the forest. It has been a turning point in the cultural history of India, a period of sharp transition from Veda to Yoga, from worldliness to world-renunciation, from "externality" to "internality." The historians do not know why the transition occurred in this particular time in history. They refer to urbanization and development of trade, which broke the static village structure and enabled free movement of ideas together with goods.[18] They further mention the corruptibility or datedness of the old Brāhmaṇical establishment as a possible incentive for leaving behind society and "institutional religion," in search for an alternative.[19] They even speculate that an epidemic or natural disaster might have been the cause of despair from worldliness and its possibilities.[20]

Individuals left society and went off to the forest (vana, āraṇya), a metaphoric, even metaphysic, not necessarily a botanic term, referring to "the other" of society and culture, to a space outside the known and the familiar, to what Patrick Olivelle (drawing on Christian terminology) refers to as wilderness.[21] The Indian image of the forest corresponds with the Judeo-Christian image of the desert.[22] Both refer to an open space which contributes to an inner transformation, which enables the wanderer or pārivrājaka to meet god, or god-in-him, or himself anew. However, whereas the desert is depicted as "empty" or "neutral," consisting of no one except for the believer and his god, the forest is portrayed as inhabited by fellow wanderers and animals. Other wanderers or sādhu-s can become a source of knowledge. One may learn from them and their experience. Animals too can become a source of knowledge. Many āsana-s or yoga postures are based on the imitation of animals.[23] The yogin watches his "neighbors" in the forest, searching as he is for alternative sources of

alternative knowledge.[24] Here one recalls the famous story of Satyakāma Jābāla (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4.5–9), which illustrates the need of different pramāṇa-s or knowledge-sources if one strives for a "different knowledge," transcending the borderlines not just of what is already known, but of what the phenomenal, worldly, committed to the subject–object segmentation perspective considers as knowable. Satyakāma, the protagonist of the story, depicted as "different" from the very beginning (owing to his ambiguous family origin), learns about the Brahman (about the "unknowable") from a bull (ṛṣabha), the fire (agni), a goose (haṃsa) and a diver-bird (madgu). It is implied that in order to transcend one's limiting human circumstances (biological, social, and even mental and psychological), other-than-human sources of knowledge are required, comprising in the present case not just of animals but even natural elements such as fire.

Olivelle suggests that animal-imitation is the epitome of the total rejection on behalf of the renouncer of rationality and social norms.[25] His observation refers to the Saṃnyāsa-Upaniṣads, a corpus with an evident social dimension. The Yogasūtra, in my reading, focuses entirely on the human consciousness. Therefore Patañjali and his commentators are hardly interested in the yogin as a renouncer of social life. However, Patañjali opens his treatise with the stunning statement yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ ("Yoga is the cessation of mental activity"), very much in tune with Olivelle's portrayal of the yogin as renouncer of rationality. Interestingly, cessation (nirodha) of mental activity (including rationality) is depicted by Patañjali as a plausible resolution based on a rational analysis of the human "state of affairs." In this respect, his philosophy is tentative, like a message in a spy movie which destroys itself after being listened to.

"The only people who see the whole picture," writes Salman Rushdie in *The Ground beneath Her Feet*, "are the ones who step out of the frame."[26] The Upaniṣadic or Yogic "forest," in my reading, is the existential stance of being "out of the frame." As such it is not necessarily a physical space, but rather an inner shift. Therefore, when the yogin departs to the "forest," the main "thing" which he leaves behind is in fact himself, that is the phenomenal, mundane, worldly "I," referred to by Patañjali as asmitā, including qualities, patterns, and even values, which the human person has assiduously accumulated from birth or even previous births.

All this is abandoned for the sake of what? What comes in place of the "phenomenal I"? And back in the historic narrative, what did the renouncers do in the forest? What were they searching for? What did they find? Was it merely a negative movement of "freedom from," if I may use Isaiah Berlin's famous formulation, or also a positive movement of "freedom to"? Or perhaps the "doing" question is out of place. Perhaps the renouncers did not "do" anything, but rather abandoned the formulae "I do, therefore I am." The question about the insights which the forest allows and one's worldly existence conceals stands at the heart of the dialogue between the householder and the renouncer, the "insider" and the "outsider," expounded

in the Upaniṣad-s, a corpus composed since the middle of the first millennium BC until when? I do not really know. Perhaps even today, if such a dialogue takes place, it is entitled to be referred to as Upaniṣad.[27] Therefore, this vast corpus consists of "early Upaniṣad-s" and "later Upaniṣad-s." The texts belonging to the latter category (which include, for instance, the aforementioned Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad-s, as well as the Upaniṣad-s known as the Yoga Upaniṣad-s) were composed, with considerable approximation, in the first half of the second millennium AD.[28]

I have sketched the outlines of the Vedic world and the yogic alternative concealed between its lines (embodied for instance by the muni/keśin). I further touched on the Upaniṣadic turn, on the forest as the "negative" (in the photographic sense of the word) of the familiar and the known, on the dialogue between the householder and the renouncer, between those living "within the frame" and those who have "stepped out of it." I would like to refer to the next historic-philosophic phase as the Sūtra period. Sūtra, literally "thread" or "threads," is the name of a literary genre composed at the beginning of the Christian era; a genre which attempts to systematize the philosophic materials which existed when the sūtra-s were composed, namely philosophical trends in the Upaniṣad-s and other texts which I have not mentioned in this rough draft of the "roots of yoga," such as the preUpaniṣadic Brahmaṇa-s and Āraṇyaka-s, the "great epics" including the Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata, as well as Buddhist and Jaina sources. The texts known as sūtra-s (due to their threaded binding or interwoven verses) attempt to define a certain philosophical discipline. The sūtra format is probably borrowed from Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, his famous grammar treatise, composed around the third or fourth century BC. It has become the standard format of presenting a śāstra or discipline. The most famous sūtra, at least in the West, is of course the Kāmasūtra, "the threads on passion," dedicated not just to erotica and erotic postures, but (at least in its introductory section)[29] to phenomenal existence in a more general sense, to everything which the human person should strive for in the mundane sphere. Other sūtra-s composed more or less at the same period include the Nyāyasūtra and the Vaiśeṣikasūtra ("the former concerned with logic and epistemology, the latter with issues which are simultaneously epistemological and metaphysical"[30]), the Brahmasūtra (an investigation toward the Brahman, roughly denoting the metaphysical essence underlying and preceding the plurality of the phenomenal world), the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (dedicated to the notion of dharma, understood here as a set of ritual obligations to be performed according to the Veda), and of course the Yogasūtra. Each of these texts (excluding the Kāmasūtra) is the root text of a darśana or philosophical school, and is extensively commented on.[31] In this respect the Buddhist sūtra-s (or in Pāli, sutta-s), that is, the sermons of the Buddha compiled retroactively by his disciples, can also be mentioned, even if they do not share the synoptic style of the "Hindu" sūtra genre.

3. The Yogasūtra text and its commentaries

The Yogasūtra attests that it is a handbook or manual (anuśāsana) for those wishing to transcend worldly life with its inherent duḥkha or suffering. It is the shortest of all the sūtra-s, consisting of about 195 verses.[32] These verses are divided into four chapters, titled Samādhi, Sādhana, Vibhūti, and Kaivalya, or "meditation," "praxis,"[33] "powers," and "aloneness/freedom" respectively. The titles are in a sense surprising, since the terms sādhana and vibhūti do not occur in the Yogasūtra text. Therefore it is not implausible that the division into chapters or at least the titles given to them is the work of a later editor, that is, not necessarily of the author/compiler of the text, whom I refer to arbitrarily, following the tradition and groping in historic and biographic vagueness, as Patañjali.

An interesting question with regard to the chapters of the Yogasūtra concerns their sequence. The first chapter, as the title indicates, deals with samādhi or meditation. This is also the main concern of the third chapter, in which not merely the meditative "limbs" (aṅga-s) of Patañjali's eightfold yoga scheme (aṣṭāṅga-yoga) are defined (in sūtra-s 3.1–3.3), but the author of the text specifies a wide range of meditations on different objects and their "outcome" in the form of siddhi-s or powers. Vyāsa, Patañjali's most authoritative commentator (I will elaborate on the commentators shortly), suggests that the second, practical chapter of the Yogasūtra is intended for yogin-s with vyutthita-citta, that is consciousness which is unsteady, distracted, and exposed to external manipulations. The first chapter, he adds, is for those endowed with samāhita-citta, namely collected, concentrated, internalized consciousness.[34] This is to say that the practice of meditation, as prescribed in chapters 1 and 3 of the Yogasūtra, demands samāhita-citta. Chapter 2 helps to develop such concentrated mind, and is therefore designated for those incapable of following the "meditation instructions" given in chapters 1 and 3. According to Vyāsa, then, it seems that a yogin endowed with the necessary concentration can skip chapter 2, in which Patañjali specifies the preliminary, "external limbs" (bahiraṅga-s) of his "yoga body," from yama to pratyāhāra.[35] Such a yogin may move directly from Patañjali's general discussion of meditation (denoted by the notions samādhi, samāpatti, dhyāna, and even smṛti[36]) in chapter 1, to the more precise depiction of the meditative "internal yoga limbs" (antaraṅga-s),[37] namely dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi,[38] in chapter 3. I would therefore conclude that the Yogasūtra is a modular work, not intended for reading from a to z. Rather the sequence of the text is to be determined according to each and every yogin or reader, as per his capacity to make sense of or to "use" the different chapters. It is, however, unclear whether the vyutthita reader/yogin should start with chapter 2 and then move to chapters 1 and 3, or follow the text linearly, starting with chapter 1, then working on the necessary preliminaries expounded in chapter 2, before reaching chapter 3 which is again dedicated to meditation. The commentators who follow Vyāsa

neither answer this question, nor touch directly on the chapter sequence issue. However, they do accept their predecessor's distinction between vyutthita and samāhita, perhaps hinted by Patañjali's own statement that "as (the intensity in practice can be) mild, medium or extreme, there is a difference (in the yogin's proximity to samādhi)," as one of them, Vijñānabhikṣu, suggests.[39]

Sequence-wise, another question is what is the status of the fourth chapter of the Yogasūtra, the Kaivalya-pāda? Chapter 3 ends with the particle "iti," which indicates the ending of a direct speech, a quote, or a treatise as a whole. However "iti" can also be read in the sense of "evam iti," "so it is," that is as emphasizing a certain point. If the word "iti" at the end of chapter 3 signifies the completion of the Yogasūtra, as the Vivaraṇa-kāra for example, one of Patañjali's commentators, believes,[40] then what about chapter 4, which not only follows chapter 3 but which ends with an "iti" of its own (unlike chapters 1 and 2)? The fact that the Vibhūti-pāda ends with "iti" implies that the Kaivalya-pāda could be a later composition, annexed to the previous chapters. Or perhaps, that it has been composed (even by the same author) as an appendix to the Yogasūtra text which includes merely three organic chapters.[41] It should be noted that Chapter 4 is more philosophical than the preceding chapters, consisting for instance of an implicit debate with the Buddhist position, regarding the necessity of postulating essentialistic selfhood such as Patañjali's puruṣa.[42] Another unique feature of the fourth chapter, which raises a doubt about the unity of the Yogasūtra, is an untypical language-game, an almost-śleṣa in YS 4.29,[43] which deviates from the Yogasūtra's "dry" technical style of writing. Classic commentators and contemporary translators are disputed about the meaning of "iti" at the end of chapter 3 and its implications. Some read it like the Vivaraṇa-kāra, as signifying the closure of Patañjali's treatise. Others prefer to read it as underscoring the term kaivalya, defined here by Patañjali.[44] In several versions of the text the problem is avoided by the omission of the particle "iti" in YS 3.56.[45] It is not implausible that this would be a better editing of the text. If Chapter 4 is a later addition, then upon its addition, the last sūtra of Chapter 3 no longer closes the Yogasūtra, and therefore the particle "iti" should be erased. What I am trying to suggest, through "iti" as an illustration, is that the text of the Yogasūtra is full of "problems" and raises numerous questions (here with regard to the unity of the text and the status of Chapter 4). Quite a few commentators and translators have tried, and still try, to "solve" these "problems" and provide the reader with a comprehensive, "clean" Yogasūtra. This is not the aim of the present endeavor. On the contrary: for me, "problems" and questions are the fuel of a philosophic reading.

The Yogasūtra is not just a short treatise, but also written, like the rest of the sūtra-s (excluding the Buddhist sūtra-s which do not belong to the same genre), in a concise and condensed style. Patañjali's tone is almost "scientific." His work does not include debates with other philosophical positions

(except in the fourth chapter). Moreover, it is not written as a dialogue like many other texts of Indian philosophy in general and yoga philosophy in particular. Al-Bīrūnī's intriguing eleventh-century Arabic translation of the Yogasūtra is written, unlike the source-text, as a question-answer dialogue between "the aesthetic roaming in the deserts and the forests"[46] and Patañjali. Patañjali's commentators Vācaspatimiśra, the Vivaraṇa-kāra, and Vijñānabhikṣu, all include siddhāntin/pūrva-pakṣin (philosopher/opponent) dialogues in their commentaries. And the Śiva-saṃhitā and Gheranda-saṃhitā, two famous Haṭha-yoga texts composed around the seventeenth century AD, are also written as dialogues between a teacher and a disciple. Often, when I read Patañjali's compact verses, I ask him in my imagination why he could not expand, at least in crucial junctions of the text. But this, perhaps, is the beauty of the text, that is, the fact that it inherently invites thinking and rethinking. And indeed, the Yogasūtra has given rise to a large number of commentaries, old and new. Jonardon Ganeri uses computer science terminology when explaining that the objective of philosophical commentary of "base texts," such as the Yogasūtra, "is to *decompress* the text being commented on."[47] He later quotes from the Śabdakalpadruma, a famous nineteenth century Sanskrit lexicon, which defines bhāṣya—a primary philosophical commentary (which refers directly to the "base text" in the absence of other commentaries)—as "amplification or expansion (prapañcaka) of what is said in the sūtra-s" (sūtroktārthaprapañcakam).[48] Ganeri further elucidates that Sanskrit philosophical commentary writing is "heavily nested," as he puts it.[49] It is to say that every commentary is grounded in previous commentaries. In our case, every commentator of Patañjali has read the Yogasūtra together with Vyāsa's bhāṣya[50] and other previous commentaries known to him.

The commentators, whose work I draw on in the following chapters, are Vyāsa, Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the Vivaraṇa, Bhojarāja, and Vijñānabhikṣu.

Vyāsa is the author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya, or at least this important text is ascribed to a scholar by this name, who we know literally nothing of, just like in Patañjali's case. Most scholars believe that he was Patañjali's contemporary or lived shortly after him. Despite this chronological proximity, one often feels a gap between Patañjali and Vyāsa, Sūtra-kāra and Bhāṣya-kāra. This feeling is born of the fact that Vyāsa not always explains, or is not capable of explaining, or not interested in explaining certain sūtra-s, most notably several siddhi-sūtra-s of the Vibhūti-pāda.[51] Vyāsa, it should be further noted, is a generic name for a great author. The Veda-s, the Mahābhārata, and the Purāṇa-s, three huge corpuses which are literally beginning-less and endless, composed or compiled over thousands of years, are all traditionally ascribed to Vyāsa, or more precisely to Veda-Vyāsa, ascription that aims at establishing a textual "unity in diversity." Therefore, the author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya or his early readers might have granted him/self the "title" Vyāsa. Philipp Maas, the praiseworthy

compiler of a critical edition of the first chapter of what he refers to as Pātañjala Yogaśāstra, namely what is commonly considered as Patañjali's Yogasūtra and Vyāsa's bhāṣya together,[52] offers a very different view about Vyāsa. "According to manuscript colophons and secondary evidence," he writes, "both texts [YS and YSb] taken collectively bear the common title Pātañjala Yogaśāstra and probably have one single, common 'author' named Patañjali. This author collected the sūtra-s from different sources and furnished them with explanations, which in later times came to be regarded as the YSb."[53] Maas's counter-perspective, suggesting that Patañjali and Vyāsa are two names of a single author, who assembled sūtra-s from different sources (Buddhist, Sāṃkhyan, bhakti sūtra-s on Īśvara etc.), and commented upon them to create a philosophical collage of his own, is intriguing. There is something refreshing about the natural manner in which Maas refers to "Vyāsa" in his work as "Patañjali,"[54] thus illustrating that his own "myth" (about Patañjali and Vyāsa as one and the same person) is as legitimate as (and far more creative than) the "myth" accepted by all.[55] An interesting counter-counter-perspective, which again projects Patañjali and Vyāsa as two different thinkers, can be implied by al-Bīrūnī's abovementioned Arabic translation of the Yogasūtra. Alongside Patañjali's text, the Persian scholar translated (and abridged, as explained in his preface) a commentary that does not coincide with any of the commentaries known to us today. Gelblum[56] calls attention to the fact that this commentary contains cosmographical descriptions different from those provided in Vyāsa's Bhāṣya of YS 3.27. From this he infers that "it was written at a time when the bhāṣya had not yet attained any great sanctity or authority."[57] Would it be too adventurous to speculate that the commentary translated by al-Bīrūnī could even be older than Vyāsa's?

Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the Tattvavaiśāradī, lived and wrote in the ninth or tenth century AD. He glossed not merely the Yogasūtra, but also philosophical texts of the Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Advaita-Vedānta traditions. I do not read Vācaspatimiśra just as an Advaita thinker who takes interest in and composes commentaries to texts belonging to other darśana-s or schools, but as an interdisciplinary scholar transcending the narrow darśana borders. For me, his vast commentarial work is an academic attempt at reconstructing a comprehensive philosophical picture based on different philosophical materials "piled on his desk."

The commentary known as the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa has been composed, according to most scholars, in the eleventh century, or a bit later. However Gopinath Kaviraj dates the text to the fourteenth century. Gerald J. Larson therefore prefers to remain on the safe side, as he dates the Vivaraṇa between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries.[58] The text is attributed to Śaṅkara, and the question is, of course, whether it is the famous Advaitin, author of the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya. T. S. Rukmani is certain that the author of the Vivaraṇa (whom I will refer to in the following chapters as the Vivaraṇa-kāra) is not the acclaimed Advaitin. Her main argument

is that the Vivaraṇa-kāra refers to the work of Vācaspatimiśra who lived and worked after Śaṅkara of the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya. She provides what she sees as five "definite references" to Vācaspatimiśra in the Vivaraṇa.[59] Kengo Harimoto, compiler of a critical edition of the first chapter of the Vivaraṇa, or the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa, as he refers to the text, takes issue with Rukmani. He analyzes each of the five instances of the word anye/anyeṣām in the Vivaraṇa, which convey reference to a view held by other/s, and which she reads as referring to Vācaspatimiśra. In each case, he argues that there is no reason to assume, as Rukmani does, that it necessarily refers to Vācaspatimiśra. His micro-conclusion is that "neither the Vivaraṇa-kāra nor Vācaspatimiśra knew the commentary on the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya by one another."[60] His macro-conclusion is that "despite Rukmani's confidence, the authorship problem seems to be still open to investigation."[61] Maas[62] and Bryant[63] agree with Harimoto that the authorship question cannot be determined.[64] Another important point, raised by Harimoto, Wezler, and Maas,[65] is that, as the latter puts it, "the Vivaraṇa-kāra based his commentary on a version of the Pātañjala Yoga-darśana [namely the YS and YSb together] that contained more original readings than the printed editions available nowadays." In other words, the author of the Vivaraṇa has not read the Yogasūtra with Vyāsa's bhāṣya known to us today, but a different, older version of the text. This fact is clearly seen in Rukmani's translation of the Vivaraṇa. For the sake of convenience, she provides the reader with the YS text, followed by the YSb and the YSbV. However there are several discrepancies between the Vivaraṇa and Vyāsa's bhāṣya, owing to the fact that the Vivaraṇa-kāra worked with a different bhāṣya-text than the one available to us. Harimoto hints that a presentation such as Rukmani's is misleading, as it creates the impression of a coherent tradition, whereas in effect, the picture is vague and a closer investigation of manuscripts and early printed editions of Patañjali and his commentators still needs to be done. For example, there has not been any attempt so far of examining which readings of the Yogasūtra and the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya Vācaspatimiśra used for his commentary.[66]

In this respect, Kitāb Pātañjala, the Arabic rendering of the Yogasūtra by al-Bīrūnī (973-1050 AD) can also be mentioned. A close reading of his text reveals that the Persian scholar has not translated all of Patañjali's sūtra-s available to us today.[67] This leads Pines and Gelblum, his English translators, to the conclusion that

> on the face of it, it is likely that these [omitted] sūtra-s did not occur in the text available to al-Bīrūnī. This may mean that the text used by him belonged to a tradition of the sūtra-s that differed from those available to us.[68]

Their conclusion adds to the vague picture hinted at by Harimoto. I will come back to this vagueness in the introduction of my Yogasūtra translation below (Appendix I).

Bhojarāja (king Bhoja) or Bhojadeva lived in the eleventh century. Belonging to the Paramāra clan, he ruled over Mālavā region and its capital Dhārā (in the west of present-day Madhya Pradesh). Besides his duties as a king, he was interested in literature, medicine, architecture, poetry, phonetics, and yoga. Bhojarāja is the author of the Yogasūtra commentary titled Rājamārtāṇḍa-vṛtti ("Commentary of the Sun King" or the "Great King"), or simply Bhoja-vṛtti.

Vijñānabhikṣu, who lived in the sixteenth century in Bengal, is author of two Yogasūtra commentaries, or more precisely, of a commentary titled Yogavārttika and its summary, the Yogasārasaṃgraha. In Vijñānabhikṣu's time, the three schools of Vedānta, namely Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Dvaita flourished, as also the devotional Bhakti movement. He was a "theist" in the sense that he believed in the necessity of "divine grace" for the achievement of mokṣa or "freedom." Like his predecessor Vācaspatimiśra, Vijñānabhikṣu was a versatile scholar who also glossed Sāṃkhya and Vedānta texts. Unlike Vācaspatimiśra, he did not gloss Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya texts, belonging as they are to "atheistic" schools, which hardly leave any room to god, godhead, or divine authority.

Contemporary Yogasūtra scholars, commentators, and translators, whose work I draw on, include Swāmī Hariharānanda Āraṇya, Swami Vivekananda,[69] Surendranath Dasgupta, Mircea Eliade, I. K. Taimni, Georg Feuerstein, Ian Whicher, Christopher Chapple, T. S. Rukmani, B. K. S. Iyengar, Yohanan Grinshpon, Gerald Larson, Ram-Shankar Bhattacharya, Mikel Burley, Shyam Ranganathan, Edwin Bryant, and Swāmī Veda Bhāratī.

Āraṇya (1869–1947) is a contemporary traditional scholar of Sāṃkhya-yoga. In the following chapters I often emphasize the difference between Sāṃkhya and yoga, implying that Patañjali adds a psychological dimension which lacks in the Sāṃkhyan investigation. However, the intimacy between the two traditions, reflected in Patañjali's deep commitment to Sāṃkhyan terminology, is further embodied by Sāṃkhya-yogācārya-s such as Āraṇya. He wrote on Sāṃkhya-yoga in Bengali and Sanskrit. His most famous work in Bengali is the Kapilāśramīyapātañjalayogadarśana, a part of which has been translated into English by Paresh Nath Mukerji under the title *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali*, consisting of Bhāsvatī, Āraṇya's Yogasūtra commentary.

Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) translated the Yogasūtra into English with commentary in 1899. The famous ambassador of Hinduism to the West, an ambassador of his own accord, who in his talks and writings sketched the outlines of what is known today as Hinduism, is a translator with his own agendas. The notion of kaivalya, for instance, he translates as independence, referring not exactly to Patañjali's idea of an introverted metaphysical selfhood, but instead to freedom with social and political overtones, to the extent of including Indian independence from the British

rule (a dream and a political goal awaiting fulfillment in his own lifetime), within the scope of kaivalya. Like other great commentators in the history of Indian philosophy (I am thinking of Śaṅkara[70]), Vivekananda uses the source-text as a platform to develop and promote his own ideas. I believe that a commentary should be evaluated not necessarily by its loyalty to the source-text, but also, in fact primarily, by its creativity. Therefore, and despite its Advaitic strands (including a constant attempt of reconciling śruti or "the authority of the scriptures" and "experience"), and Christian cellophane packaging (including the extensive use of "imported" terms such as God, Religion etc.), I am interested in Vivekananda's work.

Dasgupta's books on yoga (*A Study of Patañjali*, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, and *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*) are classics, written in the 1920s. In his three books, Dasgupta provides a comprehensive database of Pātañjala-yoga, which I often work with. Dasgupta was a prolific writer, and is also known for his acclaimed *A History of Indian Philosophy* in five volumes (published by Cambridge University Press and later by Motilal Banarsidass).

Eliade's *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* is another modern classic. First published in English in 1958, it is a panoramic survey of yoga in India, from the Vedas onward, through texts such as the early Upaniṣad-s, the later Saṃnyāsa and Yoga Upaniṣad-s, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavadgītā, Buddhist yoga, and so on. In this encyclopedic volume, Dasgupta's famous student also touches on the Yogasūtra, highlighting notions such as siddhi (yogic powers) and samādhi (yogic meditation), and discussing Patañjali's notion of freedom. If a Rājasthani miniature painting is created layer upon layer, then the primal layers, which my work as a "philosophical miniature painting" is based on and inspired by, are early works such as Dasgupta's and Eliade's.

Taimni and Feuerstein are authors of two of the best Yogasūtra translations into English, at least in my eyes. Not always I share their reading, nor always do they read Patañjali in agreement with one another, but they both provide solid attempts at deciphering the Yogasūtra.

Ian Whicher is author of several analytic works on Pātañjala-yoga, including *The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana: A Reconsideration of Classical Yoga* (2000). Whicher, proficient in Patañjali and his Sanskrit commentators, is a master of the small details who has enlightened me on many issues. However I totally disagree with his interpretation of the larger picture, which surprisingly (considering the stature of his textual work) converts a manifesto of world-renunciation into a narrative of harmony and integration and even nonegotism and ecological awareness.

Christopher Chapple is another productive "yoga writer." In the preface of his latest publication, *Yoga and the Luminous* (2008), he elucidates that he "seeks to explore Yoga through the prism of practice, while keeping sight of its historical context and its philosophical contribution."[71] The present study, on the other hand, seeks to explore philosophical junctions

in the Yogasūtra. Here, philosophy is the primary theme, not a secondary aspect "to keep sight with." Like Whicher, Chapple reads the Yogasūtra as part of a larger agenda which takes into account ecologic and feminist concerns, and sees yoga as a tool which has the capacity of healing a world in conflict. Like Whicher, Chapple makes a heroic attempt at reconciling the irreconcilable, as he insists on reading "negative" notions such as nirodha and kaivalya, constitutive of Patañjali's narrative of "inwardness" isolated from "externality" of any kind, as not excluding the possibility of active engagement in the world. Again like Whicher, Chapple's work has enlightened me in many Yogasūtra crossings.

T. S. Rukmani not only translated into English the commentaries of the Vivaraṇa-kāra and Vijñānabhikṣu, but also wrote, as part of her translation work, a large number of articles focusing on different aspects of yoga philosophy (see bibliography). Her acquaintance with the Vivaraṇa-kāra and Vijñānabhikṣu is intimate as only a translator's can be. Her notes and cross-references are invaluable.

B. K. S. Iyengar is a famous yogācārya, teacher and innovator in the field of āsana and prāṇāyāma. I am interested in his book *Light on the Yogasūtra of Patañjali*, which provides English translation and commentary of the text, mostly since he is one of a few commentators who make a serious attempt at explaining the third, powers-chapter of the Yogasūtra, usually neglected, marginalized, and even suppressed.

Another commentator who does not ignore the third, "inconvenient" chapter of the Yogasūtra is Yohanan Grinshpon. In his book *Silence Unheard: Deathly Otherness in Patañjali-yoga* (2002), he forcefully argues against what he sees as the banalization of the Yogasūtra through its depiction in terms of integration and harmony. He attempts to "disintegrate" Pātañjala-yoga from the Sāṃkhya tradition. "Authentic yoga," he suggests, is to be found primarily in the "shamanistic" powers-chapter. The daring conclusion of Grinshpon's work is that Sāṃkhya notions such as puruṣa, prakṛti, and kaivalya (to be elucidated below) are not at all essential in the Yogasūtra, concealing as they are the "otherness" of yogic experience. I find Grinshpon's playful attempt to divide the Yogasūtra into two, separating the yogic sūtra-s from the Sāṃkhyan ones, fruitful as an illustration of the multivocality of Patañjali's text. A counter exercise would be to compare Sāṃkhya philosophy as expounded in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the basic Sāṃkhya text, and in the Yogasūtra. If Patañjali is indeed a Sāṃkhya philosopher imposing technical Sāṃkhya terms on "silent" yoga experience, as Grinshpon imagines, why not investigate his contribution to Sāṃkhya philosophy? G. J. Larson, who together with R. S. Bhattacharya edited and is a key writer in the volumes on Sāṃkhya and Yoga in Karl Potter's (general editor) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, in fact compares what he refers to as "Kārikā-Sāṃkhya" and "Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya."[72] On Larson I draw mainly with regard to Sāṃkhya philosophy, but I also consulted his Yogasūtra translation in the Yoga volume of Potter's Encyclopedia.

Mikel Burley's *Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga* (2007) is also dedicated to the interface between these two traditions. Burley highlights the continuity between Sāṃkhya and Yoga, thus taking the very opposite move compared with Grinshpon. I agree with Burley that the interlacement of Sāṃkhya and Yoga deserves a close reflection. My own contribution in this direction is to be found mostly in explanatory footnotes in the Yogasūtra translation presented here. Implied is the postulation that several sūtra-s can simply not be understood without tracing their Sāṃkhyan roots.

Shyam Ranganathan (2008) and Edwin F. Bryant (2009) provide new translations with commentary of the Yogasūtra. It is always refreshing to consult yet another reading of a text which you have been reading and thinking of for a long time. It should be noted though, that the present study does not belong to the same "genre" as Bryant's and Ranganathan's works. In the present case, the Yogasūtra translation accompanies a philosophical discussion, and does not stand at the center. Another Yogasūtra translator (and much more), whose work I consulted is Swāmī Veda Bhāratī.

My reading of Patañjali's Yogasūtra strongly benefited from the work of K. C. Bhattacharyya (KCB) (1875–1949). KCB's philosophical writings revolve around the notion of freedom. He thinks about freedom at the levels of knowledge (or reason), will, and feeling. Correspondingly, he focuses on Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya (freedom at the level of knowledge), on yoga philosophy and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (freedom at the level of will), and on rasa or the aesthetic feeling (freedom at the level of feeling). Analysis of all three levels together is found in KCB's acclaimed essay "The Subject as Freedom" (1930). On KCB's style of writing, George B. Burch comments that "all his works are short and concise." However "the brevity of his works does not imply that they can be read quickly. The principal difficulty in studying his philosophy is the austerity of his written style."[73] And his eldest son, Gopinath Bhattacharyya, editor of KCB's collected essays, writes that,

> When KCB spoke, his discourses were remarkable for their lucidity and thoroughness and he would develop his points without any reserve. But when he wrote, he became almost a different man. He seemed to lose his expansiveness, became reserved and instead of lucidity tried almost to be aphoristic in his expression. Far from developing a point he was content just to set down a cryptic thesis, leaving the bewildered reader to elucidate for himself as best as he could.[74]

This very depiction (aphoristic, cryptic, leaving the reader to elucidate for himself) can be equally applied, or so I believe, to Patañjali. Moreover, in his Yoga chapters, KCB in fact composes new sūtra-s upon Patañjali's old ones. Even though he is known as "the protagonist of Neo-Vedānta philosophy,"[75] and even if "classical German philosophy and Advaita Vedānta were the two forces that exercised a major influence on his intellectual development,"[76] the longest of KCB's writings is the lecture-series "Studies in Yoga Philosophy,"

unpublished during his lifetime, on which I draw in each of the following chapters. Gopinath Bhattacharyya further writes on his father's work that,

> Much of what KCB has said of Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga is not to be found in the extant original literature on these subjects. It is an extension or a development in new directions . . . it is the discovery of new potentialities.[77]

In other words, KCB does not write about Patañjali (Śaṅkara, Kant etc.), but with and from Patañjali. He is almost the only one who actually "does" yoga philosophy, and in this respect inspires the present study. Not enough has been written on KCB[78] and hardly anything on KCB's interpretation of Yoga and the differences between Sāṃkhya and Yoga. For KCB, freedom in Yoga is an act of will, or more precisely the will to nivṛtti, or the will not to will. His position is to be elucidated as we move on, especially apropos Daya Krishna's reading of Patañjali.

My reading of Pātañjala-yoga also benefited from the writings of Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950). This is not the place or the occasion to elaborate on Aurobindo's prolific work. Influenced by the Tantra tradition, he presents an altogether different position than Patañjali's with regard to the ideal relationship between puruṣa and prakṛti, one's inner, metaphysical selfhood and "all the rest," namely the world including one's own worldly dimension. Aurobindo is an exponent of unity and synthesis, contrary to Patañjali's sharp disintegration. For him, the sublime metaphysic experience has to be effective, influential, contributive, at the phenomenal, mundane level. Aurobindo's view resonates in Daya Krishna's critique of Patañjali's notion of freedom, which stands at the center of chapters 4 and 5.

4. A quick chapter by chapter synopsis

Chapter 1 is an attempt at a conceptual analysis of the process of yoga, working with the notions of abhyāsa and vairāgya, repetitive practice and dispassion, which according to Patañjali are the central pillars of his teaching.

Chapter 2 is dedicated to the psychological strands of Pātañjala-yoga. Here I work with the notions of avidyā and abhiniveśa. The former refers to the phenomenal gaze, which projects the "on the surface" picture of the world and oneself in the world. The latter denotes clinging to life or fear of death, namely one's firm grasp at the picture created by avidyā. Patañjali's investigation highlights the psychological "materials" which affect our gaze and determine the phenomenal domain.

Chapter 3 offers a close reading of Yogasūtra 1.49, focusing on the notion of prajñā, "yogic knowledge," which "replaces" the conventional modes of

knowledge as one crosses the boundaries of his phenomenal existence in the course of samādhi or yogic meditation. My analysis shows that prajñā is delineated by Patañjali and his commentators as a link, an intriguing link, between meditation and epistemology, experience and philosophy.

Chapter 4 is a saṃvād or dialogue with Daya Krishna on yoga philosophy. First, I introduce Daya Krishna's philosophical work and unique style of philosophizing, as a background and introduction to his yoga article which Chapter 5 consists of. Then I focus on his Yogasūtra reading. At the outset, Daya Krishna argues against Patañjali's disengagement-as-freedom stance, and offers an alternative in the form of freedom to "withdraw" but also to "return." He thus rejects the equation of samādhi and mokṣa. Moreover, he reads Patañjali opposite two other yoga texts, the Bhagavadgītā and the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, which enforce rather than suppress action and involvement in the world.

If Chapter 4 offers "translation" (within one and the same language) of Daya Krishna's work in general and his essay on Pātañjala-yoga in particular, then Chapter 5 is the "source text." Not just Chapter 4 but the whole book is, in a sense, a dialogue with Daya Krishna. Chapter 5 enables the reader to "hear" Daya Krishna's own voice and "feel" his unusual questioning tone.

5. Invisible cities

I opened with Italo Calvino's imagined dialogue between Kublai Khan and Marco Polo. For me, *Invisible Cities* is a narrative of translation. Polo is a "translator" who tells the emperor of his own kingdom, of remote regions, outer or inner, which the great Khan cannot reach even though he is their "ruler." In the quoted paragraph, Kublai wants to hear about Marco and about Venice as another name for the "inheritance" which he brings along to his translation work. Polo admits that Venice exists in every depiction of every city he has visited, and that his gaze is indeed determined by his "Venetian eyes." Moreover, he argues that "the other" can only be acknowledged as such in comparison with the familiar. The great Khan therefore demands that Venice be explicitly mentioned in every description/translation from now on. And here comes the twist: "Perhaps I am afraid of losing Venice all at once, if I speak of it," Polo ponders, "or perhaps, speaking of other cities, I have already lost it, little by little." In the process of translation, I hinted above, not just the text is transformed, but even the translator is of the capacity to be transformed. Marco loses Venice not to the devouring emperor who conquers everything, but to the other cities which little by little become a part of him, a growing part of the legacy that he takes along to the next journey. Speaking of comparative philosophy, Daya Krishna once suggested that the encounter with "the other" is a rare

opportunity to “free one’s conceptual imagination from the unconscious constraints of one’s own conceptual tradition.”[79] Hence to lose Venice as one travels to other cities is perhaps an instance of freedom. I cannot hope for anything more in the following chapters, as I attempt to depict, like Marco Polo in Calvino’s narrative, my own journeys to the “invisible cities” of the Yogasūtra.

And a final remark: Unless otherwise stated, all the translations are mine.

Notes

1 Calvino (1979), pp. 68–9.
2 Daya Krishna (2001c), p. 232.
3 Chakrabarti (2011).
4 Ibid., pp. 22–3.
5 See, for example, Bryant (2009, p. xli) who writes about Vācaspatimiśra: “As an aside, this eclectic scholasticism [namely, Vācaspatimiśra’s] contrasts with the experiential focus of yoga and makes one wonder whether Vācaspatimiśra was a practicing yogī.” As another “aside,” Bryant further speculates about Vijñānabhikṣu and yoga practice (ibid., p. xliii).
6 yo asyādhyakhṣaḥ parame vyoman, so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda (Nāsadīya Sūkta, Ṛgveda 10.129; translated by Raimundo Pannikar, http://home.comcast.net/~prasadmail/ nAsadeeyasUktam-s.pdf).
7 Lath (1981), p. 8.
8 Mukund Lath (personal communication).
9 In this respect the reader can refer to almost every book of Indian history. I will mention only two recent publications: Romila Thapar’s *The Aryan: Recasting Constructs* (2008), and chapters 4 and 5, “Between the ruins and the text” and “Humans, animals, and gods in the Ṛgveda,” of Wendy Doniger’s *The Hindus: An Alternative History* (2009).
10 Daya Krishna (2006c).
11 Ibid., p. 2; Daya Krishna refers to “dialogic sūkta-s,” such as Ṛgveda 10.95 and 10.10, which convey a dialogue between Purūravā and Urvaśī (the king and his wife) in the former case, Yama and Yamī (the twin brother and sister) in the latter. “Here,” he writes, “the distinction between the ṛṣi and the devatā breaks altogether, as each is the ṛṣi and the devatā successively.”
12 I am aware of the fact that brāhmaṇa as derived from √brū is based on what can be referred to as “folk etymology.” However it beautifully suits the narrative sketched by me here. Another, more substantial possibility would be to analyze the word brāhmaṇa as derived from the root √bṛh, denoting vastness. In such a case a brāhmaṇa (a Brahmin), would be etymologically related not to language but to vastness, that is, to the Brahman.
13 In terms of wandering, the muni/keśin is portrayed as “taking the wind-route, following the gods (deva-s)” (vātasyānu dhrājiṃ yanti yad devāso avikṣata), and as “wandering in the paths of the apsara-s (nymphs, wives of the gandharva-s), gandharva-s (celestial musicians) and beasts of prey” (apsarasāṃ gandharvāṇāṃ mṛgāṇāṃ caraṇe caran).

14 See Yogasūtra 3.40: Through mastery of the udāna (up-breath or speech-breath, the yogin is) not attached to water, mud, thorns, and so on, and (is capable of) levitation (utkrānti) [udāna-jayāj jala-paṅka-kaṇṭaka-ādiṣv asaṅga utkrāntiś ca].

15 Patañjali seems to depict "his own yogin" who follows "the path" (sādhana) to samādhi, as well as other types of yogin-s known to him, such as for instance the videha ("bodiless") and prakṛti-laya ("merged in prakṛti") yogin-s, mentioned in YS 1.19, who attain samādhi spontaneously, by birth (as also mentioned in YS 4.1), and not through sādhana.

16 In this respect, see Heesterman (1988) and Bronkhorst (1993 and 1998).

17 See, for example, Olivelle (1992), p. 29 and Olivelle (2003), p. 273.

18 See, for example, Olivelle (1992), pp. 30–3 and Doniger (2009), p. 165.

19 Olivelle (1992, pp. 39–42) writes of a new, post-Vedic world which demands new philosophical horizons, such as mokṣa in place of ritual activity.

20 Ibid., pp. 33–5.

21 Ibid., p. 103.

22 See Abhishiktananda (1975), pp. 26–7, for a more detailed comparison of the Indian "forest" and the Judeo-Christian "desert."

23 Among the yoga postures listed by Vyāsa, Patañjali's earliest and most authoritative commentator, in Yogasūtra-bhāṣya 2.46, one finds for example the heron, elephant, and camel postures (krauñca-niṣadana, hasti-niṣadana, and uṣṭra-niṣadana respectively). Patañjali himself mentions animals twice, however, in a very different context. In YS 3.25, he writes that "(through saṃyama or meditation) on powers, (the yogin acquires) powers such as that of an elephant etc." (baleṣu hasti-bala-ādīni). The context, here, is the powers (siddhi-s) that the yogin obtains through different types of meditation. Patañjali is hardly interested in the world, and the mention of an elephant is a rare acknowledgment of external world outside one's consciousness. In YS 3.32, Patañjali writes that "(through saṃyama) on the 'tortoise channel' (kūrma-nāḍī), steadiness is attained" (kūrma-nāḍyāṃ sthairyam). Here again he does not speak of animal imitation, but mentions a certain nāḍī ("energy channel") named after the tortoise, which can be used as object of meditation.

24 Chapple (2008, pp. 49–59) dedicates a whole chapter to "Imitation of Animals in the Yoga Tradition." His focus is the bodily, physical dimension of animal imitation. I would like to call attention to animal imitation as a pramāṇa, namely as alternative means of alternative knowledge.

25 Olivelle (1992), p. 109.

26 Rushdie (1999), p. 222.

27 Most scholars are not as generous as me when it comes to dating the Upaniṣad-s. It is commonly agreed that the Upaniṣad-s were composed until, at most, the fifteenth century, that is, until the composition of the Allopaniṣad (or Alla-Upaniṣad), seen by some as "contradiction in terms," hence as no longer belonging to the Upaniṣadic corpus.

28 It is difficult to ascertain the dates of classic Indian texts. Even categorizations such as "early" and "later" Upaniṣad-s are schematic. In this respect the reader can refer to Olivelle's discussion of the dates of the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad-s (Olivelle 1992, pp. 8–11) and the chronology of the "early Upaniṣad-s" (Olivelle 1998, pp. 12–13). In his former discussion, Olivelle writes: "The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads share with other ancient Indian texts a common problem: it is impossible to date them with any degree of precision or certainty." In his latter

discussion, he suggests that "any dating [of the 'early Upaniṣad-s'] that attempts a precision closer than a few centuries, is as stable as a house of cards."

29 Doniger and Kakar (2002), pp. 3–13.

30 Daya Krishna (1997), p. 36.

31 The Kāmasūtra does not "belong" to any darśana and no school identifies itself with it. However the text has certainly been commented upon. In this respect, Yaśodhara's approximately thirteenth century AD Jayamaṅgala commentary can be mentioned.

32 There is a dispute about a few verses. Sūtra 3.22 is considered as a part of the Yogasūtra by Bojarāja, but not by the other commentators. Consequently it is included in some contemporary editions and translations, omitted in others. If YS 3.22 is omitted, the next verse is numbered 3.22. Moreover, Bojarāja does not accept YS 4.16 as integral part of the Yogasūtra. "It may perhaps be part of the commentary [Vyāsa's bhāṣya] of the previous sūtra [4.15]," explains Āraṇya (1981, p. 377). Therefore YS 4.16 is included in most versions of the Yogasūtra, not in all of them. Another sūtra accepted by some, rejected by others is YS 3.20. In some manuscripts (as reflected in the YS text reproduced by Rāma Prasāda (2010, first published in 1912, pp. 219–20) and Bangali Baba (2010, p. 79), sūtra 3.20 is seen not as a part of the mūla-text, but of Vyāsa's bhāṣya. Therefore, the counting and numbering of the sūtra-s in Patañjali's text vary from one version to another.

33 J. H. Woods, in his classic Yogasūtra translation, refers to sādhana as "means of attainment" (1998, p. 103).

34 See Vyāsa's brief introduction to the second chapter of the Yogasūtra (Āraṇya 1981, p. 113).

35 The "external limbs" consist of yama (primary ethical guidelines), niyama (secondary ethical guidelines), āsana (yogic posture), prāṇāyāma (breath control), and pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the senses).

36 smṛti as meditation (a synonym of dhyāna) instead of the word in its usual denotation as memory—see YS 1.20.

37 Patañjali uses the terms antaraṅga and bahiraṅga in YS 3.7–8.

38 dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi—the three phases of yogic meditation. All three are referred to together in the third chapter of the Yogasūtra as saṃyama.

39 YS 1.22: mṛdu-madhya-adhimātratvāt tato 'pi viśeṣaḥ. Vijñānabhikṣu alludes to YS 1.22 in his commentary of sūtra 2.1 (Rukmani 1983, p. 2).

40 "iti śabdaḥ samāptyarthaḥ," he writes with regard to the word "iti" in YS 3.56 (Rukmani 2001, vol. 2, p. 124).

41 In this respect, Dasgupta (1996, p. 68) speaks of "the Yogasūtra proper (first three chapters)."

42 Yogasūtra 4.19–21.

43 See the Yogasūtra translation below for an explanation of the bi-textual rendition in YS 4.29.

44 T. S. Rukmani, for instance, translates YS 3.56 as follows: "When purity of the sattva intellect and of puruṣa become equal, 'kaivalya' is obtained" (Rukmani 1987, p. 210). She "translates" the particle "iti" as inverted commas.

45 YS 3.56 would then read: sattva-puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam (see, for example Bhojarāja's Rājamārtāṇḍa in Ballantyne and Deva 1980, p. 100 and Taimni 1993, p. 372).

46 The articulation is Tuvia Gelblum's (in Larson and Bhattacharya 2008, p. 261).

47 Ganeri (2008), p. 107.
48 Ibid., p. 110; the Śabdakalpadruma's definition of "bhāṣya" is based on Hemacandra.
49 Ibid., p. 107.
50 An exception is Bojarāja, who claims to be commenting directly on Patañjali's sūtra-s, not through the prism of Vyāsa's bhāṣya. However, explicates Gerald Larson, even "his commentary is dependent throughout on the Vyāsa Bhāṣya" (2008, p. 22).
51 Yohanan Grinshpon (1997) suggests that as far as the "new physics" emerging from Patañjali's Vibhūti-pāda is concerned, Vyāsa "do not deny its feasibility, but seems to raise an objection in terms of its desirability." He is therefore depicted by Grinshpon as a "conservative intellectual" who does not meet the challenge of the "revolutionary potential" of the Yogasūtra, and instead, contributes to the "banalization of Patañjali's message." However, Grinshpon's clear-cut distinction between Patañjali the "revolutionary" and Vyāsa the "conservative intellectual," which is the crux of his article, is not to be found in his own book on the Yogasūtra (2002). Here, even Patañjali is depicted as "a verbalizer, a philosopher," both foreign to—and fascinated by—the "otherness" of the "silent yogin," and imposing his philosophic ideas on this distanced figure. Grinshpon's contention is that any attempt at verbalizing the yogic experience (including Patañjali's own attempt), experience which echoes according to him merely in the siddhi-sūtra-s of the Vibhūti-pāda, is bound to result in familiarization and banalization of the "yogic otherness." Christopher Chapple (2008, pp. 219–35) invites his readers to join him in the challenging exercise of "reading Patañjali without Vyāsa" in four Yogasūtra passages. Through cross-references in Buddhist texts as well as in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-kārikā, he attempts not exactly to read "without Vyāsa," but "beyond Vyāsa," taking issue with the famous commentator about the passages under discussion. Chapple's exercise is yet another indication of the abovementioned gap often felt between Sūtra-kāra and Bhāṣya-kāra.
52 Maas (2006).
53 Maas (2009), p. 264.
54 Ibid., p. 267.
55 According to Maas (ibid. p. 264), J. Bronkhorst reaches the same conclusion about Patañjali and Vyāsa as the "common author" of the Yogadarśana, in his article "Patañjali and the Yoga-Sūtras," in *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985), pp. 191–212.
56 In Larson and Bhattacharya (2008), p. 262.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 239.
59 Rukmani (1998).
60 Harimoto (2004), p. 179.
61 Ibid., p. 180.
62 Maas (2010), p. 88.
63 Bryant (2009), p. xli.
64 A lot has been written on the authorship of the Vivaraṇa. Maas (2010, p. 88) mentions several of the scholars who have contributed to the discussion: Bronkhorst (1985), Hacker (1968–69), Halbfass (1991), Mayeda (1968–69), Nakamura (1980–81), Oberhammer (1977), Schmithausen (1968–69), Vetter

(1979), Wezler (1983) and Whaling (1977). Trevor Leggett, the Vivaraṇa translator (1990), who believes that the text is indeed a work of the famous Advaitin, should also be mentioned, as also Larson (2008, p.71), who suggests that the strongest arguments against the ascription of the Vivaraṇa to the Advaitin are that the latter never composed commentaries on commentaries, nor written anything outside the Advaita-Vedānta system.

65 Wezler (1983, p. 32), Harimoto (2004, p. 177), and Mass (2010, p. 88).

66 Harimoto (2004), p. 177.

67 According to Pines and Gelblum (1966, 1977, 1983, and 1989), in chapter 2 of the Yogasūtra, al-Bīrūnī does not translate sūtra-s 32, 41, 50, and 51; in chapter 3 he does not translate sūtra-s 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, and 33 (34 according to the numbering of the YS in transliteration below); and in chapter 4 he does not translate sūtra-s 18, 21, 23, 24, and 29. It would be an interesting exercise to check these sūtra-s, to see how each of the chapters and the Yogasūtra as a whole looks without them, to find out if they share a common theme or themes, which the Persian scholar was perhaps uncomfortable with as a Muslim. The question is whether they did not occur in the version al-Bīrūnī worked with or have been omitted by him on purpose. If they did not occur, it would be intriguing to think of the implications of this nonoccurrence both with regard to "his version," and to "our version" which does contain them.

68 Pines and Gelblum (1989), p. 265.

69 It is Vivekananda himself who writes his name without diacritical marks.

70 Śaṅkara—in his commentaries of the Brahmasūtra, Bhagavadgītā and several Upaniṣad-s, and regardless of the question of the authorship of the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa.

71 Chapple (2008), p. xi.

72 Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 18–29.

73 Burch (1976), p. 3.

74 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. xviii.

75 Burch (1976), p. 2.

76 At least according to Gopinath Bhattacharyya, in Bhattacharyya (2008), p. xviii.

77 Ibid., p. xix.

78 Rare exceptions are S. K. Maitra, G. R. Malkani, T. R. V. Murti, and Kalidas Bhattacharyya (1958) (eds), *Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume*, Amalner: Indian Institute of Philosophy; Kalidas Bhattacharyya (1975) *The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy*, Calcutta: Saraswat Library; Kurian T. Kadankavil (1972) *The Philosophy of the Absolute: A Critical Study of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's Writings*, Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications; and the special issue on KCB's philosophy of the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (Vol. X, no. 1, 1992, editor: Daya Krishna) with contributions by J. N. Mohanty, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Gerald Larson, Eliot Deutsch, and others.

79 Daya Krishna (1989a), p. 83.

1

Abhyāsa/vairāgya: a conceptual investigation into the process of yoga

I cannot think of a more contradictory statement to Descartes's "cogito ergo sum" than Patañjali's yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ. The former statement is from Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), the latter opens the Yogasūtra. If Descartes, in tune with Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal, perceives the cogito, the thinking faculty, reason, as the essence of the human person, then Patañjali posits the very opposite.[1] For him, the citta-vṛtti-s or movements of the mind are not merely an external layer of one's self and identity, but in fact an obstacle on the way to realizing one's svarūpa or "original essence."[2] Contrary to the implications of Descartes's famous statement, according to the Yogasūtra-kāra, the "I-am-ness" of the human person can only be revealed if the mental faculty is "switched off." Following his stunning contention, Patañjali offers a detailed citta-vṛtti or mental activity "map," consisting of pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā, and smṛti (valid knowledge, invalid knowledge, verbal construction, sleep, and memory). The interlacement between pramāṇa and viparyaya is intriguing. Both notions refer to phenomenal knowledge, valid and invalid respectively (and implied is reversibility between the two: what is considered as "valid knowledge" today may become "invalid" tomorrow and vice-versa). As both pramāṇa and viparyaya refer merely to the phenomenal realm, from a metaphysical point of view there is no essential difference between the two.

Another interesting feature of the scheme is the independent status of vikalpa (subordinated in parallel schemes to viparyaya), which indicates Patañjali's philosophical preoccupation with language as the anchor of phenomenal existence, and hence an acute obstacle to samādhi.[3] The Sūtra-kāra further touches on mental activity during sleep, and finally highlights memory as a vṛtti. Memory is the mechanism which creates the "phenomenal I." One is, phenomenally speaking, a conglomeration of memories, the continuum of which is the biography one identifies with. Nevertheless, paradoxically, memory cannot "remember" the essence, the svarūpa, that which Patañjali—following the Sāṃkhya tradition—refers to as puruṣa.[4] To "remember" puruṣa, or more precisely oneself as puruṣa, memory (in the conventional sense of the word) has to be suspended; suspension which may give rise to that which memory, that is, "phenomenal memory," cannot register. I find Patañjali's definition of smṛti or memory too narrow. According to him (in YS 1.11), "Memory is conservation (or nondestruction) of an object experienced in the past" (anubhūta-viṣaya-asaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ). Absent in his definition is imagination as a necessary ingredient of memory. Is memory just object-dependent, as implied by Patañjali? Or does one add colors and tastes to past experiences and "fill the gaps" of memory with and through one's imagination? Another missing feature in the vṛtti-scheme, apart from imagination, is emotions. Patañjali depicts the human consciousness as knowledge-oriented, thus ignoring or even suppressing the emotional realm. The question is of course why. Is it because he belongs to a cultural climate in which it is uncustomary to discuss emotions?[5] Or since he evaluates emotions as subordinated to and determined by the knowledge-centered vṛtti-s enumerated by him? Prima facie, emotions (consisting of the word motion, that is, vṛtti) seem to be a constitutive factor of the constant change, movement, restlessness of consciousness, which Patañjali seeks to resolve. The "medicine" prescribed by him for mental activity as a "disease" is twofold, consisting of abhyāsa and vairāgya, repetitive practice and dispassion. In the following paragraphs I will attempt to work with these two notions, which together form the structural framework of the process of yoga as explicated in the Yogasūtra.

1. Abhyāsa

Abhyāsa—literally: repetition, repetitive practice, exercise, discipline, use, habit, custom—is the constituting formula of phenomenal human existence. For Patañjali, this familiar notion is "the other," but however the counterpart of vairāgya, literally: dispassion, detachment. Following the Sūtra-kāra, I will start with abhyāsa, between the lines of which the far less familiar notion of withdrawal, referred to by the term vairāgya, is concealed. By unpacking the notion of abhyāsa, I hope to learn something of its "other," vairāgya, and of their simultaneity or inseparability in Patañjali's formulation.

Like the citta-vṛtti-s (mental activity), abhyāsa can be kliṣṭa or akliṣṭa: outgoing, object-centered, worldly, or quite the opposite, that is, ingoing, objectless, meditative. Patañjali focuses on the latter, namely on introversive abhyāsa. For him, abhyāsa is "the effort to achieve stability (of 'empty,' motionless mind)."[6] He further maintains that "it is firmly grounded if performed attentively and ceaselessly for a long period of time."[7] In Yogasūtra-bhāṣya 2.15, Vyāsa speaks of bhogābhyāsa or "phenomenal abhyāsa" as the (fatal from a yogic point of view) procedure which grounds the human person to the phenomenal realm through avidyā, which he defines as viṣaya-sukham or enjoyment of objects. What seems in the short, phenomenal run, to be "enjoyment," Vyāsa sees as a long, yoga run duḥkha or suffering. If phenomenal repetitiveness, with which the saṃsāra-web or one's worldly existence is weaved and reweaved, is referred to by Vyāsa as bhogābhyāsa (bhoga-abhyāsa); then its yogic parallel, repetitive as its phenomenal counterpart but directed inwardly instead of outwardly, can be pertained to as yogābhyāsa (yoga-abhyāsa). The point which I am trying to make is that as far as his abhyāsa, or the effort he puts into his practice is concerned, the yogin walks on familiar grounds. He is a "doer," devoted to his "doing" as much as any other doer, even if the purpose of his practice is to achieve absolute disengagement, that is, a state of worldless-ness. Through abhyāsa, the yogin endeavors to uproot inveterate patterns, by repeatedly practicing their opposite. His challenge is to "change direction," to introvert the outgoing movement of consciousness, to overcome the solid habit of turning to objects. The problem, which Patañjali seems to deal with, is that the human person is totally unacquainted with an objectless mode of existence. He thinks and lives in terms of objects or "things." The question is what it would be like if one ceases to objectify, if one puts the mechanism of objectification "on hold." De-objectification, in my reading, is Patañjali's prescription for the "duḥkha patient," and the challenge he sets up for the yogin. A first step would be to practice "the opposite" of objectification. An instance of Patañjali's "cultivating the opposite" method, which for me is the core of yogābhyāsa is found in YS 2.33:

> To stop thoughts which contradict the yama-s, one should cultivate their opposite.[8]

The immediate context of the sūtra is Patañjali's discussion of the yama-s or essential ethical principles, from ahiṃsā (nonviolence) to aparigraha (nonpossessiveness). When a thought contradicting any of these ethical principles arises, Patañjali suggests, the yogin should cultivate its opposite. Interestingly, cultivating the opposite of a thought such as "I want to kill him" (Patañjali implies in YS 2.34 and Vyāsa elucidates in his bhāṣya) does not mean to produce a counter-thought in the form of "I do not want to kill him" or "I want to befriend him." Instead, "the opposite" would be to reflect upon the consequences of the initial contrary-to-an-ethical-principle

thought. Patañjali, in my reading, sketches a narrative of a "struggle" between two forces, that of a "harmful thought" (as a paradigm not just of unethical thoughts but of every kliṣṭa-vṛtti or outgoing movement of consciousness), and its antidotal reflection cultivated by the yogin to "confront" the former thought as it arises. In brackets I would like to call attention to Patañjali's typical accurate, almost "scientific" articulation. He aspires to cover the whole sphere of vitarka or "contrary thoughts," referring as he is to such thoughts "whether executed, planned to be executed or even approved, whether driven by greed, anger or delusion, whether mild, moderate or intense."[9] Apropos the "struggle" between "contrary thinking" and yogic "contra-contrary-thinking," Vyāsa compares (in YSb 2.33) the human tendency of reproducing "contrary thoughts" even after reflecting upon their painful implications, to a dog's impulse to lick his own vomit.[10] It is a potent simile, as it features the human obsession with "externality," and the inclination to always return to the familiar, "disgusting" or affected with duḥkha as it may be.

At this point, I am reminded of Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950), a contemporary guru, or for our sake, yogin, who in one of his numerous question-answer sessions attempts to clarify the notion of abhyāsa, or more precisely yogābhyāsa. According to him,

> The passage from pravṛtti to nivṛtti [from object-centered to objectless consciousness] is possible through abhyāsa and vairāgya. It works, but takes time.

Using the yogic notions of abhyāsa and vairagya, the renowned Advaitin, famous for his sādhana-less teaching, seems to encourage his present interlocutor to embark on the yoga-sādhana ("it works"), underscoring the effort and duration which are part of yoga as a process ("it takes time"). Effort and duration as ingredients of abhyāsa are implied in YS 1.13–14 quoted above. Maharshi further articulates that,

> The mind so used to turn outwards cannot be introverted so easily. It is difficult to restrict a cow used to feed on grass in open meadows to its own cowshed. Even if the owner seduces the cow with delicious grass and fabulous fodder, she will first refuse, then eat a little, but her tendency to look for food elsewhere will not be easily uprooted. If the owner repeatedly seduces the cow, she will slowly become habitual to the cowshed. Thereafter, even when unleashed, she will no longer wander. So is the case with the human mind.[11]

The "owner of the cow," if I may read Ramana Maharshi through a Yogasūtra prism, is puruṣa. Patañjali himself refers to puruṣa as the "owner" (svāmin in YS 2.23, prabhu in YS 4.18) of prakṛti (in the first instance), and more precisely, of the citta-vṛtti-s (in the second). However puruṣa is inactive by

definition.[12] Therefore, he cannot "seduce the cow" or introvert the mind. The mind itself, through its own effort, needs to become free of any external, objective content, in order to "isolate" puruṣa, that is, to facilitate "his" kaivalya. What would motivate a cow to stay in the cowshed if her owner is absolutely passive? The answer is that something in the superficiality of the phenomenal existence is supposed to hint at the possibility of transcending it. This superficiality resonates in the notion of duḥkha, which indicates more than suffering, referring in fact to the multifaceted phenomenal human existence, consisting of the biological dimension (including illness, death, and temporality), as well as the mental, psychological, social, cultural, and every other "external" human dimension. Indeed, the mental and psychological dimensions usually regarded as "inner," are considered in Patañjali's formulation as sthūla or external, compared with the "innermost" or sūkṣma-most puruṣa. If duḥkha is identified as such, that is as a "dance" (I draw on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's simile in Sāṃkhyakārikā 59)[13] which repeats itself again and again, birth after birth, limited, monotonous, incapable of touching "the essence"; then the mind—rooted as it is in duḥkha—can, or even should develop the tendency of disintegration. This tendency will motivate the mind to "tame" itself (through repetitive practice of internalization) to de-objectify, to stop wandering, to abstain from licking its own "vomit" again and again.

In Yogasūtra-bhāṣya 1.14, Vyāsa suggests that if performed attentively (sat-kāra), abhyāsa has the capacity of not being interrupted by vyutthāna-saṃskāra-s, that is by inbuilt "karmic impressions," which activate the consciousness in external, object-centered mode. The phrase sat-kāra, he further explains, refers to abhyāsa performed through tapas, brahmacarya, vidyā, and śraddhā ("heating practices," celibacy, knowledge, and certainty that citta-vṛtti-nirodha is attainable). Of these four components, tapas, brahmacarya, and śraddhā are mentioned by Patañjali;[14] the notion of vidyā (knowledge) does not occur in the Yogasūtra. Is it the opposite or antidote of avidyā,[15] which for Patañjali (like other mokṣa-thinkers) is the foremost obstacle on the path to samādhi? Vijñānabhikṣu, in accordance with YS 1.20, mentions śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā (certainty, strength, mindfulness,[16] [saṃprajñāta-] samādhi, and yogic insight) as the preconditions of sat-kāra or attentive practice. The Vivaraṇa-kāra suggests that "abhyāsa is the practice of yoga-means such as yama, niyama etc."[17] All of them highlight the practical, active (in a yogic, meditative sense), concrete character of abhyāsa.

By mentioning vyutthāna-saṃskāra-s, Vyāsa refers to Yogasūtra 3.9:

> When vyutthāna-saṃskāra-s (activating the consciousness in external, object-centered mode) are overpowered, and nirodha-saṃskāra-s (enabling consciousness to turn inwardly) emerge, this is nirodha-pariṇāma (nirodha-transformation), characterized by (increasing) moments of cessation (or "no-mind").[18]

In the present sūtra, Patañjali relocates the notion of nirodha (secession). If in YS 1.2 it applies to the citta-vṛtti-s (to mental activity), then here it is extended to the sub-vṛtti saṃskāra level, that is to the psychological substratum underlying the mental terrain. It is implied that in the meditative state of nirodha-pariṇāma, vyutthāna-saṃskāra-s are overpowered (abhibhava). This overpowering enables "the other saṃskāra-s," namely nirodha-saṃskāra-s, to emerge. Again it is the narrative of a "struggle" between externality and internality at the consciousness level, depicted here from the saṃskāra angle. The task of the yogin is to "weed" the "seeds of externality" and nourish their counter "internality seeds." Following Vyāsa's hint in YSb 1.14, I would like to read the "inner yogic work" at the saṃskāra-level as abhyāsa, even if none of the commentators uses the term explicitly. However, Vijñānabhikṣu suggests that the overpowering and nourishment of vyutthāna and nirodha saṃskāra-s respectively take place gradually (krameṇa), a predicate which resonates the processual character of abhyāsa as depicted by Patañjali.

2. Vairāgya

Having discussed the notion of abhyāsa, or more precisely "cultivating the opposite" method as the heart of yogābhyāsa, I would like to move on to the notion of vairāgya. Patañjali defines vairāgya in two phases. First he writes that,

> Vairāgya is thirstlessness toward objects seen and heard, which is a sign of control (vaśīkāra-saṃjñā).[19]

Then he adds that,

> Ultimate vairāgya is thirstlessness toward the guṇa-s, arising from the vision of puruṣa (puruṣa-khyāti).[20]

In the definition of "lower vairāgya" (apara-vairāgya),[21] the term saṃjñā (translated by me as sign) can also be understood as consciousness, understanding, even knowledge. If such is the case, then the sūtra is to be read as suggesting that "vairāgya is thirstlessness toward objects seen and heard, arising from consciousness of vaśīkāra," namely consciousness of one's control over one's inclination to objects. In this respect, the commentators, all of whom read saṃjñā as consciousness, differentiate between worldly (or grasped by the senses) and other-worldly objects. In the latter category, Vyāsa mentions svarga ("heaven") as well as yogic states such as "bodilessness" (videha) and "merging into prakṛti" (prakṛti-laya).[22] For the commentators, then, vairāgya is not just vaśīkāra, or control of one's thirst for objects, but consciousness of controlling this thirst. K. C. Bhattacharyya (KCB) translates

the notion of vaśīkāra as "free conquest of desire," thus reaching the same conclusion, namely that "vairāgya is not mere desirelessness."[23]

In YSb 1.15 Vyāsa explains that "lower vairāgya," namely vaśīkāra-saṃjñā, is anābhogātmika (of the nature of absence of experience)[24] and heyopādeya-śūnyā (free of the attitude of abandoning or obtaining). Vācaspatimiśra explains that the phrase anābhogātmika refers to absence of experience even when in contact with objects.[25] For him, vairāgya is inner-detachment unaffected by the contact of sense organs with external objects. His gloss brings the notion of pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the senses) into the picture. Pratyāhāra is the fifth of Patañjali's famous aṣṭānga (eight-limb) yoga scheme. It is the gateway to dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi, the meditative yoga limbs, depicted by Patañjali as "more internal than the preceding ones."[26] In YS 2.54 pratyāhāra is defined as "a state in which the sense organs as if follow the 'original essence' of the mind by disconnecting themselves from their objects."[27] And Patañjali further maintains (in YS 2.55) that "(pratyāhāra) results in absolute control over the senses."[28] Interestingly, the Sūtra-kāra suggests that in pratyāhāra the indriya-s or sense organs "as if follow" (anukāra iva) the "original," silent, objectless, introvert nature of the mind. Why "as if"? My impression is that here, as elsewhere,[29] Patañjali reminds the reader that he speaks (for pedagogic reasons) of meditative states which language can only sketch vaguely, not accurately formulate. This unavoidable vagueness is reflected by the word iva (as if). The notions of pratyāhāra and vairāgya are co-related. The former refers to disengagement at the level of the senses, the latter at the level of the mind (or the "inner sense"). The question is which comes first, disengagement at the level of the senses or the mind? Vyāsa, like Patañjali, suggests that the senses follow the mind. In other words, according to him, it is "inner" disengagement which precedes its "external" counterpart. To drive the point home, he picturesquely maintains that just as the bees follow the king-bee[30] when he flies and rest when he rests, so the senses follow the mind and disengage when the mind "stops."[31] A counter-perspective would be that as long as there is sensory input, the mind cannot find rest and quiescence. Therefore, detachment at the level of the senses must precede vairāgya or disengagement at the mind-level.

The Vivaraṇa-kāra, in his gloss of YS 1.15, resembles consciousness in a state of vairāgya to a transparent crystal (sphaṭika) no longer "colored" by the objects around it.[32] His crystal metaphor is in tune with Patañjali's own depiction of yoga as a process of purification.[33] The commentators further explain that vairāgya or dispassion is the outcome of a yogic gaze, which cuts through appearances, reveals the doṣa-s (impurities, defects), and diminishes attraction (rāga) to objects.[34] KCB therefore suggests that if abhyāsa is "positive exercise of freedom," then vairāgya is "negative annulment of unfreedom."[35]

With regard to Patañjali's definition of para-vairāgya (YS 1.16), Vyāsa writes that "ultimate dispassion" is attained not through the revelation of

the doṣa-s of an object, but rather puruṣa-darśanābhyāsāt, that is, through repetitive effort (abhyāsa) to "see" puruṣa, or oneself as puruṣa. In "lower vairāgya," detachment is the logical conclusion of the superficiality of the phenomenal, objective realm. It is, therefore, as KCB suggested, "negative" in essence. "Ultimate vairāgya," on the other hand, is "positive" in the sense that—if I may return to Isaiah Berlin's articulation—it is "freedom to" (puruṣa), rather than "freedom from" (the doṣa-s). Moreover, para-vairāgya is deeper than "lower vairāgya" in the sense that dispassion, at this stage, is not just toward objects, but toward the guṇa-s or the "inner strings" by which every object is pulled. In this respect the Vivaraṇa-kāra reads the guṇa-s as the "causes" (kāraṇa) of the object. Vyāsa further refers to "ultimate dispassion" as jñāna-prasāda-mātram, "clear objectless knowledge." Vācaspatimiśra reads prasāda as sattvic consciousness devoid of rajas and tamas, which enables the yogin to discriminate between the guṇa-s (as the core of prakṛti) and puruṣa.[36] The next level, he writes, would be vairāgya even toward knowledge itself, dispassion which is the essence of dharma-megha-samādhi, the final meditative stage before kaivalya.[37] Vācaspatimiśra's contention echoes Patañjali's own statement in YS 3.51, where he writes that "vairāgya (dispassion) even toward this (toward viveka-khyāti or yogic discernment, explains Vijñānabhikṣu), with the destruction of the doṣa (impurity) seeds, results in kaivalya."[38] KCB clarifies the difference between the two vairāgya types, "lower" and "ultimate," as he writes that,

> (para-vairāgya is) detachment not only from the object of the mind, but also from the mind itself as object, from the mind even in its final actual state of viveka [. . .] There is no knowledge except through vṛtti, and freedom though achieved through knowledge, is freedom from knowledge itself; freedom as the super-conscious activity of the mind to stand like the self, to be and not to know.[39]

For KCB, Pātañjala-yoga is not on a par with the Sāṃkhya and Advaita-Vedānta traditions, which portray freedom (kaivalya and mokṣa respectively) as interwoven in a certain knowledge or understanding. According to Patañjali, viveka-khyāti (yogic discernment between prakṛti and puruṣa) is not the final step of the yogic process. In KCB's formulation, freedom demands an "act of will," which supersedes knowledge. "Ultimate vairāgya" is detachment even toward viveka-khyāti. It is abandonment of the (Buddhist) raft or the (Wittgenstenian) ladder which the yogin used to reach this position of sheer abandonment, this position of counter-Cartesian vṛtti-less "I am-ness."

3. Abhyāsa and vairāgya

Abhyāsa is engagement, even if engagement in the repetitive attempt to disengage one's mundane existence. Vairāgya is dispassion or disengagement,

even of one's own achievements and insights, collected in the course of the yogic process. The two notions signify opposite consciousness directions: holding onto- vs. abandonment. In the following lines, I will focus on their togetherness and simultaneity in Patañjali's formulation.

In his bhāṣya of YS 1.12, Vyāsa depicts the human consciousness as a river which flows in two directions, toward the good (kalyāṇa) and the bad (pāpa). The former he refers to as the direction of viveka (discernment) and kaivalya; the latter, as the direction of aviveka (nondiscernment) and saṃsāra ("the whirlpool of existence," Woods beautifully translates[40]). The saṃsāric flow toward objects, Vyāsa explains, is dammed by vairāgya, and the yogic flow toward viveka has its floodgate opened by abhyāsa or repetitive practice of "discerning gaze" (viveka-darśana). Hence for Vyāsa, vairāgya and abhyāsa are "negative" and "positive" aspects of one and the same endeavor, as intimated by KCB above.

Vācaspatimiśra (in TV 1.12)[41] maintains that nirodha (cessation of mental activity) depends on the samuccaya, the association, even simultaneity, of abhyāsa and vairāgya. The emphasis on the togetherness of the two is repeated by Vijñānabhikṣu,[42] who in this respect refers his readers to the Bhagavadgītā, yet another yoga text in which the two notions are introduced together.

In BG 6.35 Kṛṣṇa argues that,

> The mind is undoubtedly hard to control and restless, but it can be controlled by abhyāsa and vairāgya.[43]

The author of the Bhagavadgītā does not elaborate on the "how" of the conjunction of these two consciousness modes, but just like in the Yogasūtra, they are prescribed together, as a "pair." Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya explains that abhyāsa is constant repetition of an idea (pratyaya) with regard to a certain object of thought.[44] His elucidation coincides with Patañjali's commentators and Ramana Maharshi who depict yogābhyāsa as "taming" of the mind. The constantly repeated "idea" can be in the form of reflection upon the fatal consequences of a contrary-to-yama thought, as we have seen above. Vairāgya is depicted by Śaṅkara, in his gloss of BG 6.35, as thirstlessness (vaitṛṣṇya) toward enjoyment (bhoga) of desirable objects, seen or unseen, which is a result of repetitive practice of seeing their faults (doṣa-darśanābhyāsāt).[45] His analysis is very much in tune with Patañjali's commentators. First, he suggests that vairāgya refers to the constant practice of "seeing" the doṣa-s, instead of merely the object's on-the-surface attractive appearance. He thus depicts vairāgya in terms of abhyāsa, and in this respect binds the two together. Moreover, he portrays vairāgya as discerning gaze, which reveals more than the conventional eye. Second, he delineates vairāgya as signifying the termination of the human pattern of involvement in the world through so-called pleasant experiences. "So-called," as they deepen the involvement in the phenomenal realm intermixed with duḥkha. Here

Śaṅkara is in agreement with Vyāsa in his bhāṣya on YS 2.15, in which he depicts avidyā, the "phenomenal eye" which roots the human person in saṃsāra, as based on enjoyment of objects (viṣaya-sukham). Vairāgya, then, can be seen as counteracting avidyā.

With regard to the samuccaya or mutuality of abhyāsa and vairāgya, and in light of our discussion of abhyāsa above, I would like to suggest the following: Yogābhyāsa counteracts, neutralizes, or "undoes" (Patañjali uses the word pratibandhin)[46] the working of bhogābhyāsa. I see these two "opposite" modes of abhyāsa as physical forces which annul one another. When this mutual annulment takes place, when yogābhyāsa "unstitches" bhogābhyāsa, vairāgya comes into being. To elucidate and moreover, to justify my hypothesis of vairāgya as conveying a sense of transcendence, I would like to examine yet another instance, or what I see as another instance, of the abhyāsa-vairāgya interplay, which occurs later in the Yogasūtra and which further illustrates the togetherness of the two notions.

In the third and fourth chapters of Patañjali's text, the abhyāsa/vairāgya dialectic resonates, or so I want to suggest, in another pair of notions, namely krama and kṣaṇa, sequence and moment. Krama and kṣaṇa, in my reading, are abhyāsa and vairāgya rearticulated in terms of time. Abhyāsa is a process. "It takes time," Ramana Maharshi rightly observes, and in YS 1.14 Patañjali speaks of a "long period of time" (dīrgha-kāla). In this respect it can be safely argued that abhyāsa is kramic or sequential. Vairāgya, on the other hand, is kṣaṇic in essence, as it transcends the kramic structure of abhyāsa. I will touch on this measure of transcendence inherent in vairāgya, through the notion of kṣaṇa.

In YS 3.9–10, the yogin is portrayed as a "collector" of "silent moments" (nirodha-kṣaṇa-s), attempting to gradually minimize the "gaps" between them in order to achieve consistent, uninterrupted silent flow (praśānta-vāhitā) of consciousnesses.[47] In YS 3.53 Patañjali further writes that through meditation (saṃyama) on kṣaṇa and krama, moment and sequence, knowledge-born-of-discernment (viveka-jaṃ jñānam) is accomplished, depicted by him (in YS 3.55) as nonsequential (akrama), all-encompassing (sarva-viṣaya), eternal (sarvathā-viṣaya) and liberative (tāraka).[48]

In his gloss of sūtra 3.53, Vyāsa argues that,

> sa khalvayam kālo vastu-śūnyo buddhi-nirmāṇaḥ śabda-jñāna–anupātī

Or, "time (kāla) is a substance-less (vastu-śūnya) mental-construction (buddhi-nirmāṇa), based merely on verbal proficiency (śabda-jñāna-anupātī). Interestingly, the bhāṣya-kāra employs Patañjali's exact words in YS 1.9, a verse dedicated not to time but to vikalpa or verbal construction. In YS 1.9, Patañjali writes that,

> śabda-jñāna-anupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ

Or, "verbal construction (vikalpa) is substance-less (or reference-less), and based merely on verbal proficiency."

The immediate connection between time and verbal construction is that time, according to Vyāsa, is in fact substance-less or "unreal," but however "exists" in language, or maintained as "real" through language. Muhūrta,[49] day, night, and so on, he explains, are nothing but vikalpa. He continues to suggest that "the present is a single moment; earlier and later moments do not exist" (tasmād varttamāna evaikaḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottara-kṣaṇāḥ santīti).[50] His gloss is in tune with Patañjali's assertion in YS 4.12, that "past and future exist (in the present) in their special form ('stored' in 'karmic memory')."[51] Vyāsa further argues that two moments (kṣaṇa-s) cannot coexist. It is to say that only a single moment, or more precisely the present moment, exists. Time as a universal, consisting of past, present, and future, is nothing more than vikalpa, "lingual occurrence." The yogin differs from the worldly (laukika) person in his capacity to see "time" as made of different components, real and unreal. He is not taken by the familiarity of the sequence (krama), and is capable of ascertaining the kṣaṇa, the atomic moment, the "now," in the kramic façade.

The Vivaraṇa-kāra, in his commentary of YS 3.53, underscores the absolute difference in the way time is perceived by a yogin who has reached one-pointedness and is absorbed in sattva (ekāgra-bhūmi-pratiṣṭha-citta-sattvaḥ) and by a vyutthita-cittasya, a person with a chattering, scattered mind. Even if he still takes part in the (false, worldly) "experience of time" (kāla-anubhava), a one-pointed yogin "knows" that there is no essential difference between the single moment and a thousand yuga-s (cosmic ages).[52] The sameness (tulyatā) of the two is based on the fact that every measurement of time, short or long, is constructed upon the present moment which alone is real. The Vivaraṇa-kāra continues to speculate that in a dream, one can cross a thousand miles within a few minutes, whereas in reality it would take a whole year. His conclusion is that "the conglomeration known as time is indeed a strange[53] mental-construct" (tasmād-buddhi-vaicitrya-nirmita eva kāla-samāhāraḥ). Time is a conglomeration (samāhāra) created in language (through sentences such as "he sleeps till the time of milking the cow," the author of the Vivaraṇa exemplifies).[54] Strangely, one lives in language, primarily in language. Salman Rushdie, in his *The Ground beneath Her Feet*, coins a delightful acronym to signify the language spoken in Bombay-now-Mumbai: Hug-Me.[55] It stands for Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Marathi, and English as the languages which "Bombay bhāṣā" is the intermixture of. If I may take Rushdie's Hug-Me away from its immediate context, apropos the Vivaraṇa-kāra's observations about time, then it seems that the hug of language, every language, perhaps like every hug, creates a "dreamy" experience in which "reality" is forgotten. For the yogin, even the wakeful experience of time ("He studies till the time the rice is cooked," the author of the Vivaraṇa further exemplifies) is "dreamy" and unnecessarily expansive, compared with the "minimal" time instant referred to by Patañjali and his commentators as kṣaṇa.

Vijñānabhikṣu takes YS 3.53 as an occasion to discuss the notion of time in Pātañjala-yoga opposite time as perceived by the Vaiśeṣika-s and the Buddhists. The yogic stance of time as kṣaṇa (moment) stands in sheer contrast with the position of the Vaiśeṣika school of thought. Anindita Balslev explains that,

> The Vaiśeṣika school is committed to the view of time as unitary, objective and absolute. To the Vaiśeṣika philosophers the use of instant, like any other pluralistic employment of "time" presupposes the universal substratum of the time-substance (kāla-dravya), which is a metaphysical reality. The universal, unitary time is an independent, absolute existent, whereas the instant is a relative, pragmatic conception dependent upon its relation to an event.[56]

In Pātañjala-yoga, as we have seen, it is exactly the opposite. For the yogin, kṣaṇa alone is real and time as continuum, or as a substance in the Vaiśeṣika sense, is vastu-śūnya or unreal. On the other hand, the Yogic position seems to be, at least prima facie, on a par with Buddhist viewpoint, as both amplify the present moment and reject the reality of past and future. Even the yogic interpretation of sequence (krama) as mental construction is on similar grounds with the Buddhist understanding. However, as Balslev points out,

> The common denial of the ubiquitous time as a unitary, objective reality does not lead to a common understanding in their [the yogic and Buddhist] conception of becoming and being. The distinctness of the two views is clear and pronounced . . . In the Buddhist formulation, being and time coalesce with one another. The conception of time as instant at once implies the notion of being as instantaneous. Even more, the instance and the instantaneous form an inseparable unity . . . In Yoga thinking time as instant does not imply being as instantaneous . . . [Here] the substance is conceived as enduring, as persisting through changes . . . the system remains true to the ātmavāda tradition, conceiving of the self as timeless.[57]

Vijñānabhikṣu's debate with the Buddhists in his commentary of YSb 3.53, which highlights the yogic stand with regard to substance as enduring through changes, corresponds with Patañjali's own statement in YS 3.14:

> A dharmin is "he" whom a series of past, present and future (śānta-udita-avyapadeśya) dharma-s belong to.[58]

The dharmin (or "form-bearer") remains unchanged amid the constant changing dharma-s (or "forms").[59] However, the dharmin in the present sūtra is not puruṣa, the selfhood or essence which stands at the center of the yogic process as self-enquiry. The dharmin is rather that which is referred to in the Sāṃkhyan formulation, adopted by Patañjali (at least to a certain

extent or at certain junctions of his text), as aliṅga ("the unmanifest"), that is, the most subtle layer of prakṛti, consisting of primeval matter. According to the Sāṃkhyan narrative, everything in the world is in constant change (pariṇāma), as explained by Patañjali in the previous sūtra (YS 3.13). What is seen by the conventional eye as a solid, unchanging object is in fact a "still photo" of a dynamic change-process, or as the Vivaraṇa-kāra puts it, in every cognition of an object, one projects on the presently cognized object characteristics which belong to the past.[60] The raw material which takes different forms, which assumes different qualities, is none other than prakṛti itself. Hence it is not just puruṣa that the yogin-s and the Buddhists are disputed about, but in effect puruṣa-prakṛti,[61] as a general name for the essentialist approach affirmed in Pātañjala-yoga, rejected by the Buddhists.

The theoretic discussion of time, of moment and sequence, turns in Vijñānabhikṣu's formulation into a discussion of the changing and the unchangeable, becoming and being as Balslev puts it. Krama or sequence is another name for that which is constantly changing. The notion of kṣaṇa refers both to the atomic units which the kramic chain is made of, and to an Archimedean point beyond time as becoming. The timelessness which the yogin strives for is to be found in the kṣaṇa, not in krama. Sequence is time, and time is vastu-śūnya, unsubstantiated. If according to YS 3.9–10 the yogin "collects" silent, "nirodha moments," then it should be noted that together they do not form a sequence. The term krama refers merely to a series of worldly, "vyutthāna moments." In the course of meditation, the yogin withdraws into a "silent moment," gradually transforming it to a "continuous moment," beginning-less and endless, unaffected by change. It is no longer a moment among moments, but an enduring, nonsequential (akrama) moment. This existential reading of the moment-sequence dynamics becomes transparent in YS 4.33. Just an instant before the final definition of kaivalya in YS 4.34, the closing verse of the Yogasūtra, Patañjali returns to the kṣaṇa/krama interplay and writes:

> Krama (sequence) is "the other" of kṣaṇa (moment), and is ascertained at the moment of the termination of change (pariṇāma-apara-anta).[62]

Krama is the pratiyogin or "the other" of kṣaṇa in the sense that the latter is real, the former is mere vikalpa. YS 4.33 can be read simultaneously as a part of Patañjali's discussion of time, and as an existential, even metaphysical statement anticipating the kaivalya-sūtra which comes next. KCB elucidates that as the final segment of his discussion of time, Patañjali expounds that,

> The sequence is not an objective fact but is only a thinking (speaking) construction (vikalpa), a thought-content constructed "at the moment of the termination of change," i.e. retrospectively.[63]

The point is that krama is a retrospective construct, a rearward observation, "a symbolism for the intelligible order within a change."[64] Metaphysically speaking, as the yogin approaches the peak of his "yoga ascent," having arrived at the last moment of his phenomenal existence as succession of pariṇāma-s, he is finally in the position to "look back" and "bid farewell" to the phenomenal sequence, or in fact to sequence as such, as he melts into the infinite singularity of kṣaṇa.

According to Vyāsa, in his bhāṣya of YS 1.16 which defines para-vairāgya, "ultimate vairāgya," a yogin who has reached this high stage of dispassion, realizes that for him, the continuous chain (saṃkrama) of births and deaths is cut asunder. Therefore the bhāṣya-kāra affirms that "kaivalya is directly related to ultimate vairāgya."[65] I would like to suggest that vairāgya, like the final retrospection as the yogin reaches the gate of kaivalya, is an uninvolved "free" gaze which grasps "the whole picture," which "sees" the whole of krama. Like kṣaṇa in relation to krama, vairāgya hides "between the lines" of yogābhyāsa. The very search for "something" underneath or beyond the on-the-surface comfort-zone, and every step along "the path," every stroke against the "phenomenal stream," is based on an inbuilt vairāgya tendency. Like kṣaṇa in the kṣaṇa–krama interplay, vairāgya as "transcendence" goes beyond its own interplay with abhyāsa. It is vairāgya or dispassion even toward the yogic procedure based on abhyāsa and vairāgya. It is vairāgya born of the realization that, as Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts it in his Sāṃkhyakārikā,

> No one is bound, no one released. Likewise, no one transmigrates. Only prakṛti, in its various forms, transmigrates, is bound and is released.[66]

The entire yogic process (like the Sāṃkhyan enquiry) takes place merely in prakṛti. Vairāgya as an act of transcendence is the rejection even of the yogic process as not "belonging" to me as puruṣa, who is neither bound or released, nor transmigrates in the kramic cycle of births and deaths.

Notes

1 Descartes and Patañjali—On the one hand, the two reach a totally different conclusion as intimated here. The former highlights the thinking faculty, whereas the latter sees it as a veil obstructing one's I-am-ness. On the other hand, they share a common intuition: both aim inward in search for an "inner self." Descartes is satisfied with the cogito as the most essential layer of one's existence; Patañjali heads toward what he sees as an even deeper layer of being, which he refers to as puruṣa, as the following paragraphs will illustrate. On the similarities and difference between Descartes and Yoga, see Arindam Chakrabarti (2002, p. 1).

2 YS 1.3: tadā draṣṭuḥ sva-rūpe 'vasthānam (When mental activity ceases) the seer is established in his "original essence" (svarūpa).

3 See YS 1.9, 1.42, and 3.17.
4 See YS 1.16, 1.24, 3.36, 3.50, 3.56, 4.18, and 4.34.
5 I cannot think of any classical Indian philosopher who discusses emotions, except aesthetic emotions reflected upon in the context of art, and bhakti, namely devotional or "religious" sentiments. The Buddhist category of vedanā refers in my reading to sensations or feelings, not emotions, feeling being episodic, emotion referring to a deeper consciousness-state.
6 YS 1.13: tatra sthitau yatno 'bhyāsaḥ.
7 YS 1.14: sa tu dīrgha-kāla-nairantarya-satkāra-āsevito dṛḍha-bhūmiḥ.
8 YS 2.33: vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhāvanam.
9 YS 2.34: vitarkā hiṃsā-ādayaḥ kṛta-kārita-anumoditā lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā mṛdu-madhya-adhimātrā duḥkha-ajñāna-ananta-phalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam.

To cultivate the opposite is (to reflect upon the fact) that thoughts which contradict the yama-s, such as violent thoughts and so on, whether executed, planned to be executed, or even approved, whether driven by greed, anger, or delusion, whether mild, moderate, or intense, result in endless suffering (duḥkha) and ignorance (ajñāna).
10 tyaktvā vitarkān punas tān ādadānas tulyaḥ śva-vṛttena iti bhāvayet | yathā śvā vāntāvalehī tathā tyaktasya punar ādadāna [. . .]

Having abandoned "contrary thoughts"—the yogin ponders—I accept them again. (My behavior) is like that of a dog. (Why? Since) just as a dog licks his own vomit, I take back what I have abandoned.
11 *Awareness and Eternity: Conversations with Ramana Maharshi* (1994), Tel Aviv: Gal Publishers (Hebrew), p. 29.
12 See Sāṃkhya-kārikā 19: tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddhaṃ sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca.
13 Larson (1979), p. 273.
14 tapas is listed both as a component of kriyā-yoga (practical yoga) in YS 2.1 and as one of the niyama-s (secondary ethical guidelines) in YS 2.32; brahmacarya is listed as one of the yama-s (primary ethical guidelines) in YS 2.30; śraddhā is listed as means of attaining asaṃprajñāta samādhi in YS 1.20; apropos śraddhā, Vyāsa beautifully writes (in YSb 1.20) that it protects the yogin "like a good mother" (jananīva kalyāṇī).
15 The notion of avidyā is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.
16 smṛti is memory. However in YS 1.6 Patañjali lists memory among the vṛtti-s or mental activities which the process of yoga stops or suspends. Vācaspatimiśra (Miśra 1998, p. 62) seeks to solve the problem, by suggesting that in the present case the term smṛti is synonymous with dhyāna, a meditative state which leads to samādhi. I therefore translate smṛti as mindfulness.
17 yama-niyama-ādi-yoga-sādhana-anuṣṭhānam abhyāsa iti (Rukmani [2001a, vol. 1], p. 77).
18 YS 3.9: vyutthāna-nirodha-saṃskārayor abhibhava-prādur-bhāvau nirodha-kṣaṇa-citta-anvayo nirodha-pariṇāmaḥ.
19 YS 1.15: dṛṣta-ānuśravika-viṣaya-vitṛṣnasya vaśīkāra-saṃjñā vairāgyam.
20 YS 1.16: tat-paraṃ puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam.
21 The commentators distinguish between apara and para, lower and higher vairāgya. See Vācaspatimiśra (TV 1.16 in Miśra 1998, p. 52) and the Vivaraṇa-kāra (YSbV 1.16 in Rukmani 2001a, vol. 1, p. 80).

22 See also YS 1.19: bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām. (In the case of) videha ("bodiless") and prakṛti-laya ("merged in prakṛti" yogin-s, samādhi) occurs from birth.
23 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. 303.
24 R. S. Bhatnagar renders anābhogātmika as indifference to enjoyment of the object (personal communication).
25 Tattvavaiśāradī 1.15 (Miśra [1998], p. 62).
26 Yogasūtra 3.7: trayam antar-aṅgaṃ pūrvebhyaḥ.
27 Yogasūtra 2.54: sva-viṣaya-asaṃprayoge cittasya sva-rūpa-anukāra iva-indriyāṇāṃ pratyāhāraḥ.
28 Yogasūtra 2.55: tataḥ paramā vaśyatā-indriyāṇām.
29 See also YS 1.43 and 3.3; in both cases the Sūtra-kāra speaks of meditative states, nirvitarkā samāpatti in the former case, samādhi in the latter.
30 The king-bee (madhukara-rāja), rather than queen-bee, illustration is a rare historical window to Vyāsa's life-world.
31 YSb 2.54 in Rukmani (1983), p. 234.
32 Rukmani (2001a, vol. 1), p. 79.
33 In YS 1.41, Patañjali uses a similar metaphor, resembling the yogic "empty mind" to a transparent jewel:

> kṣīṇa-vṛtter abhijātasya-iva maṇer grahītṛ-grahaṇa-grāhyeṣu tat-stha-tad-añjanatā samāpattiḥ.

In the case of (a yogin whose) mental activity has decreased, (whose consciousness is as clear) as a transparent jewel, a merging (samāpatti) of perceiver (grahītṛ), perception (grahaṇa) and object perceived (grāhya) takes place.

34 See, for example, Vijñānabhikṣu (Rukmani 1981, p. 98), who seems to quote from an unknown source, or paraphrase a famous saying, according to which doṣa-darśanena vaitṛṣṇyam bhavati (thirstlessness arises from seeing the defects). In his bhāṣya of YS 2.5, with reference to avidyā as misidentification of the impure (aśuci) as pure (śuci), Vyāsa speaks of false attraction to the body of a young woman (kanyā). It is implied that a discerning yogic gaze, which reveals the doṣa-s, brings about vaitṛṣṇya or thirstlessness in place of attraction.
35 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. 306.
36 Miśra (1998), p. 52.
37 See YS 4.29: (A yogin) who takes no interest whatsoever even in prasaṃkhyāna (yogic realization), achieves through yogic discernment (viveka-khyāti) the samādhi-stage of dharma-megha ("cloud of dharma"). prasaṃkhyāne 'py-akusīdasya sarvathā viveka-khyāter dharma-meghaḥ samādhiḥ.
38 Yogasūtra 3.51: tad-vairāgyād api doṣa-bīja-kṣaye kaivalyam.
39 Bhattacharyya (2008), pp. 303–4.
40 Woods (1998), p. 34.
41 Tattvavaiśāradī 1.12 (Miśra 1998, p. 47).
42 Yogavārttikā 1.12 (Rukmani 1981, pp. 92–3).
43 Bhagavadgītā 6.35: asaṃśayaṃ mahābāho mano durnigrahaṃ calam | abhyāsena tu kaunteya vairāgyeṇa ca gṛhyate ||
44 Śrīmadbhagavadgītā Śaṅkarabhāṣyasametā: Bhagavadgītā with Śaṅkarabhāṣya (1988), p. 112.

45 Ibid.
46 See YS 1.50; the context here is the capacity of nirodha saṃskāra-s (or more precisely the saṃskāra of ṛtam-bharā prajñā) to counteract vyutthāna saṃskāra-s.
47 YS 3.10: tasya praśānta-vāhitā saṃskārāt.
A flow of silent (consciousness, praśānta-vāhitā) is brought about by (nirodha-) saṃskāra-s.
48 Vyāsa glosses the term tāraka as denoting knowledge emerging from one's sva-pratibhā, "own light," contrary to knowledge based on any "external" instruction (upadeśa). The Vivaraṇa-kāra and Vijñānabhikṣu explain that it is knowledge derived from saṃyama or yogic meditation. Vācaspatimiśra focuses on the capacity of knowledge-born-of-discernment to liberate or deliver from the saṃsāra.
49 muhūrta is a moment or any short period of time (Apte 2000, p. 444). The term can also indicate a measure of time covering 48 minutes, which according to Āraṇya (1981, p. 336) is the case here.
50 YSb 3.53 (in Āraṇya, ibid.).
51 YS 4.12: atīta-anāgataṃ sva-rūpato 'sty adhva-bhedād dharmāṇām.
Past and future exist (in the present) in their special form ("stored" in "karmic memory"). Owing to the time difference, their properties (as past, present, and future) are different.
52 kṣaṇa-yuga-sahasrayos tulyatā (Rukmani 2001a, vol. 2, p. 115).
53 vaicitrya is strange, fantastic, wonderful, multifaceted.
54 Ibid.
55 Rushdie (1999), p. 7.
56 Balslev (2009), p. 114.
57 Ibid., pp. 115–16.
58 YS 3.14: śānta-udita-avyapadeśya-dharma-anupātī dharmī.
59 I draw on Feuerstein (1989, p. 103) who translates dharmin and dharma as "form-bearer" and "form" respectively.
60 Rukmani (2001a, vol. 2) p. 35.
61 In YSb 4.33 Vyāsa explicitly speaks of the nityatā (eternity, permanence) of prakṛti and puruṣa alike.
62 kṣaṇa-pratiyogī pariṇāma-apara-anta-nirgrāhyaḥ kramaḥ.
63 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. 237.
64 Ibid.
65 etasyaiva hi nāntarīyakaṃ kaivalyam iti (last sentence of YSb 1.16, Rukmani 2001a, vol. 1, p. 80).
66 SK 62: tasmān na badhyate 'addhā na mucyate nā 'pi saṃsarati kaścit, saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ (Larson 1979, p. 274; his translation).

2

Revisiting avidyā and abhiniveśa: a note on yoga psychology

1. The subject-matter

S.N. Dasgupta opens his pioneering discussion of yoga psychology with the following statement:

> The difficulty of putting the ideas of an antique age into modern forms is that they do not often suit them. Not only are the modes of expression different, but the methods of enquiry, as well as the interest which guides them in each case, are also different.[1]

It is almost an apology for using the term psychology in the context of Pātañjala-yoga, owing to the fact that Patañjali's "method of enquiry" is not "a matter of laboratory investigation," as Dasgupta puts it, but of "abstract conjectures under the domination of metaphysical theories"; and since "the interest which guides him," unlike that of "the present generation" (Dasgupta's work was published in 1930), is not "to serve the usefulness of the present world." Both his observations are accurate. Unlike the current analytic situation which demands the collaboration of analyst and patient, the yogin is his own "analyst." One's consciousness is the analyst, the object of analysis, and the laboratory (or clinic) in which the analysis takes place, all in one. However, if Dasgupta implies that yoga is "metaphysic," and psychology is "scientific," then the writings of Freud and Jung, in their different ways, also display metaphysical strands. And if he

hints at the medical roots of modern psychology, then the following lines will show that it is not unlikely that classical yoga corresponds with and even borrows from Āyurveda. As for Dasgupta's second observation, the goal of yoga psychology is indeed not "to serve the usefulness of the present world," but on the contrary, to enable total abandonment of one's worldly aspects. If Western psychologies work with one's "narrative,"[2] then yoga psychology aims at illustrating that this very "narrative," which one is so used to identify with, is not "necessary" but "voluntary," and as such can be transcended or shifted aside.

I would like to argue that the term psychology is not foreign to an investigation such as Patañjali's any more than the term philosophy. The Yogasūtra comprises of philosophical as well as psychological aspects. I neither use these notions reluctantly, nor see the necessity of finding parallel Sanskrit notions, as a justification for using them.[3] Patañjali's questioning tone and discussion of themes such as language, time, and perception, are sufficient—or at least this is my contention—in order to speak of his philosophy. His enquiry into the depths of the human consciousness, and attempt to decipher the mechanisms which activate it in its various modes, can be referred to as psychological, even if his ultimate goal is to bring about a state of citta-vṛtti-nirodha, that is, motionless, objectless, "empty" consciousness. He himself sees the Yogasūtra as anuśāsana,[4] a practical guide for those who wish to overcome duḥkha or suffering as the initial characteristic of one's phenomenal existence. He aims not at reducing but at extinguishing duḥkha altogether. This far-reaching goal[5] demands an equally far-reaching "cost" to be paid by the yogin, namely total disengagement of any worldly aspect of one's existence. Patañjali's extreme stance does not exclude him from the psychological discourse. On the contrary: it rather makes him an intriguing interlocutor of Western psychologists, from Freud and Jung (the latter being a favorite among comparativists)[6] to Heinz Kohut, Wilfred Bion, and Stephen Mitchell. Fruitful as such a dialogue would be, and even though not enough has been done in this direction, the following paragraphs are not dedicated to a comparison or dialogue of this sort. They are rather first steps in gathering materials for a future dialogue. They consist of a close reading of two notions which Patañjali underscores in his enquiry into the recesses of the mind, namely avidyā and abhiniveśa. The former refers to the "conventional gaze," responsible for the "on the surface" picture of the world and oneself in the world. This familiar gaze, in the light of which one lives in the world, conceals—in Patañjali's formulation—the sheer "otherness" of puruṣa, one's metaphysical core, as well as the fundamental difference between puruṣa and prakṛti. This gaze, "our gaze," the Sūtra-kāra implies, is not an "objective" reflection of "the world out there." It is rather the outcome of internal forces and psychological patterns, through which one "meets" the world, seen by Patañjali, following the Sāṃkhyan narrative, as "factual" or having an "ontological existence" of its own. The notion of abhiniveśa, to be also discussed as the chapter unfolds, is depicted by the

Sūtra-kāra as an instance of avidyā, that is, as born of the "conventional gaze." It denotes clinging to life, or fear of death as the other side of the same coin. Both notions, avidyā and abhiniveśa, are formatted by Patañjali as kleśa-s, "causes of affliction," fundamentals of one's phenomenal existence interwoven with duḥkha. As such, they are to be dealt with in the process of yoga.

2. The two layers of consciousness

Patañjali sees the human consciousness as twofold. Its outer layer is the mental faculty, the modifications or vṛtti-s of which he discusses at the very opening of the Yogasūtra (and I have touched in Chapter 1). Underlying the mental faculty is a psychological substratum, which the Sūtra-kāra refers to using the notions of kleśa, vāsanā, and saṃskāra. The former, to be discussed here, pertains to the psychological patterns which dictate the human person as he phenomenally is. The notions of vāsanā and saṃskāra refers to "karmic imprints" or "after-effects,"[7] "carried along" in the case of vāsanā-s even from previous births. These "imprints" are the outcome of every activity, inner (mental) or outer. From another angle, it can be said that vāsanā-s and saṃskāra-s are "hidden memories" which ordinary memory cannot register, but which are nevertheless collected and "stored" unconsciously,[8] to be later aroused, effective and even determinative in one's phenomenal aspects of being.

The two layers of consciousness, the mental and the psychological are portrayed by Patañjali and his commentators as corresponding with or feeding one other. In YSb 1.5, Vyāsa suggests that a saṃskāra is the "result" of previous vṛtti-s and the "cause" of future vṛtti-s. In this respect, he speaks of vṛtti-saṃskāra-cakram aniśam or "perpetually revolving wheel of vṛtti-s and saṃskāra-s," each affecting the other. Implied is a picture of the human consciousness as a replica-based mechanism. At every "worldly encounter," one replicates previous such encounters or experiences. The human person is defined by inner patterns, which are in turn reinforced by every vṛtti or action. In YSb 2.13, Vyāsa compares the mind to a fishing net (matsyajālam) made of vāsanā-s which come into being as a result of the activity of the kleśa-s.[9] The simile again suggests that it is through inner patterns or "knots" that the "fishy" external world is "captured."

The first step toward release from the "fishing net" is to become acquainted with the "materials" which the "net" is made of. In chapter 2 of the Yogasūtra, under the heading of kriyā-yoga, practical yoga, intended "to bring about samādhi and diminish the kleśa-s,"[10] Patañjali enumerates five kleśa-s: avidyā, asmitā ("I-sense"), rāga (attraction), dveṣa (aversion), and abhiniveśa. I will focus on the first and last kleśa-s, but however, since all five are interrelated, asmitā, rāga, and dveṣa will not remain completely untouched. Moreover, avidyā is portrayed as the "field" (kṣetra) or the

"breeding ground" (prasava-bhūmi) of every other kleśa.[11] Therefore, any discussion of avidyā applies, in a sense, to the other kleśa-s as well.

The connection between vṛtti-s and kleśa-s, or between the vṛtti-scheme expounded in chapter 1 of the Yogasūtra and the kleśa-scheme explicated in chapter 2, is hinted by Patañjali who suggests (in YS 1.5) that the vṛtti-s can be kliṣṭa or akliṣṭa (afflictive or nonafflictive),[12] the word kliṣṭa alluding to the notion of kleśa. Vyāsa puts into words (in YSb 1.5) what Patañjali merely hints at, explaining that kliṣṭa vṛtti-s are kleśa-hetukāḥ. "The hindered (kliṣṭa) are those which are caused by the hindrances (kleśa)," Woods translates.[13] Vyāsa argues, then, that the vṛtti-s or mind-movements, in their kliṣṭa (worldly rather than meditative) mode, are determined by one or more kleśa-s. Vācaspatimiśra speaks of "asmitā etc." with reference to the kleśa-s as "causes" of the vṛtti-s.[14] The Vivaraṇa-kāra speaks of "avidyā etc."[15]

In his gloss of YS 2.3, Vyāsa further connects kleśa and vṛtti, suggesting that "kleśā iti pañca viparyayā ityarthaḥ," that is, that the kleśa-s are five types of viparyaya or invalid knowledge. Viparyaya is one of the five vṛtti-s enumerated by Patañjali in YS 1.6, alongside pramāṇa, vikalpa, nidrā, and smṛti (valid knowledge, verbal construction, sleep, and memory). Vyāsa subordinates the kleśa scheme of chapter 2 to the vṛtti scheme of chapter 1 as a subdivision of viparyaya. The problem is that not just viparyaya, but even the remaining of the vṛtti-s, at least in their kliṣṭa-mode, as the Bhāṣya-kāra himself acknowledges in YSb 1.5, are interconnected with the kleśa-s. Valid knowledge and verbal construction (pramāṇa and vikalpa), for example, in their out-facing mode (and perhaps even in their short-term akliṣṭa, introversive mode, before they fade away in the course of meditation), are rooted in avidyā as much as viparyaya is.

3. A psychodynamic formulation of the kleśa-s

In YS 2.4 Patañjali writes that the kleśa-s can be dormant (prasupta), weak (tanu), interrupted (vicchinna), or stimulated (udāra).[16] I cannot think of a more psychological, even psychodynamic formulation. It means that the kleśa-s are always there, latent underneath the "external" vṛtti or mental stratum. Vyāsa clarifies that a dormant kleśa exists merely in potentiality (as curd in milk, Vācaspatimiśra simplifies). It is "awakened" when consciousness "meets" an object. It is not so in the case of a yogin endowed with viveka-khyāti or yogic discernment. In his case, the kleśa-s have been totally neutralized, and even if they still exist in potentiality, they can no longer be aroused by external stimuli. A weak kleśa, Vyāsa further explains, is weakened through "cultivating its opposite" (pratipakṣa-bhāvana). His statement corresponds with YS 2.33, which I discussed in Chapter 1. Vyāsa extends Patañjali's "cultivating the opposite" method, applying it

to the kleśa-level. We saw that for Patañjali, to "cultivate the opposite" is to reflect on the fact that contrary-to-yama thoughts result in endless suffering (duḥkha) and ignorance (ajñāna). We also saw that "the opposite" of a violent thought, according to Vyāsa, is a contemplative outlook, "going beyond" the limited horizon of hiṃsā. What would "the opposite" of each kleśa be, if we turn back to Vyāsa on YS 2.4? He himself does not specify, but Vācaspatimiśra takes on the challenge and explains that kriyā-yoga[17] is "the opposite" or "antidote" (pratipakṣa) of the kleśa-s at large, and more precisely that samyag-jñāna (discerning knowledge) is the antidote of avidyā, bheda-darśana (differentiating vision) of asmitā,[18] mādhyasthya (equanimity or neutral approach) of rāga and dveṣa together, and anubandha-buddhi-nivṛtti (dismissal of the idea of continuity) of abhiniveśa.[19] Vācaspatimiśra's analysis correlates with YS 2.34, in the sense that the "antidote" of the each vṛtti there, of every kleśa here, is rooted in a certain "yogic understanding," in broadening one's perspective. As we have seen above, Patañjali's method of "cultivating the opposite" applies not merely to the vṛtti (YS 2.33–34) and kleśa (YSb 2.4) levels, but even to the saṃskāra substratum (YS 3.9–10). An interrupted (vicchinna) kleśa, Vyāsa finally elucidates, still in his gloss of YS 2.4 (in which he states that the kleśa-s can be dormant, weak, interrupted, or stimulated), is a kleśa the activity of which is temporarily "blocked" by the activity of another kleśa.

4. Avidyā: an epistemological analysis

Patañjali's discussion of the notion of avidyā is both epistemological and psychological. I will touch on the former and expand with regard to the latter. The epistemological dimension is conveyed in sūtra-s 2.5 and 2.24, the psychological in 2.15.

In YS 2.5, Patañjali defines avidyā as "misidentification of the impermanent as permanent, the impure as pure, the painful as joyous, and nonselfhood as selfhood."[20]

It is a typical Sāṃkhyan definition, in the sense that avidyā is portrayed as a cognitive "miscalculation," projecting prakṛti as permanence, purity, joy, and selfhood, all of which are supposed to be attributes of puruṣa.[21] The Sāṃkhya tradition offers an epistemological remedy to this epistemological error, in the form of viveka-khyāti, discerning gaze, which distinguishes rather than confuses between puruṣa and prakṛti, the human metaphysical core and "all the rest." It should be remembered that "all the rest" consists of not merely "external externality," namely objects of identification, but also, even primarily, of "internal externality," namely mental content and psychological patterns which store and restore "external," worldly experiences. In YSb 2.5 Vyāsa, in a traditional philological move (repeated by the rest of the commentators), investigates the subtleties of avidyā through a comparison

with two other words consisting of the prefix a-(=nañ): amitra ("not a friend," "enemy") and agoṣpada ("not a cow's footprint"). The former expression pertains to a person who might have the appearance of a friend, but who in fact is not one. In the same way, avidyā might have the appearance of "true knowledge," but in effect, it is not and should not be regarded (even though it usually is) as such. "True knowledge," in the yogic sense, distinguishes prakṛti from puruṣa. In Vyāsa's second illustration, the term agoṣpada refers to a footprint which not being that of a cow must be the footprint of some other animal, or alternately pertains to a large piece of land contrary to the small footprint of a cow. The point which Vyāsa attempts to make is that the prefix a- in avidyā is not negative in the sense of "absence of knowledge." In light of this philological analysis, Vijñānabhikṣu refers to the notion of avidyā as viśiṣṭa-jñāna, "a certain type of knowledge."[22] This "certain type" is what we usually refer to as knowledge, namely knowledge in the conventional, phenomenal sense of the word. It is the "positive" content of avidyā which conceals or blocks the trans-phenomenal, discriminative (viveka-ja), subtle (sūkṣma) "knowledge" which the vertical (depth-wise) process of yoga is prescribed to de-conceal.

In Yogasūtra 2.24, Patañjali returns to the notion of avidyā. Here he defines it as the cause (hetu) of the afflictive conjunction (saṃyoga), discussed in the preceding sūtra, of prakṛti and puruṣa. In other words, avidyā is again portrayed within the Sāṃkhyan narrative of the puruṣa-prakṛti erroneous intermixture. Avidyā is depicted as obscuring one's "true identity" as a prakṛti-less puruṣa. Therefore, in the following sūtra, Patañjali argues that when avidyā dissolves, this erroneous conjunction comes to an end, thus revealing the "aloneness" (kaivalya) of "the seer" (puruṣa).[23] Vyāsa, in his encyclopedic commentary of Yogasūtra 2.23, lists no less than eight definitions of the term avidyā (attributed to different texts or śāstra-s, a list further elaborated by the other commentators).[24] Interestingly, the Bhāṣya-kāra substitutes the term avidyā with adarśana. We are allowed to presume that just like in avidyā, the prefix a- in adarśana is not negative. Accordingly, the phrase does not mean "lack of seeing," but rather refers to the phenomenal gaze, a gaze not sensitive enough to ascertain the difference between puruṣa and prakṛti. It is primarily, the use of the term adarśana implies, about what we see and what we cannot see, or refuse to see.

Still in YSb 2.24, Vyāsa employs an amusing anecdote to underscore the essential difference between the negative and positive readings of avidyā, and to highlight the positive, instead of the seemingly negative lingual "appearance" of the term. He quotes a pūrva-pakṣin, a philosophical opponent, who resembles Patañjali's position according to which the melting of avidyā reveals one's "true identity" as puruṣa, to the wife of an impotent husband who asks him why she is childless, and is answered that when he dies he will impregnate her.[25] The pūrva-pakṣin mistakenly reads avidyā negatively as "impotent" not-knowing. Therefore, his contention is that if an "empty entity" could not provide a "liberative result," it is inconsequential

to expect such a "positive" result from its eradication. Negation of negation, he implies, cannot be effective. The pūrva-pakṣin's misunderstanding is used by Vyāsa to clarify the "positive" nature of avidyā to his readers.[26]

5. Avidyā: a psychological analysis

In YS 2.15, the notion of avidyā is not mentioned but is, however, implied. Here Patañjali writes that,

> Owing to the suffering inherent in change, in pain (tapas), in the (ripening of) saṃskāra-s and in the strife of the fluctuating guṇa-s, all is suffering for the discerning.[27]

In the present sūtra, the vivekin, a "discerning yogin" no longer affected by avidyā, is depicted. Through the portrayal of the vivekin, avidyā is projected via-negativa as a gaze not penetrating enough to see prakṛti as "she" really is, or more precisely, as a gaze blind to subterranean changes, to the constant movement of the guṇa-s and to the potent presence of saṃskāra-s and vāsanā-s under the allegedly "solid" façade of phenomenal reality. To see prakṛti "as she is" is to become aware of the "forces" which "bubble" under the surface, awareness which according to Patañjali cannot but result in the conclusion that duḥkha or suffering is the essence of one's phenomenal existence. Patañjali's narrative is psychological, as it is based on and calls for an in-depth investigation of the multilayered human consciousness, and also since it aims at confronting a sense of duḥkha which is not just theoretical but tangible and literally painful.

In his gloss of YS 2.15, Vyāsa offers an explanatory definition of avidyā, suggesting that viṣayasukhaṃ cāvidyetyuktam, or viṣaya-sukhaṃ ca-avidyā-iti-uktam, since—apropos our discussion of kṣaṇa and krama, moment and sequence—in Sanskrit, to write is to create a (textual) sequence; to read is to ascertain the "moments" (or words) in the sequence. In translation, Vyāsa suggests that "enjoyment of objects is called avidyā." It is to say that avidyā signifies a pattern of involvement in- and attachment to the world through what one usually thinks of in terms of "enjoyment" or "pleasure" (sukha). It is the short-termness of mundane pleasure, and its dependence upon objects, the commentators explain, which make it erroneous from a yogic point of view. Drawing on Bhagavadgītā 18.38, Vācaspatimiśra speaks of the "pleasure" one feels as he eats food mixed with sweet poison.[28] It is merely the yogin, or the vivekin as Patañjali refers to him, not deluded by avidyā, not taken by this so called "pleasure," far more sensitive than the common man (like the eye compared to every other bodily organ, as Vyāsa beautifully puts it[29]), who notices the "sweet poison" inherent in every phenomenal occurrence. In the same bhāṣya (YSb 2.15), Vyāsa employs yet another powerful simile to emphasize the vanity of seeking pleasure as the remedy

for the pains of mundane existence. According to him, a seeker of pleasures is like person who runs away from the sting of a scorpion, only to be bitten by a snake. The more one is involved in the world, attached to objects, identifies with "externality," his duḥkha deepens. The notion of avidyā, it is implied, pertains not just to certain blindness and its painful consequences, but to an uncontrolled inner tendency toward objects and "externality." In this respect, avidyā is not merely a cognitive error to be corrected cognitively as in the Sāṃkhyan formulation. The deeply rooted tendency of "externality," which is an actual cause of pain, has to be disclosed and worked with. We have reached an alternative definition of avidyā, derived from Vyāsa's definition: avidyā is the tendency toward "externality." The question is how to deal with this tendency, with tendencies or inner dispositions at large, which "phenomenalize" and "unfree" us.

6. "The third stage of the snake": KCB on the psychological dimension of avidyā

To highlight the psychological dimension which supplements, in the yogic process, the Sāṃkhyan mere cognitive deliberation, I would like to draw on KCB. In his paper "Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā" (published in 1925),[30] he offers an original reading of the popular snake-rope parable. Very briefly, the parable tells of a person who in twilight mistakes a rope for a snake. From here onward the narration differs according to the narrator and the philosophical tradition he belongs to. According to Śaṅkara,[31] the protagonist's fear of the snake dissolves when someone tells him "rajjuriyam nāyam sarpa iti" ("It is a rope, not a snake!"), an utterance which illustrates his own transformative mahāvākya ("great utterance") "tat tvam asi."[32] Twilight is avidyā, a time of the day (or modus of consciousness) which does not enable one to "see" or "know" clearly. Even if we put aside the mahāvākya narrative, since for Patañjali, unlike Śaṅkara, the remedy for avidyā is not and cannot be lingual or Vedic, it can still be said, in light of our discussion so far, that to see the rope as a rope is to no longer to be obscured by avidyā. In this respect, avidyā as a cognitive error is corrected. But avidyā is not merely, or even primarily, cognitive, and therefore mere cognitive or theoretic "correction" is not enough. This "but" is where KCB comes into the picture. In his analysis of the parable, he focuses on what he refers to as the "the third stage of the snake." In the previous, obvious, two stages, the snake is perceived first as "real" and then as "unreal." But what happens next? According to KCB, "though corrected, the snake is not forgotten."[33] Writing in the Advaitic framework, as the title of his paper indicates, KCB uses the third stage of the snake, in which he neither (or no

longer) "exists" nor "not exists" to elucidate Śaṅkara's notion of māyā. He writes:

> The "indescribable" should be nought but is still given in absolute mockery of thought. It marks, in a sense, the frontier between thought and faith, being the given limit of thought on the one hand and the promise of the annulment of given-ness on the other.[34]

My present interest is not māyā as anirvacanīya ("indescribable"). However, I find KCB's emphasis of "the third stage of the snake" extremely fruitful for our yoga psychology discussion. The snake, as KCB points out, neither disappears, nor is forgotten, even though it is "corrected" in the second stage from "real" to "unreal." Despite the "correction," it is still felt, responded to, and in a sense ("in absolute mockery of thought") even perceived. I would like to further suggest that post the encounter with the snake (that in effect had been a rope all along), the protagonist moves on, carrying the snake within him. The snake is "imprinted" in his consciousness as a saṃskāra. As such, it has the potentiality to be "awakened" next time that the protagonist sees a coiled "something" in front of him. As KCB puts it,

> The illusion [of a snake] has no longer to be logically or objectively corrected, that correction being finished; there is demand only for the correction of the hidden subjective defect through which it is still given.[35]

Leaving aside the Advaitic overtones of KCB's articulation (namely the a-priori mechanism of adhyāsa hinted at), I would like to suggest that for Patañjali, as for Śaṅkara of whom KCB writes, the real problem is not the external, objective snake, but the inner, subjective mechanism owing to which one produces snakes (in the Advaitic formulation) or is inclined to be bitten by them (in Vyāsa's scorpion-snake parable in YSb 2.15).

In this respect, Daya Krishna remarks that,

> The very cessation of dependence both from within and without is the object of yoga for Patañjali [. . .] But the internal world of desires rooted in the body and the mind and the saṃskāra-s augmented and elaborated by the imagination in a hundred ways, cannot be shut so easily.[36]

A first step toward confronting the "inner snake," or even snakes in the plural, would be to develop the capacity of "seeing" them, that is of seeing that which is commonly unseen, deeply concealed, even repressed. In YS 3.18 Patañjali refers to the yogin's capacity of perceiving the saṃskāra-s or one's inner, psychological tendencies, through sākṣāt-karaṇa or direct yogic perception, a term closely related to saṃyama or yogic meditation.[37] His statement coincides with YS 1.18 which depicts asaṃparjñāta samādhi

as a meditative state in which the vṛtti-s are diminished and merely the saṃskāra-s remain.[38] In other words, it is a meditative state which enables the yogin to work directly with these deep tendencies. However, my current focus is on the notion of kleśa, not saṃskāra.[39] The question is, therefore, how to reach the kleśa patterns, in order to cope with them and be released from them. Here the notion of abhiniveśa becomes instrumental. In the following lines I will argue that abhiniveśa holds a special position within the kleśa scheme, in the sense that it has a tangible on-the-surface presence besides its subterranean existence. Therefore, it is enumerated as a kleśa among kleśa-s, rather than included within the category of rāga in its positive form (clinging to life) or dveṣa in its negative form (fear of death). As such, namely as extending from above the surface to underground depths, the yogin can follow his "visual" or "felt" clinging/fear to its unseen root, and work not with the external symptom but with its inner source. But before touching on abhiniveśa, I would like to examine one more angle of the psychological exposition of avidyā in Yogasūtra-bhāṣya 2.15.

7. The therapeutic paradigm

Toward the end of his bhāṣya, Vyāsa notes that like the medical science (cikitsā-śāstra) which is fourfold, comprising of roga, roga-hetu, ārogya, and bhaiṣajya, or disease, the cause of disease, absence-of-disease and the remedy, so is "this science," that is, the "science of yoga." Yoga as a fourfold śāstra consists of heya, heya-hetu, hāna, and hānopāya, or "that which is to be eliminated" (the disease), its cause, its elimination, and a prescribed method to achieve elimination. Saṃsāra (worldliness) is the disease, the conjunction of prakṛti[40] and puruṣa (namely avidyā in the Sāṃkhyan sense of the term) is its cause, mokṣa is absence-of-disease and samyag-darśana (clear sight) is the remedy. The Vivaraṇa-kāra, who discusses the fourfold therapeutic paradigm in his gloss of Vyāsa's Ysb 1.1,[41] as the overture of the whole of the text, "translates" the phrase samyag-darśana as viveka-khyāti (yogic discernment, or awareness of the absolute difference between prakṛti and puruṣa). His "translation" is based on Patañjali's own YS 2.26.[42] Vyāsa's catur-vyūhatva or fourfold division itself is based on and can be seen as an introduction to sūtra-s 2.16–17 and 2.25–26, in which Patañjali himself uses the terms heya, heya-hetu, hāna, and hānopāya.[43] The notions of samyag-darśana and viveka-khyāti both stand as "the opposite" of avidyā. To be "cured" of one's worldly existence, it is implied, is to no longer be deluded by avidyā. Both notions "sound" epistemological as they denote a clear, unveiled, unobstructed sight. However the term avidyā, as we have seen, takes into account inner factors or psychological materials which determine the "how" and even the "what" of one's sight. The rope "becomes" a snake not just because of insufficient light during twilight, but since an "inner

snake" is waiting to be "awakened" by an external encounter with a coiled object.

The therapeutic paradigm is relevant to our discussion, as it allows Vyāsa to introduce the yogic process as "the treatment" for duḥkha, a treatment with a salient psychological strand. In his famous article on the subject,[44] Wilhelm Halbfass examines the paradigm in its Buddhist and Yogic formulations, with reference to Āyurveda or classic Indian medicine. He reaches the conclusion that,

> While there is no identifiable medical model for the four noble truths of the Buddha, the case seems to be different as far as the medical references in the Yoga texts are concerned.[45]

The medical connotation of the quadruple scheme in its Buddhist formulation is seen by Halbfass (who draws on Wezler) as metaphoric or as mere illustration of the transformative power of the Buddhist teaching. The very scheme in its yogic formulation he views in an altogether different light. According to him,

> [In Yoga, the model] implies a claim of superiority, that is, the idea that Yoga provides health in a superior sense which transcends all merely physical healing.[46]

I am not sure that I share Halbfass's clear-cut distinction between Buddhism and Yoga in this respect, but however yoga is depicted by him as an actual "medical procedure," offering treatment that surpasses physicality, which regards the entire field of phenomenal existence as a disease to be cured. Moreover, he speculates that Yoga (again, unlike Buddhism) could have adopted the fourfold scheme directly from the medical science, and suggests that "in doing so, it must have been aware of the role of the four noble truths in Buddhist soteriology."[47] He finally states that,

> It is not only through the adoption of this paradigm, but also through its transcendence that Yoga and other schools of Indian thought articulate their self-understanding.[48]

It is to say that puruṣa as "trans-causal" and "supra-therapeutic"[49] is unaffected by yoga as a healing process, which takes place entirely at the prakṛti domain and which culminates in "a giant leap" to the puruṣa realm "beyond." Halbfass further touches on the intertwinement of health and self-identity through etymological analysis of the word svāsthya, "health," which he literally translates as "coinciding with oneself." It is implied that yoga, like Āyurveda, aims at reaching the svarūpa, one's "original essence" underneath the on-the-surface layer, the disconnection with which is the cause of illness.

8. Abhiniveśa in the kleśa-scheme

In Yogasūtra 2.9, Patañjali writes that "clinging to life is a natural inclination rooted even in the wise."[50] The term abhiniveśa positively indicates the will to live on; negatively, it signifies the fear of death or dying. In other words, abhiniveśa means rāga (attachment) to life, and dveṣa (aversion) to death. Rāga and dveṣa, I remind the readers, are two of the five kleśa-s (namely, instances of avidyā) mentioned by Patañjali in his scheme (alongside avidyā, asmitā, and abhiniveśa). They signify opposite movements of consciousness in the form of attachment and aversion.

Abhiniveśa, I would like to argue, is depicted by Patañjali as a kleśa or cause of affliction, rather than as a beneficial, protective life instinct,

(a) Since it functions in rāga and dveṣa modes of objectification. It means that abhiniveśa is a motion (vṛtti) to or from. For the Sūtra-kāra, motion is always toward objects, and is therefore contradictive of his own ideal of citi-sakti, "empty consciousness" as potential static power.

(b) Since it is "afflicted" by duality. Pātañjala-yoga is commonly classified as "dualistic," owing to the Sāṃkhyan puruṣa/prakṛti formulae which Patañjali adopts. However, in addition to "Pātañjala Sāṃkhya," that is, to sūtra-s complying with the Sāṃkhyan narrative, there is another voice, another trend in the text, which alludes to transcendence of the dvandva or "two-ness" domain.[51] In this respect, the yogin develops first sahana (the capacity to bear), then anabhighāta (immunity)[52] toward dualities.[53] In the case of abhiniveśa, the dvandva or duality which the yogin is supposed to develop immunity to, or to be untouched by the oppositeness (or seemingly oppositeness) of its components, is of course "life" and "death," or again, rāga and dveṣa to life and death respectively.

To demonstrate its deep-rootedness, Patañjali suggests that abhiniveśa is a natural tendency (sva-rasa) rooted even in the wise (viduṣaḥ). It means that wisdom or knowledge at the mental, citta-vṛtti level cannot release a person from one's fear of death. Vyāsa verbalizes the immediacy of abhiniveśa as an instinct inherent in every living creature, through the intimate proclamation "mā na bhūvam bhūyāsam," "Let me not be nonexistent! Let me exist!" The first person formulation demonstrates, in my reading, the fact that abhiniveśa is not a theoretical postulation, but a very personal, even experiential conviction. Vyāsa goes as far as observing this burning desire not to cease even in worms which have just been born (kṛmer api jāta-mātrasya). This instinctive attachment to life, he elucidates, can only be the result of the pain of death-experience in previous lives (pūrva-janmānubhūtaṃ maraṇa-duḥkham). According to him, every living creature has a latent memory (vāsanā)[54] of previous deaths, and therefore passionately holds onto life. As per Vyāsa, it is in effect fear of dying, of the pain of dying, not of death as an "unknowable" or as abstract notion. Even the learned (kuśala), Vyāsa agrees with Patañjali, is afraid of dying. According to the Bhāṣya-kāra, the learned is he who knows his previous births (an obtainable siddhi mentioned in the

second and third chapters of the Yogasūtra).[55] However, such knowledge cannot disperse the fear, generated according to Vyāsa by one's "karmic memory." The author of the Vivaraṇa and Vijñānabhikṣu take this point further. According to them,[56] a learned is he who knows that the ātman, the core of selfhood, is eternal. How can such a person, who knows that death is but as an "illusion," be afraid of it? Vijñānabhikṣu further maintains that a learned is he who has overcome avidyā (which he interprets in a narrow, cognitive sense), asmitā, rāga, and dveṣa, but is still afflicted by abhiniveśa. Hence according to him, abhiniveśa is the most difficult kleśa to subdue. Knowledge of whatever kind, the commentators agree, is not sufficient to overcome fear of death or dying. A deeper "meditative work," penetrating the psychological layers underlying the citta-vṛtti surface, is needed.

Patañjali further reflects on "the instinctive desire to live"[57] in Yogasūtra 4.10. Here he discusses the notion of saṃskāra or "karmic impression," and maintains that "(Saṃskāra-s) are beginning-less because the desire for continuity (āśiṣ), which sustains them, is eternal."[58] The term āśiṣ, used here, is a synonym of, or at least has a close "family resemblance" to the notion of abhiniveśa.[59] Vyāsa in his gloss of āśiṣ employs the same first-person phrase he has used in YSb 2.9 with regard to abhiniveśa. He also repeats the narrative of maraṇa-trāsa, fear of dying, as born of the "memory" of aversion and pain (dveṣa-duḥkhānusmṛti) involved in previous death-experiences.[60] For him, the terms abhiniveśa and āśiṣ allude to the "negative" fear of dying, not to the "positive" clinging to life. Interestingly, following his gloss of āśiṣ, Vyāsa's discussion (as the discussion of the commentators after him) is about different births (or cycles of life) and the transition of the citta (consciousness) between births and bodies. In this respect questions about the size and shape of the citta are raised, and different approaches are cited.

Abhiniveśa/āśiṣ is depicted by Patañjali's commentators as two-dimensional, comprising of a "visible," on-the-surface fear, "felt" by all (by learned men, children, and worms just born), and a hidden from the eye, deeply rooted, hard to catch kleśa or "inner snake." In her thorough analysis of Patañjali's kleśa-structure, Anindita Balslev asks "Why make a separate rubric for fear of death and not simply list it under dveṣa, marking death as the most undesirable?".[61] I would like to suggest that it is the "bipolarity" of abhiniveśa, its "external" presence as well as deep-rootedness, seen by Vijñānabhikṣu as deeper than any other kleśa, that "deserves" a rubric of its own. As a "snake" which stretches from above the surface to the hidden spheres of consciousness, abhiniveśa provides the yogin with a rare opportunity to cut through the "seen" and "felt," and reach the underlying "psychological substratum" which determines the "on the surface reality." One's fear of death, it is implied here, can turn into a tool in the yogic work which does not stop at the kleśa-level but aims further ahead, at a "beyond" which a "stoppage" at the mental and the psychological levels together is supposed to reveal.

Notes

1 Dasgupta (1996), p. 259.

2 In his paper "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), Freud articulates the goals of psychoanalysis as following: "First, that the patient shall no longer be suffering from his symptoms and shall have overcome his anxieties and his inhibitions; and second, that the analyst shall judge that so much repressed material has been made conscious, so much that was unintelligible has been explained, and so much internal resistance conquered, that there is no need to fear a repetition of the pathological processes concerned" (quoted in Mitchell 1993, p. 22). Stephen Mitchell formulates a more "updated" psychoanalytic goal: "What the patient needs is not a rational reworking of unconscious infantile fantasies; what the patient needs is revitalization and expansion of his own capacity to generate experience that feels real, meaningful and valuable . . . Now the psychoanalysis process is described less in terms of correction, illumination, or renunciation of infantile thought, and more in terms of confirmation, evocation, expansion, and reconciliation. If the goal of psychoanalysis in Freud's day was rational understanding and control over fantasy-driven, conflictual impulses, the goal of psychoanalysis in our day is most often thought about in terms of the establishment of a richer, more authentic sense of identity" (ibid., p. 24).

3 Halbfass (1988) examines the search for equivalents of key Western concepts, such as "philosophy" and "religion," in Indian vernaculars and modern Sanskrit. He touches on the politics and hidden agendas behind the search, underscoring a sense of alleged universalism which according to him is but another name for Europeanization (or nowadays, Westernization), strived at paradoxically in India as much as is Europe. See chapters 15–18 and 23–24 of his book.

4 YS 1.1: atha yogānuśāsanam. (This is the yoga handbook.)

5 If Patañjali aims at a state of total "duḥkha-less-ness," or absolute cessation (nirodha) of suffering, or of one's phenomenal existence as suffering, then Freud targets at what he sees as a more realistic, rational (and from a yogic perspective, worldly) goal: "You will be able to convince yourself," he addresses the potential patient in *Studies in Hysteria* (1895), "that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has been restored to health, you will be better armed against that unhappiness" (quoted in Mitchell 1993, p. 16).

6 See for instance H. Coward (2002) and P. Mahaffey (2008).

7 Yoga Kośa (1991), p. 290.

8 See YS 4.9: Since memory and the saṃskāra-s are one in essence, there is a causal relation (between action and its fruition), even if they are separated in terms of birth, place and time (jāti-deśa-kāla-vyavahitānām apy ānantaryam smṛti-saṃskārayor eka-rūpatvat).

The notion of smṛti, memory, refers to that which ordinary memory cannot remember, namely to "forgotten" past actions, "remembered" in the form of vāsanā-s, "waiting" to be aroused by corresponding "karmic conditions." Apropos different types of memory, Vyāsa distinguishes (in YSb 1.11) between bhāvita-smartavyā and abhāvita-smartavyā, "memory of real things" (as in wakefulness) and "memory of unreal things" (as in a dream). His distinction

is intriguing, even if he does not consider dream memories to be deeper or more revealing as they are treated in psychoanalysis, but quite the opposite. Vācaspatimiśra refers to dream memories as viparyaya, that is erroneous (Miśra 1998, p. 44).

9 YS 2.13 in Āraṇya (1981), p. 135.

10 YS 2.2: The purpose (of kriyā-yoga) is to bring about samādhi and diminish the kleśa-s (samādhi-bhāvana-arthaḥ kleśa-tanū-karaṇa-arthaś ca).

11 See YS and YSb 2.4 respectively.

12 The notion akliṣṭa, according to the Vyāsa, refers to mental activity which contributes to the attainment of khyāti or yogic discernment (between puruṣa and prakṛti). Kliṣṭa, Vācaspatimiśra further clarifies, thus touching on the guṇa-narrative, is rajasic and tamasic; akliṣṭa is purely sattvic. Kliṣṭa-vṛtti-s, then, are the fuel of outgoing, object-centered mind-movements; akliṣṭa-vṛtti-s belong to the introversive yogic process. According to the first chapter of the Yogasūtra, yogic meditation consists of both "cognitive" (saṃparjñāta) and "noncognitive" (asaṃparjñāta) ingredients. Akliṣṭa-vṛtti-s (or nonafflictive mind-activity) are the "materials" which cognitive samādhi is made of. If the commentators imply that each of the vṛtti-s, from pramāṇa to smṛti can be either kliṣṭa or akliṣṭa, then Dasgupta (2007, pp. 100–1) suggests that abhyāsa and vairāgya ("the habit of steadiness" and "nonattachment to pleasures" in his translation) are the akliṣṭa-vṛtti-s. To highlight the fundamental difference between kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa, and to illustrate the fact that the latter vṛtti-s cannot be "polluted" by the former ones, Dasgupta, perhaps as a man of his period, suggests that "A Brahmin being in a village which is full of the Kirātas, does not himself becomes a kirāta (a forest tribal)." One could think of better, egalitarian, illustrations.

13 Woods (1998), p. 17.

14 Miśra (1998), p. 25.

15 Rukmani (2001a) vol. 1, p. 32.

16 avidyā kṣetram uttareṣāṃ prasupta-tanu-vicchinna-udārāṇām (YS 2.4).

17 Kriyā-yoga (practical yoga), according to Patañjali (YS 2.1) consists of tapas, svādhyāya, and īśvara-praṇidhāna or "heating practices" (perhaps alluding in this case to yogic meditation), daily recitation, and devotion to īśvara.

18 In YS 2.6 Patañjali writes that "asmitā ('I-sense') comes into being when the power of the seer (dṛk-śakti) and the power of seeing (darśana-śakti) appear to be one and the same" (dṛg-darśana-śaktyor eka-ātmatā-iva-asmitā). Asmitā, then, is an instance of the false conjunction of puruṣa and prakṛti. Therefore bheda-darśana, or the ability to differentiate between the two, is depicted by Vācaspatimiśra as the "antidote" of asmitā.

19 Miśra (1998), p. 143; on the "antidotes" of each of the kleśa-s, see also Swāmī Veda Bhāratī (2009), p. 46.

20 anitya-aśuci-duḥkha-anātmasu nitya-śuci-sukha-ātma-khyātir avidyā (Yogasūtra 2.5).

21 In SK 19, puruṣa is defined as "a witness, possessed of kaivalya (aloneness, freedom), indifferent, spectator and inactive" (sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca) (Larson 1979, p. 261). This is to say that noninvolvement in the worldly realm is puruṣa's main characteristic. The "positive" attributes ascribed to "him" in YS 2.5, namely permanence, purity, joy, and selfhood, sound Vedāntic, especially the terms sukha (joy, with its "family resemblance" to ānanda or bliss) and ātman

(selfhood). In the Sāṃkhya formulation, puruṣa is depicted merely via negativa as "not prakṛti." On the Vedāntic connotations of the term sukha see Bryant (2009, pp. 182–3). There is, however, no reference to Vedānta sources in the writings of the commentators. Whicher (2000, p. 111), constantly searching for "footholds" to establish his reading of Pātañjala-yoga as "positive" involvement on the world, rather than "negative" disengagement, reads the term sukha as supporting his contention. "Interestingly," he writes, "Patañjali seems to be admitting that there is a special kind of happiness (sukha) that is intrinsic to freedom (aloneness) in Yoga."

22 Vijñānabhikṣu, Yoga-Vārttika 2.5 (Rukmani 1983, p. 25).

23 sva-svāmi-śaktyoḥ sva-rūpa-upalabdhi-hetuḥ saṃyogaḥ। tasya hetur avidyā। tad-abhāvāt saṃyoga-abhāvo hānaṃ tad-dṛṣeḥ kaivalyam (Yogasūtra 2.23–25).

24 Rukmani (1989a, pp. 173–4) offers a detailed analysis of each of the eight alternative definitions of avidyā.

25 Vyāsa's anecdote about the impotent husband is replicated by Vācaspatimiśra, the Vivaraṇa-kāra and Vijñānabhikṣu.

26 Yohanan Grinshpon offers an altogether different, psychoanalytical, reading of the anecdote. "We must ask," he suggests, "who is the impotent husband in the reality which the story is said to illustrate? I believe it is Vyāsa himself (or indeed Patañjali); a scholar who fails to reach mokṣa, though he 'knows'. Is not the story a suggestive allegory of Vyāsa's (and Patañjali's) impotence over the impenetrability of the truth embedded in the inaccessible yogic silence?" (2002, p. 93). Grinshpon uses the anecdote to convey his feeling, or rather hypothesis, according to which Patañjali and Vyāsa, the philosophers, the "verbalizers," are in fact outsiders to the freedom inherent in yogic experience.

27 YS 2.15: pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ.

28 Miśra (1998), p. 175.

29 In YSb 2.15 Vyāsa distinguishes between the yogin and the nonyogin or the common man. Interestingly it is the level of their sensitivity which makes the distinction. He compares the yogin to the eyeball (akśipātra), which is the most sensitive of organs. A falling cobweb, he writes, hurts the eye, but is hardly felt by any other body part. In the same way, mundane pleasure "hurts" the yogin, not anyone else, as he alone is sensitive enough to "feel" that it belongs to the duḥkha-realm.

30 Bhattacharyya (2008), pp. 93–106.

31 Śaṅkara works with the parable in Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya 1.4.6.

32 The utterance "tat tvam asi" (to be found originally in the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, and which is the pramāṇa or means of mokṣa as liberative knowledge in Śaṅkara's teaching) can be rendered as "thou art that." For Śaṅkara it means "you (tvam) are (asi) Brahman (tat)," rather than the "phenomenal I."

33 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. 97.

34 Ibid., p. 99.

35 Ibid., p. 102.

36 Daya Krishna (1997), p. 54.

37 Yogasūtra 3.18: saṃskāra-sākṣāt-karaṇāt-pūrva-jāti-jñānam.

Through sākṣāt-karaṇa (direct yogic perception) of the saṃskāra-s, knowledge of previous births is obtained.

38 virāma-pratyaya-abhyāsa-pūrvaḥ saṃskāra-śeṣo 'nyaḥ (YS 1.18).
In the other (type of samādhi, i.e. asaṃparjñāta or "noncognitive" samādhi), achieved through repetitive practice of the cessation of mental activity, only the saṃskāra-s ("karmic impressions") remain.

39 For a thorough discussion of the notion of saṃskāra in Pātañjala-yoga see Whicher (2005).

40 Vyāsa uses the term pradhāna, which I "translate" as prakṛti. Pradhāna, the Yoga Kośa (p. 194) elucidates, is either a synonym of prakṛti or refers to the vyakta, the manifest dimension of prakṛti.

41 YSbV 1.1 (Rukmani 2001a, vol. 1, p. 2).

42 YS 2.26: viveka-khyātir aviplavā hāna-upāyaḥ.
Steady yogic discernment is the means of cessation (of avidyā).

43 The fourfold paradigm is better known in its Buddhist formulation as the catvāri āryasatyāni ("four noble truths"), in which tṛṣṇā (in Pāli, taṇhā) or "thirst" stands in place of avidyā as the cause of duḥkha. The Buddhist scheme is perhaps the influence behind Vyāsa's articulation, or even behind Patañjali's choice of words (heya, heya-hetu etc.). The Buddhist term tṛṣṇā is more palpable, less philosophic or theoretic than avidyā. In later Buddhist formulations, such as Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, the term avidyā (in Pāli, avijjā) replaces tṛṣṇā. Interestingly, the fourfold paradigm is also found in Vātsyāyana's Nyāyasūtra-bhāṣya 1.1.1, formulated with almost the same terminology as Patañjali's (heya, hāna, upāya). In this respect, see Halbfass (1992, pp. 246–8).

44 "The Therapeutic Paradigm and the Search for Identity in Indian Philosophy," in Halbfass (1992), pp. 243–63.

45 Ibid., p. 248.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 249.

48 Ibid., pp. 253 and 256.

49 Ibid., p. 253.

50 sva-rasa-vāhī viduṣo 'pi tathā-rūḍho 'bhiniveśaḥ (Yogasūtra 2.9).

51 Take for example YS 1.41 quoted in Chapter 1 above, and YS 2.48: Then (when his āsana is perfected, the yogin) is not affected by opposites (or dualities, tato dvandva-anabhighātāḥ). See also Yogasūtra-bhāṣya 2.32.

52 sahana—in YSb 2.32; anabhighāta—in YS 2.48.

53 In YSb 2.32 Vyāsa enumerates four dvandva-s: jighatsā/pipāsā (hunger and thirst), śīta/uṣṇa (cold and heat), sthāna and āsana (standing and sitting, or ordinary, that is, nonyogic posture and yogic posture), and finally kāṣṭha-mauna/ākāra-mauna ("silence of wood" opposite "formal silence"). Interestingly, except heat and cold, these pairs are not exactly of opposites. The fourth pair refers to two types of silence (mauna), the former (kāṣṭha-mauna) deeper than the latter (ākāra-mauna). In a state of "formal silence," the muni (i.e., the yogin who has taken a vow of silence) can still communicate without uttering words, through gestures or in writing; silence or stillness of wood is more essential.

54 Since he speaks of experience which has taken place not in this life-time but in previous births, Vyāsa refers to its memory as vāsanā, rather than saṃskāra.

55 Yogasūtra 2.39 and 3.18.

56 Rukmani (2001a), vol. 1, p. 236; Rukmani (1983), vol. 2, pp. 35–6.

57 Dasgupta (1996, p. 296) translates abhiniveśa as "the instinctive desire to live," and elsewhere (pp. 68 and 308) as "the will to live." According to him, "It is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence." One's phenomenal existence as a "sin" is a rearticulation in Christian terms of the derogative approach of Pātañjala-yoga to the phenomenal layers of existence. Vyāsa, we have seen, refers (in YSb 2.15) to one's saṃsāric (worldly) aspects as a nothing less than a disease (roga).

58 tāsām anāditvaṃ ca-āśiso nityatvāt (Yogasūtra 4.10).

59 Yoga Kośa (1991), pp. 61–2.

60 Vyāsa's narrative is adopted and elaborated by Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the Vivaraṇa, and Vijñānabhikṣu in their commentaries of YS 2.9 and 4.10 (Miśra 1998, pp. 155–8, 404–9; Rukmani 2001a, vol.1, pp. 235–7, vol.2, pp. 144–8; Rukmani 1983, pp. 31–6; Rukmani 1989, pp. 26–36). Vācaspatimiśra, for instance, suggests (in Tattvavaiśāradī 4.10) that a child just born, who slips from his mother's lap and desperately holds onto her necklace, acts out of fear of dying, which can only be the outcome of "memory" of a previous death experience.

61 Balslev (1991), p. 80.

3

Rethinking prajñā: Yogasūtra 1.49 under a philosophical magnifying glass

This chapter is an attempt at a close reading of the notion of ṛtam-bharā prajñā, "truth-bearing yogic discernment" in YS 1.49. T. S. Rukmani suggests that "the entire system of Rājayoga hinges on the concept of prajñā,"[1] and provides a thorough analysis of the term in all its five appearances in the Yogasūtra (YS 1.20, 1.48, 1.49, 2.27, 3.5).[2] The present endeavor is different, devoted as it is to a single sūtra, 1.49, as an illustration of the potency of a close reading. Wherever you "dig" in the Yogasūtra, you find yourself absorbed in the Sāṃkhyan narrative, and discover philosophical threads which are not always transparent "on the surface" of the text. The following paragraphs, then, are an exercise in "textual archeology," focusing on the notion of prajñā as a link between meditation and epistemology, experience and philosophy, in Patañjali's text.

Patañjali opens the Yogasūtra with the striking definition of yoga as "cessation (nirodha) of mental activity (citta-vṛtti)."[3] Subsequently he clarifies what he sees as belonging to the category of mental activity, enumerating, as we have seen, a fivefold citta-vṛtti scheme that the process of yoga aims at stopping or suspending. The initial component of Patañjali's scheme is pramāṇa or valid knowledge. In YS 1.7 he elucidates that "valid knowledge is based on sense-perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and reliable testimony (āgama)."[4] Later, in YS 1.49, Patañjali introduces the notion of

ṛtam-bharā prajñā, which replaces or at least supplements pratyakṣa as the yogin moves forward, or inward, on the yogic path.

According to Patañjali,

> (ṛtam-bharā prajñā) is essentially different from knowledge based on reliable testimony and inference as it touches on particulars.[5]

The capacity of ṛtam-bharā prajñā, as "yogic knowledge" accomplished through samādhi, to illuminate particulars, not just universals, will be explained shortly. But first, I would like to call attention to the fact that in light of YS 1.7, "something is missing" in YS 1.49. Patañjali suggests that ṛtam-bharā prajñā is different from or has an anya-viṣaya, a different object (namely particular instead of universal), than knowledge (prajñā) based on reasoning and reliable testimony.[6] He does not say that it is fundamentally different from or has a different object than knowledge based on pratyakṣa or sense-perception. I would like to argue that pratyakṣa is "present in its absence" in the sūtra under discussion. Moreover, I believe that in the present case, as elsewhere in a synoptic work such as Patañjali's, we should listen carefully not just to the said, but even to the unsaid. By not mentioning pratyakṣa, or through its "presence in absence," Patañjali alludes to a common denominator between prajñā and pratyakṣa. Despite their different scopes—pratyakṣa depending on and "working" within the range of the senses, prajñā beyond their reach—both are of the capacity of capturing particulars. The special status of pratyakṣa in sūtra 1.49, its "presence in absence," enables the Sūtra-kāra to use it as an illustration of prajñā, that is to clarify what prajñā is through sense-perception as its phenomenal parallel, and simultaneously to underscore the profound difference between the two. Patañjali cannot proclaim that prajñā and pratyakṣa are similar, each belonging to a different consciousness-mode, internal opposite external, or yogic as opposed to mundane, but he nevertheless allows the reader to "feel" the "similarity." Moreover, through the "comparison" of the two, Patañjali introduces prajñā as the means of yogic knowledge. Not just of insight, discernment, or any other term lacking epistemological commitment, but of knowledge in the full sense of the word. This is to say that like other mokṣa-thinkers, Patañjali attempts, at least in the present instance, to "knowledgify" the meditative experience, in order to maintain its "objectivity," "necessity," even "reality."

Before turning my magnifying glass to Patañjali's commentators on YS 1.49, I would like to further speculate whether prajñā resembles pratyakṣa not just in essence, that is in its immediacy, directness, and capacity to reveal the particular, but also in the sense that both are "present in their absence." Pratyakṣa is "present in its absence" in the technical sense that in YS 1.49 it is pulled out of the pramāṇa triplet formulated in YS 1.7 and accepted by almost every darśana or philosophical position. Prajñā, on the other hand, is "present in its absence" in a more fundamental sense. I will try to explain how.

In YS 1.47, Patañjali depicts the meditative setting in which ṛtam-bharā prajñā arises. According to him,

> When (the meditative state called) nirvicāra becomes lucid, clarity emanating from the inner-self occurs.[7]

According to Vyāsa (in YSb 1.47), the clarity (prasāda) under discussion reveals things "as they are" (bhūtārtha). To elucidate his statement, he quotes a saying which resembles this clarity to the lucid vision from the top of a hill. From his (inner) hilltop, the Bhāṣya-kāra explains, the aśocya (free from suffering) yogin is in a position to see those who are still "down there" as suffering (śocya). Hence adhyātma-prasāda (clarity emanating from the inner-self) is presented as an outlook "from above," or as the gaze of a yogin no longer involved in or determined by phenomenal or mundane experience. It is an outlook which reveals the phenomenal realm "as it is," namely as intermixed with śoka or suffering. Vācaspatimiśra clarifies that adhyātma-prasāda does not have the self (ātman) as its object (viṣaya), but rather as its substrate or base (ādhāra).[8] Therefore it is not clarity that reveals the self, that is puruṣa, but clarity which puruṣa is the source of. The Vivaraṇa-kāra and Vijñānabhikṣu suggest that it is clarity with regard to the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti, or puruṣa-prakṛti-viveka as the latter puts it. It is to say that to see prakṛti "as it is," is to see it as different from, or not essentially entwined with puruṣa. Prajñā, then, is a special type of knowledge facilitated by the clarity emanating from puruṣa. What I am trying to suggest is that since puruṣa is always there as the inner core of the human person and as the "origin of awareness,"[9] whether acknowledged or not, covered by clouds of avidyā or revealed through the yogic process; the clarity or prasāda originating from it is also there, available, "waiting" to be disclosed. Patañjali himself speaks of the process of yoga in terms of prakāśa-āvaraṇa-kṣaya, or "removal of the covering of the inner light."[10] Patañjali's commentators, as we shall see, portray ṛtam-bharā prajñā as para-pratyakṣa or "higher perception." My contention is that "truth-bearing" prajñā is implicit in every instance of ordinary pratyakṣa; that it is a deeper layer of perception, commonly unseen or not put into effect. As such, it is "present in its absence," or "silently accompanying" every act of perception, to be unveiled as the light of the inner-self is "released."

How do the commentators read Yogasūtra 1.49?

Vyāsa opens with the attempt to explain why reliable testimony (śrutam āgama-vijñānam) and inference (anumāna) cannot capture the particular.[11] In the former case, he suggests, it derives from reliable testimony being

based on and rooted in words (śabda). He thus echoes Patañjali's stand with regard to the "vikalpic" nature of language.[12] "Vikalpa," Rukmani explains, "depends on understanding the meaning of words, and does not depend on the words referring to an existent object."[13] Language, therefore, is "too far" from its referents, remaining always in the sphere of approximation and generality. Anumāna, as per Vyāsa's gloss, cannot touch on particulars because of its in-built indirectness. When someone reaches somewhere, he exemplifies, we "calculate" through inference that motion has taken place. Hence anumāna is portrayed as a second-order pramāṇa, which depends on the first-order pratyakṣa.[14]

Vyāsa further argues that loka-pratyakṣa, worldly or ordinary sense-perception cannot capture subtle (sūkṣma), hidden (vyavahita), or distant (viprakṛṣṭa) objects, and therefore prajñā is needed. He employs the exact words of YS 3.26, a sūtra which discusses the activation of extraordinary senses through yogic meditation.[15] Vyāsa, then, distinguishes prajñā not just from śruta and anumāna, mentioned in YS 1.49 explicitly, but even from pratyakṣa, interpreted by him as loka-pratyakṣa, which is very much a part of the sūtra—or so I am trying to argue—even if via-negativa, in its absence. It is implied (taking into consideration the reference to YS 3.26) that prajñā is "yogic sense-perception," revealing the subtle, hidden, and remote, and "working" not with the ordinary senses but with the sharper, supranormal senses mentioned in the Vibhūti-pāda.[16]

Vyāsa further alludes to a debate with a pūrva-pakṣin, a philosophical opponent who argues that a particular (viśeṣa), the knowledge of which cannot be ascertained through āgama, anumāna, or loka-pratyakṣa, does not exist. The Bhāṣya-kāra firmly answers that such a particular, whether pertaining to a subtle element or to one's own consciousness (bhūta-sūkṣma-gato vā puruṣa-gato vā), can definitely be grasped through prajñā which occurs in the course of samādhi. In this respect it should be once again noted that subtlety exists not merely in objects but also in the subject. Or in other words, prakṛti, the inner details of which prajñā reveals, is not just "the world" but even one's "worldly selfhood" consisting of the mental faculty and the psychological substratum together.[17]

Vyāsa's reply to the pūrva-pakṣin reveals yet another dimension of prajñā as yogic pratyakṣa. Not only does it work with extraordinary senses, and is thus related to the siddhi-s enumerated by Patañjali in chapter 3 of the Yogasūtra; it also touches on the inner details of the human consciousness—hidden, remote, and concealed in their own way—within the yogic process which leads to kaivalya. Pratyakṣa is therefore threefold, consisting of loka-pratyakṣa (sense-perception in its common denotation), external yogic pratyakṣa which works at the same domain as loka-pratyakṣa but is more detail-sensitive, and finally, internal yogic pratyakṣa, which has the capacity of perceiving inner subtleties within one's consciousness. If according to the pūrva-pakṣin, a knowable is merely that which is given

through a pramāṇa, means of knowledge, then in Vyāsa's formulation, prajñā is as valid a pramāṇa as sense-perception, inference, and reliable testimony, "working" in areas beyond the scope of the former three.

Vācaspatimiśra follows Vyāsa's line of interpretation. He begins by underscoring the limitedness of the conventional pramāṇa-s, referring in this respect not just to śruta and anumāna, which provide mere generic knowledge, but also to loka-pratyakṣa. Hence even for him, the "present in its absence" pratyakṣa has a significant role in YS 1.49. The weakness of śruta or reliable testimony, Vācaspatimiśra argues, is that it is rooted in words (śabda), which are vyabhicāra, that is of the nature of "too-wide pervasion,"[18] or "going away from," or even confusion. The obvious weakness of ordinary pratyakṣa is that it depends on the senses. Moreover, Vācaspatimiśra suggests that phenomenal knowledge, that is, knowledge obtained through any of the conventional pramāṇa-s, is inevitably infected by rajas and tamas, hence intrinsically unclear.[19] If Vyāsa's pūrva-pakṣin has argued that "a particular" beyond the scope of śruta, anumāna, and (loka-) pratyakṣa is necessarily nonexistent, since there is no pramāṇa to capture it; then Vācaspatimiśra replies that a pramāṇa (means of knowledge) is not the cause (kāraṇa) of the prameya (object of knowledge), in the strong sense that when the former ceases, so does the latter. He illustrates: even when the moon is just a single kalā, namely one sixteenth of a full moon, and the deer (hariṇa) on the moon cannot be seen, no one doubts his existence.[20] The illustration is interesting. First, since a deer replaces the more conventional man or rabbit on the moon. Second, and more significantly, the illustration raises the fundamental question of the interplay between pramāṇa and prameya, means of knowledge and knowable. Does a pramāṇa "objectively" reveal an "independent" object to the perceiver, or does it "actively" shape the object, or even ratify its factuality as hinted by the pūrva-pakṣin?

The author of the Vivaraṇa opens his commentary with the statement that ṛtam-bharā prajñā has a different object than "knowledge of ordinary people" (sāmānya-puruṣa-pratyaya).[21] He replicates Vyāsa's contention that śruta and anumāna are limited to universals, and cannot touch on particulars. Thereafter, he reformulates and extends the dialogue with the pūrva-pakṣin. His opponent, like Vyāsa's, argues that a particular, external or internal, which is beyond the grasp of śruta, anumāna, and loka-pratyakṣa (the only valid pramāṇa-s according to the Sāṃkhyan narrative adopted in the Yogasūtra), must be nonexistent. The Vivaraṇa-kāra counter-argues that every existing thing is graspable by an appropriate pramāṇa, which in the present case is samādhi-prajñā, prajñā born of samādhi. The pūrva-pakṣin further asks: If these particulars are to be known pratyakṣeṇa, that is through (prajñā as higher) pratyakṣa, does it mean that they are not made known by īśvara? The question is intriguing, as it brings īśvara into the picture. The place and role of īśvara or god in the Yogasūtra, and more broadly in Pātañjala-yoga, is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Is

he puruṣa or prakṛti? Patañjali inaugurates a third, intermediate, category for him, that of puruṣa-viśeṣa, "special puruṣa."[22] In brackets let me say that for me, there is an encyclopedic dimension to Patañjali's work, in the sense that he mentions other yoga-types known to him besides his own. In this respect I include the videha ("bodiless") and prakṛti-laya ("merged in prakṛti") yogins of YS 1.19; the different, alternative paths of attaining yogic achievements (siddhi-s) enumerated in YS 4.1; and īśvara, introduced in YS 1.23 after the particle vā, "or." The query of the pūrva-pakṣin in YSbV 1.49 implies that if subtle elements and even one's own consciousness can be known through prajñā as "higher pratyakṣa," īśvara becomes redundant. The Vivaraṇa-kāra replies that they are known as vastutva, "substances that exist."[23] Therefore, they can, and moreover, should be perceived directly. Īśvara, it is implied, is indeed dispensable, at least in this respect.

The opponent does not give up, and wants to know why subtle elements or one's own consciousness cannot be known through reliable testimony or inference. Why directly? Sometimes, he adds, one cannot even grasp a particular placed on one's palm. His attempt is to secure the threefold conventional pramāṇa scheme, arguing that prajñā is not necessary. First he suggested īśvara as a substitute of the yogic pramāṇa, now he is willing to settle for indirect knowledge. The Vivaraṇa-kāra, in his reply, sticks to his predecessors' maxim, according to which a particular can only be known through direct means. If one cannot perceive a particular as accessible as on one's own palm, it does not mean that such perception is impossible. On the contrary, it is not merely possible but even necessary, direct perception being the only suitable pramāṇa of a particular.

Like his predecessors, Vijñānabhikṣu opens his commentary of YS 1.49 by dismissing śruta and anumāna as possible pramāṇa-s of particulars. The former, he explains, is based on words, which cannot convey but universals. Each word is of infinite possible particular referents. Therefore, upon hearing a word, there is always a quantum of uncertainty (saṃśaya) about its specific referent, or about the applicability of the word, universal in nature, to a particular.[24]

If such is the case, argues the pūrva-pakṣin, whose objections Vijñānabhikṣu rearticulates, that is, if knowledge of particulars cannot be conveyed through reliable testimony and inference, why not opt for "worldly sense-perception" (laukika-pratyakṣa)? Why to postulate "yogic perception" (yoga-ja-pratyakṣa)? Just like his predecessors, Vijñānabhikṣu focuses on and works with the notion of pratyakṣa, the "via negativa" of YS 1.49. His response to the opponent's objection echoes what has already been argued from Vyāsa onward, that is, that ordinary pratyakṣa applies merely to the gross (sthūla), whereas the subtle (sūkṣma) can only be perceived through a "subtle pratyakṣa" such as samādhi-prajñā. As per Vyāsa, we have seen, prajñā applies to subtle elements both in the world and in one's inner world (bhūta-sūkṣma-gato vā puruṣa-gato vā). For Vijñānabhikṣu, the term puruṣa

does not refer to one's consciousness, as suggested by me drawing on his predecessors, but to the Sāṃkhyan puruṣa "himself," "the other" of prakṛti. He glosses the segment "puruṣa-gato vā" as suggesting that "the quality of particularity is there in puruṣa-s as well" (etena puruṣeṣvapi viśeṣādi-dharmaḥ svīkṛtaḥ).[25] And Rukmani notes that "each puruṣa has its own particularity."[26] Vijñānabhikṣu thus draws on the Sāṃkhyan narrative about the plurality of puruṣa-s (puruṣa-bahutva),[27] against, for instance, the oneness of the ātman in Advaita philosophy, which everyone and everything is supposed to be a part of. The multiplicity of puruṣa-s, Sāṃkhyakārikā 18 implies, is inferred from the different circumstances (birth, death, different experiences) of different individuals or embodied selves "here" in the world. In other words, according to the Sāṃkhyan-s, if one denies difference and plurality at the puruṣa level, plurality and difference at the phenomenal level cannot be explained. Interestingly, perhaps the greatest challenge of the Advaita tradition is to justify the discrepancy between plurality at the vyavahāric realm and unity at the paramārthic sphere. Moreover, the plurality of puruṣa-s is not implied by Sāṃkhyakārikā 19, which projects puruṣa as aloof, remote, enclosed. What, if at all, could be the relationship between liberated puruṣa-s, each of whom, according to SK 19, is a monad in itself?

Another explanation for the necessity of plurality at the puruṣa level is found in YS 2.22. Here Patañjali suggests that,

> Even though "she" (prakṛti) ceases to exist in respect of "him" (a certain puruṣa), for whose sake "her" purpose has been achieved, "she" continues to exist for others (for other puruṣa-s still afflicted by avidyā) being as "she" is of a common nature.[28]

The plurality of puruṣa-s, that is, the fact that there are always puruṣa-s who are yet seeking liberation, to be achieved through the efforts of prakṛti, gives "her" a "reason" to "continue." In other words, the plurality of puruṣa-s sustains the world, and fortifies the status of the "here" alongside the "beyond."

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, every puruṣa, whether liberated or not (muktāmukta), has its own individual dharma-s or characteristics. In this respect he mentions past, present, and future reflections of the upādhi-s or "limitations" of the different puruṣa-s.

The novelty of Vijñānabhikṣu's gloss is that according to him, alongside its function in revealing subtle elements "in the world," which are beyond the scope of conventional pratyakṣa, prajñā is of the capacity to illuminate the individuality of each and every puruṣa; individuality which remains intact even when a puruṣa is no longer involved in prakṛti. Puruṣa, then, in Vijñānabhikṣu's reading, is indeed a particular (a "singular universal" or "universal singular," as Larson beautifully puts it[29]) to be captured by prajñā as yogic perception.

Vijñānabhikṣu's pūrva-pakṣin raises yet another objection: an object is "hidden," hence beyond the grasp of pratyakṣa, when direct contact between the object and one's sense organs cannot be established. How, then, can a hidden object be perceived through samādhi-prajñā? Are we to imagine that in prajñā, the contact with the object which was not there in ordinary sense-perception is (somehow, mysteriously) recreated?

Vijñānabhikṣu replies that,

1. No, in prajñā it is not based on a contact of sense organ and object.
2. However, if in pratyakṣa, the object is the "cause" (kāraṇa) of knowledge,[30] it is the same with prajñā. This is to say that knowledge of subtle elements, as also knowledge of the particularity of a puruṣa, depends primarily on them. Or in other words, the knowledge attained through prajñā is vastu-tantra, not puruṣa-tantra, objective rather than subjective.[31] Consequently, the objects of prajñā as a pramāṇa are not and cannot be nonexistent.
3. How does prajñā work, then? It removes the tamas or "unclarity" inherent in phenomenal, unenlightened consciousness. No longer obscured by tamas, Rukmani explains, and "being all-pervading in its natural purity [sattva], there are no objects beyond the range of the mind."[32] If the conventional pramāṇa-s are directed at a certain object (sense-perception revealing its particularity, inference, and reliable testimony its generic character), then prajñā is directed at or works to dissolve the tamas element, interwoven in every episode of conventional cognition. When tamas is dispersed, there is "direct contact" with every object, ordinary, subtle, even with the particularity or individuality of puruṣa. However this "direct contact" is not the sense-organ and object contact, which ordinary pratyakṣa is based on. We are back with pratyakṣa as an illustration of prajñā. One can only speak of the latter in terms of the former, despite the essential difference between the two, underscored by commentator after commentator. Interestingly, the focus of Patañjali's discussion, within which prajñā is introduced, is meditation. According to him, prajñā takes place in nirvicārā samāpatti ("meditation beyond reflectivity"), en route to nirbīja (objectless) samādhi. The discussion of his commentators shifts from meditation to epistemology, concerned as they are primarily with the status of prajñā as a pramāṇa.

Contemporary interpreters and translators of the Yogasūtra do not add much to the discussion of the commentators of the old; rather, each of them picks up a segment of the discussion sketched in detail above. Vivekananda, for example, writes on YS 1.49 that,

> The central idea of the Yogis is that just as we come in direct contact with objects of the senses, so religion even can be directly perceived in a far more intense sense. The truths of religion, as God and Soul, cannot be perceived by the external senses. I cannot see God with my eyes, nor can I touch Him with my hands.[33]

In his typical style, consisting of God, Soul, and Him,[34] all in capital letters, together with the nonIndian notion of "religion,"[35] Vivekananda reinforces the classic commentators' presentation of prajñā as para-pratyakṣa. Famous for searching as a young man a guru who actually "sees God," Vivekananda returns in his present commentary to his early quest for "direct contact" with the sublime. Prajñā is projected by him as the pramāṇa which enables yogin-s, such as Rāmakṛṣṇa and Vivekananda himself, in his Narendranath days at Dakṣiṇeśvar, to "see God" and to "touch Him," even if not through the senses. Vivekananda works with the analogy between prajñā and pratyakṣa hinted in YS 1.49, and like Patañjali, speaks of the yogic experience (or more universally, of religious experience) in terms of the more available experience of the senses.

Ian Whicher dedicates a thorough discussion to the notion of prajñā in a chapter titled "A Closer Look at Perception in the Yogasūtra."[36] The title itself assumes the interconnection between pratyakṣa and prajñā. Drawing on Vācaspatimiśra's and Vijñānabhikṣu's commentaries of YS 1.7, Whicher suggests that yogi-pratyakṣa or yogic perception is a synonym of sākṣātkāra (direct yogic perception), a term used by Patañjali in the Vibhūti-pāda as again a synonym, or as closely related to, or according to Whicher, as "the basis of" saṃyama (object-centered yogic meditation). In YS 3.18, for example, Patañjali writes that "through sākṣāt-karaṇa (direct yogic perception) of the saṃskāra-s, knowledge of previous births is obtained."[37] In this case, the saṃskāra-s are the object of yogic perception. In YS 3.19, Patañjali argues that "(Through sākṣāt-karaṇa) of mental content (pratyaya), knowledge of (the content of) other minds is obtained."[38] "This (knowledge)," he adds in 3.20, "does not include (other factors) which determine (the content of the mind looked into), since they are not the object (of sākṣāt-karaṇa).[39] This last clarification is important as it highlights the directness, particularity, and 'objectivity' of yogic perception, all of which have been discussed above.[40]

Whicher depicts perception in Pātañjala-yoga as a process of purification, or sattvification as he puts it, very much in tune with the commentators' discussion. In this respect, he speaks of the transformation from "ordinary perception, by way of the outward facing power of the mind to perceive objects through the senses" to "yogic perception through the inward facing power of the mind." It is the latter which "eventually leads to the mind's complete purification, sattvification, and liberation."[41]

A significant point raised by Whicher apropos perception as a process of purification is that ordinary perception "is subject to distortion due to various karmic factors in the mind (i.e., saṃskāra-s and vāsanā-s), that affect

or color how we perceive and appropriate the objects we encounter."[42] It is to say that ordinary pratyakṣa is limited not merely by the senses, but even by karmic factors, to be cleansed in the process of yoga alongside the "purification" of perception itself from loka-pratyakṣa to para-pratyakṣa.

Whicher further alludes[43] to YS 4.20, which highlights in his reading the "epistemological limitations of the mind." Here Patañjali suggests that the mind (citta) cannot perceive both an object and itself simultaneously. Therefore it perceives objects, and is itself "perceived" by puruṣa (and as the next sūtra suggests in reply to a Buddhist pūrva-pakṣin, not by another citta or other citta-s).[44] I would like to suggest that if in YS 1.49, Patañjali draws a parallel between pratyakṣa and prajñā despite their essential difference, here the parallel is between the mind as the perceiver of objects, and puruṣa as the "perceiver" of the mind as it perceives objects. The "problem" is that puruṣa does not "perceive" in the same sense as the mind. "He" is indeed depicted in Sāṃkhyakārikā 19 as endowed with sākṣitvam and draṣṭṛtvam, that is, the "qualities" of being a "witness" and a "spectator,"[45] but as per the Sāṃkhyan narrative, "he" is absolutely passive (or endowed with akartṛ-bhāva), hence it is "her" (prakṛti) who is perceived by "him," or is illuminated by "his" light, rather than "him" "actively" perceiving "her."[46] Vyāsa dedicates his gloss of YS 2.20,[47] to the similarity and difference in the perception of the mind (buddhi) and puruṣa. The mind perceives objects as long as they come in touch with it through the senses, or "color" it. In the same way but altogether differently, the buddhi is "perceived" by puruṣa. In the same way, as Vyāsa puts it in his present gloss and Vācaspatimiśra in his commentary of YS 1.7, since "puruṣa is the introspector[48] of the buddhi" (buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī puruṣaḥ). The verb pratisaṃvedī conveys the link between puruṣa and the buddhi. Owing to "his" unchanging presence, the ever-changing buddhi is "seen." Moreover, in the light emanating from "him," the buddhi is not just "seen" but also perceives objects. When "his" light is reflected in the buddhi, the light assumes the latter's shape, just as the buddhi itself assumes the form of the objects perceived by it. The buddhi is hence depicted as a prism, through which the light of puruṣa is refracted and transforms into a citta-vṛtti. Similar as puruṣa's "perception" is to the perception of objects by the mind, Vyāsa also underscores the difference between these two perception types. The buddhi as puruṣa's "object," he suggests, is not "perceived or not perceived" (gṛhītā'gṛhītā) as the objects of the mind are by the mind, but is rather constantly "perceived," the light of puruṣa being ever illuminating. Vyāsa, in his gloss of 2.20, cannot but speak of puruṣa in terms of the buddhi. Perception is a function of the buddhi or the mind. However Patañjali's "soteriological pedagogy," as it is referred to by Whicher,[49] compels him and his commentators to speak of the unspeakable. Their "translation task" is to convey "the other" in familiar language, to hint at puruṣa through the language of prakṛti.

A philosophical magnifying glass always reveals something new, a seldom noticed angle, a hardly touched on viśeṣa, even in a text of which so much has already been written such as the Yogasūtra. In the present case, the notion of prajñā, or more precisely ṛtam-bharā prajñā as depicted in YS 1.49, was the focus of enquiry. Our "grand discoveries" included first, the hinted parallel between pratyakṣa and prajñā based on the reading of YS 1.49 vis-à-vis YS 1.7; a parallel which results in the projection of prajñā as para-pratyakṣa by Patañjali's commentators. Hence prajñā is reformulated as nothing less than a yogic pramāṇa or means of knowledge. This explains the second "grand discovery," about the shift from meditation to epistemology in the discourse of the commentators, who discuss the notion of prajñā within the technical, philosophical context of perception. Another "discovery," at least for me, minor but however intriguing, was the "deer on the moon," which I catalogue together with the "king-bee" (madhukara-rāja) from Vyāsa's commentary of YS 2.54. While the deer is as valid an image as any other to be seen on the moon, and while it has since been discovered that the bee-king is in fact a queen, these rare examples offer unique historical windows to the minds of thinkers whom we read, with whom we think, with whom we spend hours upon hours, yet of whom we know literally nothing beyond the texts ascribed to them.

Notes

1 Rukmani (1989b), p. 183.
2 Ibid.
3 yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ (YS 1.2).
4 pratyakṣa-anumāna-āgamāḥ pramāṇāni (YS 1.7).
5 śruta-anumāna-prajñābhyām anya-viṣayā viśeṣa-arthatvāt (YS 1.49). Or in Rukmani's translation, "[ṛtambharā prajñā or truthful discernment] has a different object from that of the intelligence arising from scriptures and inference; because it has a particular as its object" (ibid., p. 247).
6 Reliable testimony—in YS 1.7 Patañjali uses the term āgama. In YS 1.49 he opts for the term śruta. His commentators agree that in the present case, āgama and śruta are synonyms.
7 nirvicāra-vaiśāradye 'adhyātma-prasādaḥ (YS 1.47).
8 Tattvavaiśāradī 1.47, in Miśra (1998), p. 125.
9 The articulation is Whicher's (2000, p. 144).
10 YS 2.52 and 3.44; See also Christopher Chapple's "Luminosity and Yoga" (2008, pp. 71–82), a chapter dedicated to images and metaphors of light in the Yogasūtra.
11 Patañjali and his commentators do not question the very possibility of perceiving particulars, even through pratyakṣa. Monima Chadha, formulating a "Nyāya-Kantian approach" (2001) and "drawing inspiration from Navya-Naiyāyikas" (2004), argues that (a) we cannot in effect perceive particulars, and the very idea of perceiving a particular-as-

such (representing in her discussion Buddhist positions such as that of the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika-s) is incoherent; and (b) we can perceive only universal features. Mark Siderits (2004) recreates a Buddhist response to the Naiyāyika's challenge as presented by her. The Nyāya–Buddhist, Chadha–Siderits saṃvād is an intriguing one, even if it is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

12 See YS 1.9, 1.42 and 3.17.

13 Rukmani (1989c), p. 167.

14 Vācaspatimiśra in his commentary of YS 1.7 (Miśra 1998, p. 29) refers to pratyakṣa as mūla-pramāṇa, that is, as the root of all other (conventional) pramāṇa-s.

15 YS 3.26: pravṛtty-āloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam

By focusing the light of (extraordinary) sense-activity, knowledge of the subtle, hidden, and remote is attained.

16 See also YS 3.37: Hence (as a result of obtaining puruṣa-jñāna, knowledge of puruṣa), prātibha (yogic illumination) and extraordinary senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting, and smelling arise (tataḥ prātibha-śrāvaṇa-vedanā-ādarśa-āsvāda-vārtā jāyante); and YS 3.42: Through saṃyama on the relation between ear and space, divine hearing is attained (śrotra-ākāśayoḥ saṃbandha-saṃyamād divyaṃ śrotram).

17 It seems that the term puruṣa in Vyāsa's response to the pūrva-pakṣin (bhūta-sūkṣma-gato vā puruṣa-gato vā) does not refer to puruṣa in the Sāṃkhyan sense of the word, denoting one's metaphysical core. Āraṇya (1981, p. 107), in P. N. Mukerji's translation, interprets the term puruṣa here as "the Puruṣa-like receiver (Mahān)." And Whicher (2000, p. 237) explains that "puruṣa is not an object in samādhi. Puruṣa is 'subtle', but is in an entirely different category from prakṛti and her evolutes . . . Since the topic of these sūtra-s [YS 1.41–9] is cognitive or object-oriented samādhi, and it is not until asaṃprajñāta that the 'aloneness' (kaivalya) of puruṣa can occur, the degrees of subtlety (sūkṣmatā) mentioned above [in YS 1.44–5] only lead up to unmanifest prakṛti." Whicher's analysis refers to YSb 1.45, but is also applicable, at least in my reading, to the term puruṣa in Vyāsa's gloss of YS 1.49.

18 The translation is Woods's (1998, p. 95).

19 Vācaspatimiśra corresponds with the notion of vaiśāradya mentioned by Patañjali in YS 1.47, which according to Vyāsa denotes a steady flow of sattvic buddhi, "pure mind" devoid of rajas and tamas.

20 Miśra (1998), p. 128.

21 Rukmani (2001), vol. 1, p. 198.

22 See YS 1.24: kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvaraḥ. Īśvara is a special puruṣa untouched by the kleśa-s, by action and its fruits, and by "long-term karmic imprints" (āśaya).

Unlike Patañjali, Śaṅkara dares to suggest that īśvara or god belongs to the phenomenal category of māyā, rather than to the trans-phenomenal domain of the ātman/Brahman (see his Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya 2.1.14). Roughly speaking (and despite significant differences), māyā is the Advaitic parallel of prakṛti, the ātman/Brahman of puruṣa.

23 Rukmani (2001), vol. 1, p. 199.

24 Rukmani (1981), p. 248.
25 Ibid., pp. 249–50.
26 Ibid., p. 250.
27 In Sāṃkhyakārikā 18, Īśvarakṛṣṇa writes that,

> The plurality of puruṣa-s is established because of the diversity of births, deaths, and faculties; because of actions or functions (that take place) at different times; and because of difference in the proportions of the three guṇa-s (in different entities).

jananamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamād ayugapatpravṛtteś ca, puruṣabahutvaṃ siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyayāc cai'va (Larson 1979, p. 261; his translation).
28 kṛta-arthaṃ prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭaṃ tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt (YS 2.22).
29 Larson (1992), p. 99.
30 See Patañjali's own YS 4.17: An object is known or unknown as much as the citta (consciousness) is "colored" by it (or acquires its form).

> tad-uparāga-upekṣitvāc cittasya vastu jñāta-ajñātam.

31 I use the terms vastu-tantra and puruṣa-tantra as in Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya 1.1.4.
32 Rukmani (1981), p. 251.
33 Vivekananda (2004), p. 163.
34 Interestingly, Rāmakṛṣṇa's famous disciple, who sat at the feet of his guru in goddess Kālī's temple at Dakṣiṇeśvar, prefers "Him" to "Her."
35 In this respect see Paul Hacker's discussion (1995, p. 238) of the "inverted translation" of the Western, monotheistic term "religion" into "dharma." The notion of dharma with its wide range of meanings (cosmic order, ritualistic life, duty, truth, righteousness, and in the Buddhist context, the teachings of the Buddha) is further expanded to accommodate the idea of "religion." The point is that language does not depict but creates and determines. In this sense, Vivekananda not merely borrows a Western term to depict an Indian phenomenon, but rethinks and reinterprets his own tradition vis-à-vis the Christian narrative.
36 Whicher (2000), pp. 143–9.
37 saṃskāra-sākṣāt-karaṇāt-pūrva-jāti-jñānam (YS 3.18).
38 pratyayasya para-citta-jñānam (YS 3.19).
39 na ca tat sa-ālambanaṃ tasya-aviṣayī-bhūtatvāt (YS 3.20).
40 Interesting as the clarification in YS 3.20 is for the sake of our discussion, the explanatory character of the sūtra might suggest that is does not belong to the so-called mūla-text (root-text), but to a commentary. And indeed several manuscripts attribute the words of YS 3.20 to Vyāsa, as reflected for example in the text and translation of Rāma Prasāda (2010, pp. 219–20; first published in 1910), and Bangali Baba (2010, p. 79). For both of them, it is not a sūtra but a part of the commentary.
41 Whicher (2000), p. 147.
42 Ibid., p. 145.
43 Ibid., pp. 147–8.
44 YS 4.19–21: It (the citta) is not a light-to-itself (i.e., the citta perceives objects but not itself), as it is seen (or "perceived" by puruṣa). Furthermore, both cannot be perceived simultaneously. Had one mind (citta) been perceived by

another, it would have led to infinite regression (atiprasaṅga) from one mind (buddhi) to another, and to intermixture of memories.

> na tat sva-ābhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt | eka-samaye ca-ubhaya-anavadhāraṇam | citta-antara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher-atiprasaṅgaḥ smṛti–saṃkaraś ca

45 The question is what the difference between sākṣitvam and draṣṭṛtvam is. What do each of these prima facie close (almost synonymous) terms denote? Or, how do the two terms complement, or perhaps even overlap one another? The commentators of the Sāṃkhyakārikā attempt to clarify the ambiguity in their glosses.

46 In Sāṃkhyakārikā 66, Īśvarakṛṣṇa imagines a "farewell conversation" between puruṣa and prakṛti, on the verge of kaivalya:

> dṛṣṭā maye'ty upekṣaka ekaḥ
> dṛṣṭā'ham ity uparamaty anyā

Or,

> "She has been seen by me," says the indifferent one. "I have been seen," the other says as she ceases.

Since he is essentially passive, puruṣa speaks in the passive form: "she has been seen by me," rather than "I saw her." The passive form is the most common in Sanskrit, but nevertheless I would like to read puruṣa's words as "representing" his in-built passivity.

47 YS 2.20: The seer (draṣṭṛ) is nothing but pure seeing (dṛśi). Although pure (i.e., content-less), he "sees" mental activity.

draṣṭā dṛśi-mātraḥ śuddho 'pi pratyaya-anupaśyaḥ.

48 I draw on the Yoga Kośa (1991, p. 190). Even though they translate the term pratisaṃvedana as introspection, the Kośa authors remark that "though introspection is not quite the correct word for puruṣa's apprehension of the processes of its citta (mind), it is better than seeing." A similar remark is found in H. Āraṇya's gloss of YS 2.20. Here he notes, apropos Patañjali's use of the word draṣṭṛ (seer), that "puruṣa is not a seer in the usual meaning ascribed to the term, because that would be imputing the quality and action to puruṣa, who is beyond both" (i.e., beyond qualities and action alike) (1981, p. 179). Like the authors of the Yoga Kośa, Āraṇya conveys the short-handedness of language with regard to puruṣa.

49 Whicher (2000), p. 146.

4

Text as a process: a dialogue with Daya Krishna

One cannot understand any work unless one ceases to see it as a finished product

(DAYA KRISHNA, "THINKING CREATIVELY ABOUT THE CREATIVE ACT")[1]

But friends, the Vyavahāra matters!

(DAYA KRISHNA, "CIVILIZATIONS: NOSTALGIA AND UTOPIA")[2]

To think is to risk

(MIGUEL DE BEISTEGUI)[3]

The following paragraphs are written as an introduction to the next chapter which consists of Daya Krishna's (henceforth DK) article "The Undeciphered Text: Anomalies, Problems and Paradoxes in the Yogasūtra" (2006). Their aim is to present the paper within the broader scope of DK's philosophical work. I will touch on DK's methodology, which he himself refers to as saṃvād, a term which will be discussed shortly. Subsequently I will reflect on DK's saṃvādic reading of the Yogasūtra. A special emphasis will be given to DK's critique of Patañjali's kaivalya or disengagement-as-freedom notion, as well as to the alternative offered by him, freedom-wise. I will depict DK's reading of the Yogasūtra as an instance of his larger attempt at rethinking classical Indian philosophy, with its different branches, schools, and texts. For DK, his Yogasūtra article to be presented here is just an illustration of

the fruitfulness of rethinking, or thinking with, or thinking from old texts of which allegedly everything has already been said and written. In this respect, it is more of a prolegomenon than a comprehensive study in yoga philosophy. Like a wandering sādhu, if I may return to Vikram Chandra's dialogue from the Entrée, DK is a visitor at different disciplines and numerous texts. He arrives, leaves the specialists a pile of questions for consideration, and drives his "question-wagon" on to the next text, tradition, or field of study. Questions, for DK are the essence of philosophy as saṃvād. "From the perspective of systematic philosophy," Arindam Chakrabarti observes, "Daya Krishna's endless journeys of thinking might appear chaotic and rudderless. But my hunch is that he would have laughingly welcomed that allegation."[4] The present chapter is dedicated, then, to DK's Yogasūtra thinking-journey. The questions he raises in his article have been the incentive, or at least a major incentive, in writing this book. Not in order to answer them, but since, as Chandra's sādhu rightly points out, "questions give birth only to other questions." Hence the following lines are not merely about DK's saṃvādic approach to the Yogasūtra, but also about my own saṃvād or dialogue with him, through his Yogasūtra reading.

1. Philosophy as saṃvād

For DK, saṃvād (I follow the Hindi pronunciation rather than the full written form, saṃvāda)—dialogic encounter, open discussion, sometimes even biting debate—is the heart of philosophy and philosophizing. Saṃvād may take different forms. The most basic saṃvād is an interpersonal dialogue, a philosophical meeting in which each of the participants is both a pūrva-pakṣin and a siddhāntin, both questioning the other and defending his own position. "Have you ever met a person with a great reputation whose books you have read and gone to meet him and talked to him?" DK asks his listeners in "Thinking Creatively about the Creative Act," a talk-turned-into-article.[5] The motivation to travel afar to meet a thinker is that through the meeting, one may be able to "see" his thinking-stream instead of buying the alleged finality of his thought. DK makes a clear-cut distinction between "thinking" and "thought."[6] The latter refers to an ostensibly final or complete "product," and the former to an ongoing dynamic process. The "products" of the thinking process, in the form of articles, books, works of art, and so on, are perceived by DK as mere stops along the journey, intended to collect questions, feedback, and counter-perspectives, based on which one's thinking may develop in new directions. DK goes as far as to suggest that "the *presence* [DK's italics] of the person, in a sense, transcends all that he has written, and to a certain extent even negates it."[7] Arindam Chakrabarti is somewhat skeptic about what he refers to as "the phenomenology of witnessing and listening to a conceptual artist-at-work."[8] However, he recalls two such major saṃvād-s which had a tremendous impact on DK's thinking, namely his encounters with Kalidas

Bhattacharyya, KCB's son and one of DK's teachers, and Pandit Badrinath Shukla, to whom he has dedicated his opus magnum *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*. It is my feeling that the dialogic friendship between DK and Badrinath Shukla, between the professor and the pandit, contributed to the fact that Indian philosophy has gradually become the subject-matter of DK's thinking, a "turn" which culminated in his final work, *The Jaipur Edition of the Ṛgveda*, of which I will write below. This is the place to mention the meetings between traditional pandits, writing and thinking in Sanskrit, and scholars trained in the Western tradition of philosophizing, which DK (among others) initiated and participated in. He wholeheartedly believed in the capacity of these meetings to produce something novel-adventurous-comprehensive in Indian philosophy. He regarded the meetings, or the experiments, as he used to refer to them, as instances of a unique dialogue between "India" (the pandits) and the "West" (the professors) and as an intriguing model of comparative philosophy. Interestingly, he himself was initially inclined toward the Western tradition of philosophizing, but in the course of time shifted to become a dvibhāṣī, "bilingual translator," between these two cultures of thinking.[9]

Another form of saṃvād, even more prevailing than the interpersonal philosophic dialogue, is the reader–text saṃvād, which for DK is not less dynamic, mutual, and lively an encounter than the face-to-face, person-to-person saṃvād. He writes:

> I understand a text better when I ask myself what does the author try to do. I make the text my own and then see which questions arise in my mind, and whether the author's thoughts moved in the same way as mine or not. Thus I get into his work, into his thought process, taking it up and carrying it in a direction it was not taken before.[10]

He further elucidates his vision of the reader–text saṃvād in a letter to a friend:

> Perhaps we could think of Kant in another way, not as a philosopher to be "understood" by other thinkers in the last two hundred years, but as a starting point for carrying the Kantian enterprise further. This can be done in the context of other philosophers also, instead of wasting time in "understanding" what they "really" said. We might profit from their insights and carry them further to the best of our ability. This would bring diverse and multiple aspects of a thinker to our notice, which are seldom seen, and other strains which exist only as a tendency in his thought.[11]

According to DK, the challenge in reading Kant, or any other philosopher, is to think *with* him. This is to say that DK is hardly interested in arriving at a faithful restoration of Kant's thought, but instead in taking part in his thinking process, in rethinking the "problems" that Kant had tried to deal with.

Paradoxically, according to DK, this would not be just a stimulating exercise, but in effect the most faithful reading of Kant, or for that matter Patañjali, or any other thinker. Furthermore, for DK, a text is never a closed entity with a single meaning, namely the author's. "What attracts our attention," he writes, "is the product of creativity and not the process of which it is the end result."[12] His task, as he saw it, was to shift the readers' attention from the product to the process. "Text as a process" means not just that the writer's thinking process is reflected in the text, but that the text becomes a "meeting place" of author and reader, a "realm of between" in which the reader is as integral a contributor to the text as the author. Such an attitude changes the conventional balance between authorship and readership. The text no longer "belongs" to the author, but turns into a saṃvād. "Text as a process" is apauruṣeya, however not in the literal sense of or "not being composed by a human author," as the śruti or scriptures are traditionally considered, but in the sense of having more than a single author, of becoming a mutual, collective endeavor. In Nietzschean terms, "text as a process" belongs to "none and all." In Barthesian terms, "the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the author," however, not in Barthes's own sense of a text isolated from its authorship or an "authorless" text, but in a multiauthored sense, in the sense that the authorship is not annihilated but rather extended.

Mukund Lath, DK's close associate and a renowned thinker and translator in his own right, touches on the Sanskrit notion of svīkaraṇa ("making one's own"), a term coined by the seventh or eighth century poet Rājaśekhara in his work Kāvyamīmāṃsā, with reference to lines, couplets, stanza, and other units "borrowed" or "quoted" from other poets and used in one's own poetry. For Rājaśekhara, explains Lath, a svīkaraṇa is not haraṇa or plagiarism, but "a legitimate, even commendable poetic practice, which operates through creatively transforming given material."[13] I would like to read DK's "I make the text my own" technique as a philosophical instance of svīkaraṇa. Along these lines, I decided to "borrow" his Yogasūtra article and "use it in my own poetry." It will not only make my dialogue with him more vivid, but also enable the reader to read/meet/participate in DK's work according to the "reading instructions" provided by him above.

I would like to conclude this short introduction of DK's work with a note on his final project, *The Jaipur Edition of the Ṛgveda*, to which he dedicated the last two years of his life. DK took the *Ṛgveda*, the most revered text of the Indian tradition, and placed it (literally) under his magnifying-glass. After a close reading, he reedited the text according to the ṛṣi-s and the ṛṣikā-s, that is, the poets to whom the sūkta-s or Vedic hymns are ascribed. By collecting the hymns composed by each ṛṣi and ṛṣikā (and DK was extremely interested in the voice of the ṛṣikā-s, the women ṛṣi-s), otherwise scattered in the different maṇḍala-s of the text, he sought to reveal a hitherto unnoticed layer of the text. He therefore purchased big scissors, and started (again literally) to cut and repaste. He created a fascinating collage with far-reaching consequences for any "tradition text," to use an old phrase by

Eliot Deutsch.[14] If a "traditional text" belongs to and stands for a certain tradition, then in the case of "tradition text," it is the tradition which "belongs" to the text, which writes and rewrites itself time and again through the text, commentary after commentary and translation after translation.

The *Jaipur Edition of the Ṛgveda* is a creative, playful, thought-provoking reader–text saṃvād, in the course of which reader and text alike are transformed. DK not only rereads and rewrites the Ṛgveda, but also meets himself anew through the text. On his own transformation he writes in amazement to a circle of close friends in 2007:

> What may come as a shock and a surprise is the work on the *Ṛgveda* that we have been doing. It is unbelievable! Daya Krishna is working on the *Ṛgveda*. But the unbelievable does happen.

As these lines are written, the manuscript of *The Jaipur Edition of the Ṛgveda* still awaits publication.

2. Daya Krishna on yoga

For DK, as I have suggested above, questions are the heart of the philosophical work. In "The Undeciphered Text," he raises numerous questions which occurred as he was reading the Yogasūtra. I will discuss his paper following the question-trail.

Question #1: What is the relation between samādhi and kaivalya?

DK notices that the first chapter of the Yogasūtra is dedicated to samādhi, the last to kaivalya. His initial, tentative response is that there must be a difference between these two notions, which could be denoting distinct yoga-goals. Later, DK suggests that "the Yogasūtra may be seen as crystallizing a long tradition of Buddhist, Jain, and Upaniṣadic preachers." If such is the case, then the terms samādhi and kaivalya could be taken from different sources, the latter from the Sāṃkhya tradition, even if it is also used by the Jain-s. Further down the track, and following a close reading of the text, DK reaches the conclusion that "for the author of the Yogasūtra, it is kaivalya that is the final stage and, presumably, either identical with samādhi or the result of it." Both notions allude to disengagement-as-freedom, a philosophical position which DK cannot accept.

Question #2: What is the relation between kaivalya and śakti or power?

According to DK, the only thing that can escape the vṛtti category in Patañjali's formulation is the power or śakti to stop or extinguish the vṛtti-s, namely nirodha-śakti. However, he writes,

> The Yogasūtra does not seem to have any discussion on this, or even realize the implications of this for its ideal of realizing kaivalya, which

> it undermines in a fundamental way. The kevalin, in case the Sāṃkhya framework is accepted for Yoga, cannot be kartā or a bhoktā, but only a draṣṭā, and hence cannot do anything, or have any power.

In YS 4.34, Patañjali defines kaivalya as a state in which "the power of pure consciousness (citi-śakti) abides in its own essence (sva-rūpa-pratiṣṭhā)." The notion of citi refers to a motionless, vṛtti-less citta, that is "empty," "silent," "transparent" consciousness. However neither Patañjali nor any of his commentators discusses, as DK rightly points out, the notion of śakti or power in relation to kaivalya. The commentators focus on the first part of YS 4.34, which defines kaivalya as a state in which "the guṇa-s turn back to their source, once (their work) for the sake of puruṣa is accomplished" (puruṣa-artha-śūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ). The mention of potential power, power not-to-be-used, power which cannot be used by definition, in the form of citi-śakti (or nirodha-śakti in DK's formulation), corresponds in my reading with YS 3.38. Here Patañjali writes that,

> [The siddhi-s or yogic powers] are obstacles to samādhi, but nevertheless attainments when the consciousness is directed outwardly (to the world).[15]

Interestingly amidst a long list of siddhi-s,[16] Patañjali suggests that the siddhi-s are siddhi-s (attainments) only for an outward-facing consciousness, and hurdles (upasargā) on the inward-facing path to samādhi. This is to say that these "powers" are in effect not-to-be-used by the yogin who strives for kaivalya. In their short glosses on the sūtra under discussion, the commentators do not discuss the notion of siddhi as "power," but merely repeat Patañjali's comment that the yogin should be indifferent[17] to these "powers" born of meditation. In YS 3.51, Patañjali reinforces his contention that the paths of siddhi and samādhi/kaivalya are incompatible, as he writes that,

> Dispassion (vairāgya) even to this (to the siddhi mentioned in the previous sūtra, or perhaps to the aforementioned siddhi-s at large), with destruction of the doṣa (impurity) seeds, results in kaivalya.[18]

I see a correlation, even continuation, between the siddhi-s and the śakti of the citi, as they both convey a narrative of power not to be used. As KCB puts it,

> [Yoga is] essentially the will to nivṛtti and not to pravṛtti, the will to mukti, to freedom as the power to stand distinct from the power to create objective values indefinitely.[19]

The highest degree of power, then, is "the power to stand distinct from power," to be able not to use it, as one resolves to no longer be a "user," a "doer," a kartā. However DK does not buy the ideal of power divorced from action. He pleads for "the possibility of enlightened action, emanating

from that 'free' and 'enlightened' consciousness that the process of yoga is supposed to unveil." He is unimpressed by "the power to stand distinct," unless it is accompanied by the "power to engage" and a sense of freedom to "travel" between the two at will. In this respect he uses the terms nivṛtti-sāmarthya and pravṛtti-sāmarthya, the power to disengage and the power "to return" and act in the world, which according to him cannot but complement, correct, modify, and influence one another.

Question #3: What is the relation between the siddhi-s and the vṛtti-s?

DK observes that the siddhi-s depend on the vṛtti-s. Therefore the endeavors of accumulating siddhi-s on the one hand and of arresting the citta-vṛtti-s or stilling the mind on the other, contradict and exclude each other. DK's observation about the interlacement between siddhi and vṛtti is accurate with regard to most of the siddhi-s. Interestingly, the majority of the siddhi-s enumerated in chapter 3 of the Yogasūtra consist of different types of knowledge (jñāna) such as knowledge of past and future (YS 3.16), knowledge of the sounds of every living creature (3.17), knowledge of (the content of) other minds (3.19), knowledge of the subtle, hidden, and remote (3.26), knowledge of the arrangement of the stars (3.28), knowledge of the movement of the stars (3.29), knowledge of the arrangement of the body (3.30), and even knowledge of puruṣa (3.36) and knowledge born of discernment (between puruṣa and prakṛti) (3.53). Knowledge, even "yogic knowledge," is indeed a vṛtti, a movement of the mind. Other siddhi-s expounded in the Vibhūti-pāda, such as the development of extraordinary senses (3.37 and 3.42) and of supranormal capacities, such as having power such as that of an elephant (3.25), levitation (3.40), free movement in space (3.43), entering another body (3.39), mastery over the elements (3.45) and over the senses (3.48) are also interrelated with vṛtti-s as they are based on and/or provide data to the mental faculty. However DK is hardly interested in the siddhi-s as camatkāra-s or "miracles." In a sense, he is not at all interested in Patañjali's siddhi-s, but in the notion of siddhi as alluding to "the active or volitional powers of consciousness," which according to him are neglected in Patañjali's vṛtti-scheme "which seems to concentrate more on knowledge." Hence ideally, the knowledge-centered vṛtti-s and action-centered siddhi-s could complement each other.

Question #4: "What exactly is a vṛtti, and 'how' does it 'arise' and 'cease', and 'why' does it happen to be so?"

This is a classic example of a DK-type of question. As he was playing with the notion of vṛtti apropos Patañjali's vṛtti-scheme and the vṛtti-siddhi interplay, DK felt the urge to return to basics, and to try to decipher the very notion itself. His extensive use of quote marks ("how," "why," "arise," "cease") demonstrates his gentle touch of the term, as he puts it under his philosophical microscope. After all, the notion of vṛtti, which DK attempts

to rethink, refers to the subtle working of consciousness, not so easily "translated" into gross, vikalpic words.

Question #5: "The assumption that every possible vṛtti can be classified under these [i.e., Patañjali's] five, and five heads alone, seems at least prima facie, questionable."

I worked with this question above,[20] and suggested that Patañjali's fivefold scheme fails to cover the domains of imagination and the feelings. Questioning the Sūtra-kāra's vṛtti-scheme, DK further asks and comments:

Question #6: "It is not clear if the author of the Yogasūtra would classify yama and niyama amongst the vṛtti-s. It would be a disaster if it were to be so, as instead of cultivating them one would have to try to stop them."

The yama-s and niyama-s, if taken as inner tendencies at the level of consciousness can indeed be "labeled" as vṛtti-s. In YS 2.33–4, discussed above,[21] Patañjali and his commentators depict ahiṃsā, nonviolence, as "going beyond" violence, owing to a penetrating reflection upon violence and its consequences. If such is the case, DK's observation about yama and niyama as vṛtti-s start to make sense. Does it mean that they are to be stopped in the process of yoga? In this respect KCB surmises that,

> The absolute will that yoga implies [i.e., the will to nivṛtti, to "stoppage"] is as much "beyond good and evil" as the absolute knowledge of the Vedāntist or the absolute bhakti of the Vaiṣṇava.[22]

For the Nietzschean KCB, yoga as transcendence goes beyond the phenomenal realm, including its ethical dimension. DK who is interested in yoga in as much as it has the capacity to contribute to, modify, and improve the phenomenal domain, is not taken by the picture of yoga as amoral (not immoral). "It would be a disaster," he responds to the very thought that the yama-s and niyama-s will be "burned" in the great yogic "flame" as vṛtti-s.

Question #7: "But why the outgoing movement of consciousness should be regarded as something 'undesirable' in itself, or the 'inward' movement intrinsically desirable, has remained the 'unasked' question in the Indian tradition."

Question #7 rearticulated: "The question is what makes a vṛtti, whether outward or inward, good or bad, and, at a deeper level, what *are* these two movements of consciousness, and whether one obstructs the other or the pursuit of one excludes the pursuit of the other."

DK turns his magnifying glass to the twin-notions of pravṛtti and nivṛtti, in an attempt to "defend" pravṛtti. For him, the two modes of consciousness, the outer-facing as much as the inner-facing, are "necessary." And freedom, according to him, is the capacity to "switch" between these modes at will.

On pravṛtti and nivṛtti, KCB elucidates that,

> To Yoga, both are forms of willing, while to Sāṃkhya the negative one [nivṛtti] is not willing but only reflection, a knowing process implying abstention from willing. [. . . In Yoga] nivṛtti too is willing, willing explicitly to cancel finitising pravṛtti, willing in reflective knowledge where the knowledge is an aspect of the willing and is to be ultimately suppressed by it. Both pravṛtti and nivṛtti emerge in knowledge, but while the positive willing never outruns knowledge, negative willing outruns knowledge in the last resort in asaṃprajñāta.[23]

For KCB, Yoga is all about willing, or more precisely about nivṛtti as "the will to retract willing" or "the will not to will."[24] He also speaks of "nirodha-will" or the "vṛtti-arresting will"[25] either as a synonym of nivṛtti, or as a special type, the yogic type, of nivṛtti. According to him, nivṛtti, which he also refers to as "spiritual willing," is "free willing that not only springs from knowledge but continues and actualizes it."[26] This continuation and actualization takes place in asaṃprajñāta ("noncognitive") samādhi. KCB very lucidly explains that,

> In saṃprajñāta-yoga the mind stands in a vṛtti and resists its change into other states, while in asamprajñāta it is taken to withdraw itself from all vṛtti-s. The will to prevent the emergence of vṛtti is called nirodha, which is understood as the heart of yoga.[27]

In a different context, dealing with the notion of freedom interwoven in the "ownerless emotion" of rasa-aesthetics, Mukund Lath beautifully interprets the concept of rasa as "the self-consciousness of emotion from within emotion itself" and as "emotion observed through the eye of emotion."[28] In the same way, I would like to suggest, apropos KCB's analysis, that nivṛtti in Pātañjala-yoga is "the self-consciousness of willing from within willing itself" and "willing observed through the eye of willing." However the awareness inherent in nivṛtti does not exhaust its "active" vṛtti-preventing function. Unlike DK who sees pravṛtti and nivṛtti as equally significant, KCB works within the yogic framework, which regards nivṛtti as more "far-reaching" than pravṛtti, owing to its capacity of taking the yogin to the final "stop" of his "willing-journey," surpassing knowledge.

Question #8: What is the relation between samādhi and mokṣa?

This is DK's mahā-question, the cornerstone of the whole paper. It enables him to take issue with Patañjali's disengagement-as-freedom narrative, and to sketch an alternative.

"For some strange reason," he writes, "mukti and samādhi have been considered identical." And he adds that,

> Somehow, for some reason, the Indian tradition devalued all that is included under the term pravṛtti and believed there is a no "return" from nirvikalpa samādhi, as it is the same as mokṣa, that is, the "final" stage from which there is no "return". . . The fact that one is an "embodied"

> being, who is "alive" in the ordinary biological sense of the term, should be sufficient to question this identification.

For DK, the notions of samādhi, nirodha, and kaivalya are (almost) synonyms and they all allude to "withdrawal of consciousness from all externality." The notion of mokṣa, on the other hand, he sees as implying freedom both to "withdraw" and to "return." Withdrawal without return is for him bondage in disguise, loss of freedom in the name of freedom. Trapped in "irreversible samādhi,"

> [O]ne becomes totally incapable of doing anything, let alone helping others on the path to yoga or anything else. Surely, the author of the Yogasūtra could not have meant this. [. . .] The fact that he wrote the text to show "others" the path is the proof.

DK sees the writing of the Yogasūtra as an act of "return" on behalf of its author. His insistence on helpfulness as a sign of freedom reminds me of Śaṅkara, the famous Advaitin. In his commentary of the action-centered Bhagavadgītā, he deviates from his custom of referring to mokṣa merely in terms of knowledge, and suggests that an action which is loka-saṃgrahāya, "for the sake of the whole world," or simply "helpful" as DK puts it, is an "enlightened action." Such action is either undertaken by a person who has already achieved mokṣa or contributes to its attainment.[29]

If freedom is taken as consisting of both "withdrawal" and "return," then DK offers an alternative reading of the Yogasūtra, a reading which permits the "return":

> The "vṛtti-nirodha," then, has to be understood in a different way. It can only mean the capacity of nirodha in respect of any vṛtti whatsoever, and not the "actuality" of it in the sense that there is no vṛtti at all, or that even the possibility of any vṛtti arising has been abolished forever. [. . . T]he pursuit of yoga and attainment of samādhi should result in the purification of the vṛtti-s, their "release" from "self-centeredness," and not their cessation or nirodha as the Yogasūtra seems to say.

DK's alternative is based on a single word, capacity. Instead of nirodha, he suggests thinking in terms of the capacity of nirodha, which allows the complementary capacity to "return."

Question #9: The present question is about the biological, physical, material, phenomenal dimensions of one's existence and Pātañjala-yoga: "But can there possibly ever be a nirodha of that which has been described by the terms āsana and prāṇāyāma in the aṣṭāṅga-yoga of the Yogasūtra?"

I do not think that DK's worry is about āsana and prāṇāyāma as such, but about the "reality" of the world in which the yogin sits silently in meditation, and which is forgotten or suppressed in Patañjali's discussion. DK insists that,

> [J]ust as the "living body" is there, very much there, "helping" one to be in a state of samādhi, so is the air one breathes, the earth on which one sits and all the rest which supports the earth and the air in the universe.

To drive the point home, DK draws on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, a yoga-text which does not "forget" the material aspect in the quest of the absolute. In this respect, DK underscores the Upaniṣadic notion of anna, "food," and suggests that,

> The samādhi of the Yogasūtra can only be of a being who has not only prāṇa, manas, vijñāna and ānanda, but who is also sustained and nourished by anna, the umbilical cord that binds him to the universe.

DK is interested, then, in freedom not from matter, but with and within matter. From the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad he also draws a nonisolationistic, even social or communal approach to freedom, which also echoes in Buddhist sources and sets an alternative to Patañjali's disengagement-as-freedom narrative.

Question #10: "The [Yogasūtra] text ends with the Kaivalya-pāda, but it does not ask what shall be the relation between these kevalin-s. The Jain-s, who also have this notion of a plurality of kevalin-s, have not asked the question either."

This question, hinted at in Chapter 3 above, interweaves DK's curiosity about the Sāṃkhyan puruṣa-bahutva narrative, which suits his own constant search for the plural over the advaitic or monolithic, and his "demand" for "enlightened action" instead of "indifferent stillness" on behalf of the mukta/kevalin. If Patañjali closes the Yogasūtra with "empty consciousness" contained within itself and power-not-to-be-used,[30] then DK envisions a different ending, in the form of active collaboration of kevalin-s for a better world.

Question #11: "If one accepts the possibility of samādhi and also of the 'return' from it, one would have to ask the crucial question: How does the attainment of the former affect the latter? One's vyavahāra cannot remain unaffected by one's adventure into the paramārtha, as it would be to deny its effectivity and power, and thus its 'reality' itself."

If he has previously asked how the world and the worldly contribute to yogic meditation (question #9), at present DK raises the opposite but complementary question: How does samādhi or the paramārthic, metaphysic experience contributes to the vyavahāra and the vyavahāric? For him, the "yogic withdrawal" is measured by its capacity to change the world upon "return." He explains:

> [O]nce one accepts the idea of "return" after the "withdrawal" into samādhi, one also accepts the "reality" of that to which one returns. The implications of this "acceptance" are so enormous, that they would

> undermine the very foundations on the basis of which the edifice of Indian spirituality has been built.

Acceptance of the possibility of "return" implies acceptance of the "reality" of the phenomenal realm. This is what DK means when he speaks of "enormous implications." In such a case, popular notions such as māyā and līlā, which refer to the worldly, mundane realm derogatorily as insubstantial, even illusory, will break into pieces. The "here" will gain or regain its status as meaningful. DK pleads for a panoramic picture, wide enough to cover the metaphysical together with the physical, the alaukika, and the laukika alike.

A similar philosophic move, which insists on the collaboration between profound and profane, is found in DK's reflection on art and the aesthetic experience, apropos classic formulations of the rasa theory.[31] If the theory of rasa is subjectivistic, in the sense that it measures the artwork in terms of the feelings it arouses in the viewer/listener/reader, then DK protests against the marginalization of the object, matter, the artwork itself. He rejects the rasika's instrumental approach to art, and refuses to see art as "painted" initially on the human consciousness as its "canvas." Moreover, he is interested in the interplay between one's visit (or repeated visits) to the aesthetic realm, beautifully depicted by him (like the sphere of yogic experience) as "a world where necessity is minimized and freedom is maximized,"[32] and one's less glamorous phenomenal existence. He explores the possibility of "withdrawal" from the phenomenal aspects of one's life into the world of art, as well as the inevitable "return." He wants to know how these two worlds affect one another, how the two realms meet. This saṃvād he inspiringly depicts in the closing paragraph of "Thinking Creatively," very much in tune with his freedom approach as revealed in his analysis and critique of Patañjali's outlook:

> The arts are ultimately rooted in what may be called "the art of living" and unless life is seen in terms of an artistic creation, we cannot understand the creation which is embodied in a work of art. It is, of course, true that we all are most of the time bad artists as far as the art of living is concerned. But then, how few are the works of art that are really good. Most of them are inferior and very few attain a greatness which endures in time. A Gandhi is as rare as, say, a Shakespeare or Michelangelo. To link creativity in the field of art with the one that is there at the foundations of life itself is to see the world and ourselves with a transformed vision, which challenges each one of us to look at ourselves and the world anew, and face the challenging task of creating ourselves and the world we live in, in a better, more beautiful way. The "crafting" of being through the act of becoming is the secret of both ourselves and the world, and it is through art that we learn this truth most easily. Let us try to understand

art in this perspective, and perhaps our lives would become a little more akin to art than they have been until now.[33]

* * *

Three technical notes:

(1) DK's article has been previously published in the revised and enlarged edition of his book *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective* (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006). I thank Prof. Shail Mayaram of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, and Sri V. K. Gupta of the Indian Books Centre/ Sri Satguru Publications for their kind permission to reprint the article in a newly prepared annotated version. An effort has been made to keep DK's article "untouched" as much as possible, to enable the readers to "listen" to him instead of reading a heavily edited paper.

(2) DK uses numerous Sanskrit terms in his article. Some of them might be known even to the nonSanskritist reader from the previous chapters of the book. However, to make the article readable even for nonSanskritists, I added short explanatory footnotes of Sanskrit terms. Some of the terms explained here are also glossed, more elaborately, later in the glossary. These are central terms of the Yogasūtra, such as samādhi. DK also mentions schools of thought, texts and philosophers, such as Sāṃkhya, Bhagavadgītā, and Śaṅkara. These are explicated not here but in the glossary below.

(3) References: DK usually does not provide references. In the case of the Upaniṣad-s and the Bhagavadgītā, he quotes from memory, assuming that most of his readers are as acquainted with these passages as he is. As far as the Yogasūtra is concerned, he wrote the article with the text open before him, assuming that the readers would do the same as they think with him. For the sake of readers less versed than DK in the texts he quotes from, I added references with English translation of the quotes. Only once DK himself provides a reference, that of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2. I added the full quote with translation. This reference is given by him, as he wants to share with the readers his "shock" over the fact that the root-text of "a supposedly commonsense tradition as the Nyāya" depicts pravṛtti as a doṣa, that is the "outgoing movement of consciousness" as a "defect." The explicit reference to this famous "apavarga sūtra" is made by him to amplify his argument in defense of pravṛtti.

DK's single footnote, referring to the work of his friend and colleague R. Balasubramanian, is marked [DK].

Notes

1 Daya Krishna (1999), p. 20.
2 Daya Krishna (2005a); the notion of vyavahāra refers to the daily, phenomenal, worldly, mundane realm.
3 de Beistegui (1998), p. 1.
4 Chakrabarti (2011).
5 Daya Krishna (1999), p. 21.
6 Daya Krishna (1988).
7 Ibid., p. 47.
8 Chakrabarti (2011).
9 The minutes of the dialogues between pandits and professors are available in two of DK's books: *Saṃvāda: A Dialogue between two Philosophical Traditions* (1991) and *Bhakti: a Contemporary Discussion—Philosophical Explorations in the Indian Bhakti Tradition* (2000). In the later *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Vedānta, Mīmāmsā and Nyāya* (2004), the Pandits respond to articles on Indian philosophy written by "non-traditionalists" such as DK himself.
10 Daya Krishna (1999), p. 21.
11 Daya Krishna's letters, Daya Krishna Archive, Jaipur.
12 Daya Krishna (1999), p. 19.
13 Lath (1998), p. 25.
14 Deutsch (1989).
15 YS 3.38: te samādhāv upasargā vyutthāne siddhayaḥ.
16 These are the siddhi-s enumerated in the third chapter of the Yogasūtra, which the yogin achieves by meditating on specific objects as specified here: knowledge of past and future (3.16), knowledge of the sounds of every living creature (3.17), knowledge of previous births (3.18), knowledge of (the content of) other minds (3.19), invisibility (3.21), capacity of concealing one's sound etc. (namely, one's smell, touch and even taste) (3.22), foreknowledge of one's death (3.23), acquiring powers (3.24), acquiring powers such as that of an elephant (3.25), knowledge of the subtle, hidden and remote (3.26), knowledge of the universe (3.27), knowledge of the arrangement of the stars (3.28), knowledge of the movement of the stars (3.29), knowledge of the arrangement of the body (3.30), cessation of hunger and thirst (3.31), steadiness (3.32), vision of the siddha-s (the accomplished yogin-s of the past) (3.33), omniscience (3.34), knowledge pertaining to consciousness (3.35), knowledge of puruṣa (3.36), awakening of prātibha and extra-ordinary senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting, and smelling (3.37), the mind (citta) entering another body (3.39), levitation or determining the time of one's own death at will (3.40), radiance (3.41), divine hearing (3.42), the capacity of moving freely in space (3.43), elimination of the covering of the (inner) light (3.44), mastery over the elements (3.45), miniaturizing the body "etc." (the commentators explain that the phrase etc. refers to the capacity of magnifying the body, of levitation, of reaching anywhere, and of passing through solid surfaces, to mastery over the elements, to the capacity of creating something out of nothing or causing something to disappear, and finally to the power of wish-fulfillment), perfection of the body and immunity to dharma-s

(i.e., natural constituents such as fire, water and wind) (3.46), mastery over the sense organs (3.48), quickness of the mind, perception without the aid of the senses, and mastery over the pradhāna (prakṛti, the objective world) (3.49), omniscience and mastery over every state of existence (3.50), knowledge born of discernment (3.53), awareness (pratipatti) of (the distinction between) similar things, which cannot be distinguished by origin, characteristics, or location (3.54). It would be interesting to reflect on the "development" within the sequence of the siddhi-s, from the former (3.16) to the latter (3.54). Is there a movement from "gross" to "subtle," for instance? It would also be interesting to compare these siddhi-s to the siddhi-s of chapter 2 (YS 2.35–2.45), as well as to the notion of siddhi as used by Patañjali in YS 4.1 and as understood by his commentators. A closer analysis of the siddhi-s could highlight the relation of knowledge and power (or knowledge and action, or knowledge and will), or perhaps even knowledge as power in the Yogasūtra.

17 It is Vijñānabhikṣu who uses the word upekṣa, indifference (Rukmani 1987, p. 144).

18 YS 3.51: tad-vairāgyād api doṣa-bīja-kṣaye kaivalyam; I have mentioned this sūtra in Chapter 1 in a different context, and following Vijñānabhikṣu, suggested that the term vairāgya (dispassion) can refer not just to the siddhi specified in YS 3.50 or the siddhi-s at large, but even to viveka-khyāti, yogic discernment.

19 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. 305.

20 See Chapter 1.

21 See Chapter 1.

22 Bhattacharyya (2008), p. 305.

23 Ibid., p. 222.

24 Ibid., p. 284.

25 Ibid., p. 226.

26 Ibid., p. 225.

27 Ibid., pp. 225–6.

28 Lath (2009), p. 177.

29 See Śaṅkara's Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya 3.20, 4.19, and 5.7.

30 YS 4.34.

31 See his sharp article "Rasa: The Bane of Indian Aesthetics" (2004b).

32 Daya Krishna (1999), p. 25.

33 Ibid., p. 26.

5

“The undeciphered text: anomalies, problems, and paradoxes in the Yogasūtra” by Daya Krishna

The Yogasūtra is a venerable text of the Indian tradition, the foundation for yogic practices that are supposed to culminate in samādhi,[1] the nirvikalpa-samādhi,[2] which is the parama-puruṣārtha[3] for most Indians, as it is considered to be identical with mokṣa[4] which they all seek, or ought to seek. Yet, the sequence of chapters in this text seem, at least prima facie, to raise a problem as it ends with kaivalya which has to be different from samādhi as it has already disposed it off in the first chapter with which it begins, and is “named” after it. “Samādhi-pāda” is the first adhyāya[5] of this short sūtra text, the shortest amongst the sūtra texts dealing with Indian

[1] samādhi—the ultimate meditative state.

[2] nirvikalpa-samādhi—samādhi which altogether excludes mental activity; Patañjali does not use this term, but instead speaks of nirbīja (objectless) samādhi.

[3] parama-puruṣārtha—highest human goal or human ideal.

[4] mokṣa—freedom (from the mundane realm and the “mundane I”).

[5] adhyāya—chapter.

philosophy, followed by other chapters called Sādhana-pāda, Vibhūti-pāda and Kaivalya-pāda.[6]

The text seems to be, self-consciously, a prayoga-śāstra,[7] not interested in theoretical discussions or refutations of a pūrva-pakṣa,[8] except incidentally. It is an anuśāsana grantha,[9] as it proclaims in the first sūtra. But, strangely, yoga is not defined positively, but only negatively as citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ (YS 1.2).[10] The vṛtti-s[11] are given as consisting of pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, smṛti, and nidrā,[12] and supposed to be kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa[13] in nature. Their complete nirodha[14] is supposed to result in the attainment by the self of its "true" nature and its "establishment" in it permanently.

There is, presumably, no difference between kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa vṛtti-s in this regard, as vṛtti per se is supposed to stand in the way of "realizing" one's "true" nature. But if so, the only thing that could, or should, escape this far-reaching, comprehensive, and universal category called vṛtti, or what may be called the "natural forms" that the citta[15] usually takes, is the force or power or śakti that can effectuate their total stoppage or even permanent extinction. The power of nirodha or nirodha-śakti has to be there, but the Yogasūtra does not seem to have any discussion on this, or even realize the implications of this for its ideal of realizing kaivalya,[16] which it undermines in a fundamental way. The kevalin,[17] in case the Sāṃkhya framework is accepted for Yoga, cannot be a kartā[18] or a bhoktā,[19] but only a draṣṭā,[20] and hence cannot do anything, or have any power.

Strangely and paradoxically, the Yogasūtra does talk of siddhi-s,[21] and in fact, has a whole chapter on it. The third adhyāya is devoted to it, without the author asking how these could possibly be there, if citta-vṛtti nirodha has already been achieved. The siddhi-s, certainly, cannot be there without

6 The chapters (pāda-s) on meditation (samādhi), praxis (sādhana), powers (vibhūti), and aloneness/freedom (kaivalya).

7 prayoga-śāstra—practical guide, experiential text.

8 pūrva-pakṣa—counter-perspectives, other philosophical positions.

9 anuśāsana grantha—handbook, practical guide.

10 Cessation of mental activity.

11 Vṛtti-s—mind movements, mental activity.

12 pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, smṛti, and nidrā—valid knowledge, invalid knowledge, verbal construction, memory, and sleep.

13 kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa—afflictive and nonafflictive.

14 nirodha—cessation, stoppage, extinction.

15 citta—consciousness, mind, the thinking faculty.

16 kaivalya—aloneness/freedom; the final goal of Pātañjala-yoga.

17 kevalin—a yogin who has attained kaivalya.

18 kartā—agent, doer.

19 bhoktā—one who enjoys the fruits of his actions.

20 draṣṭā—detached observer or witness.

21 siddhi-s—powers.

the vṛtti-s and, if so, their occurrence is a sure sign that one is not practicing yoga, or even trying to realize it, but doing something else.

The problem that the whole notion of siddhi raises for the basic and foundational notion of vṛtti has not been seen by the writers on this text. The vṛtti-s are enumerated in sūtra 1.6, and it will be difficult to accommodate the siddhi-s in it. The list of vṛtti-s seems to concentrate more on "knowledge" than the "active" or "volitional" powers of consciousness. The siddhi-s, perhaps, try to rectify this, but without leading to a "unified" picture, as the "svarūpa"[22] to which one has to return and in which one has to be steadfastly established, is that of one who only "knows" and cannot do anything.

The deep division and dichotomy between "knowledge" and "action" lies at the heart of India's philosophical thought, and the Yogasūtra only confirms it. A clear analysis of the notion of vṛtti might perhaps have saved the situation. What exactly is a vṛtti, and "how" does it "arise" and "cease," and "why" does it happen to be so? The term, it should be remembered, is "neutral," though the author of the Yogasūtra does not treat it to be so. Nivṛtti[23] is supposed to be a vṛtti as much as pravṛtti[24]; only the direction of the former is different, as the well-known Upaniṣadic saying prāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayaṃbhūs, tasmāt parāṅ paśyati nāntarātman[25] attests. But why the outgoing movement of consciousness should be regarded as something "undesirable" in itself, or the "inward" movement intrinsically desirable, has remained the "unasked" question in the Indian tradition. Even such a supposedly "common sense" tradition as the Nyāya equated pravṛtti with doṣa[26] in Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2, without giving any reasons for doing so.[27] Pravṛtti per se cannot be good or bad; nor can nivṛtti be so. The differentiation between good and bad cuts across the pravṛtti/nivṛtti distinction, as the Gītā and the Yogavāsiṣṭha try to say in their different ways.

The question, then, is what makes a vṛtti, whether outward or inward, good or bad and, at a deeper level, what *are* these two movements of consciousness, and whether one obstructs the other, or the pursuit of one excludes the pursuit of the other. Perhaps, the notions of sāmarthya[28] and svātantrya[29] which are already there in the tradition might help in the matter.

[22] svarūpa—the "original essence" of the human person, which according to Patañjali precedes any worldly identification (sārūpya).

[23] nivṛtti—ingoing, reversal movement of consciousness, away from objects, away from the world.

[24] pravṛtti—object-centered, intentional, outgoing movement of consciousness.

[25] The self-existent (svayaṃbhū) pierced the openings outward; therefore one looks outward, and does not see the inner self (antarātman) (Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.1.1).

[26] doṣa—defect, weakness.

[27] Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2: duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñānānām uttarottarāpāye tad-anantarāpāyād apavargaḥ

Suffering (duḥkha), birth (janma), outgoing movement of consciousness (pravṛtti), faults (doṣa), and misapprehension (mithyā-jñānānām)—on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release (apavarga).

[28] sāmarthya—power.

[29] svātantrya—freedom.

There is the idea of pravṛtti-sāmarthya[30] and though the complementary idea of nivṛtti-sāmarthya[31] is not there, it can easily be added, particularly if one takes the notion of siddhi seriously, not in the specific form which it takes in the Yogasūtra, but generally. In fact, the idea of svātantrya or "freedom" may provide the other "directional center" to that of siddhi or "power" which is contained in the notion of sāmarthya. The idea of svātantrya, that is, of "sva-tantra," means "being determined by the self" or not losing one's "freedom" because of anything internal or external to oneself. The so-called "tantra" that one "weaves" or "creates" for oneself by oneself, can be "sva" only if one is "free" in respect to it, that is, not "bound" by it in the sense of an "obsessive compulsion."[32]

The vṛtti-s, then, will be seen differently, and so also the idea of nirodha, the two notions that are central to the Yogasūtra. The pravṛtti-sāmarthya would lead to abhyudaya,[33] and the nivṛtti-sāmarthya to siddhi in the generalized sense of development of the "internal" powers of the mind. "Nirodha," or the ability to stop the vṛtti-s of either kind, would result in one's re-establishment at the self-consciousness level, in that primordial and foundational freedom or "svātantrya," which was once at the level of consciousness, and on which both the pravṛtti and the nivṛtti sāmarthya-s are founded. The distinction between kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa vṛtti-s would, then, depend on whether they make one "free" to pursue both pravṛtti and nivṛtti depending on the situation, or not. Not to be able to pursue nivṛtti would be as much a sign of bondage as not to be able to pursue pravṛtti. The mention of maitrī, karuṇā, muditā, and upekṣa,[34] the well known śīla[35] in Buddhism in sūtra 1.33, and of yama and niyama[36] in sutra 2.30 and 2.32 are evidence of this.

The author of the Yogasūtra could, obviously, not have meant the "nirodha" of all these through the practice of yoga, though large parts of the tradition have interpreted him this way. It is true that kaivalya as the end of yoga propounded in the last chapter of the Yogasūtra seems to support the traditional interpretation. Both the Sāṃkhya and the Advaita Vedānta traditions face the very same dilemma, as their analysis lands them in the paradoxical situation where the attainment of "freedom" results in the total loss of freedom, as one becomes intrinsically incapable of "exercising" any

[30] pravṛtti-sāmarthya—the power of extroversion, of involvement in the world, of intentionality.

[31] nivṛtti-sāmarthya—the power of introversion, of disengagement, of self-sufficiency.

[32] DK plays with the components of the compound svatantra (independence, freedom), namely tantra (literally thread) and sva (self). Through this etymological play, he suggests that even the notion of freedom can become a bondage, or that one has to be free even with regard to freedom.

[33] abhyudaya—prosperity, attainment of the good.

[34] maitrī, karuṇā, muditā, and upekṣa—friendliness, compassion, joy, and equanimity. DK returns to the four bramavihāra-s or "sublime attitudes" below.

[35] Śīla—morality, ethical foundation.

[36] yama and niyama—primary and secondary ethical guidelines.

freedom at all. One has voluntarily given up the "freedom to return" and one is left with one's own "aloneness" with no possibility of "relating" to anything whatsoever.

The "svarūpa" in which one has to be established through yoga, then, has to be different from "kaivalya," or even from "saccidānanda,"[37] as the Advaitins[38] generally tend to describe the svarūpa of the ātman.[39] There must be the possibility of action, enlightened action, emanating from that "free" and "enlightened" consciousness that the process of yoga is supposed to "unveil" or "bring into being" or achieve through a subtle, gradual transformation of consciousness that slowly changes it in all its aspects and all its levels, including those of "knowing," "feeling," and "willing." The Gītā has called it "karma kauśala" in its well known definition of yoga as yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam.[40] The Buddhists had called this prajñā,[41] which is supposed to arise, like kaivalya, after samādhi in the sequence of śīla, samādhi, and prajñā. It should be remembered that it is this prajñā which leads to the idea of pāramitā[42] on the one hand and the ideal of the bodhisattva,[43] on the other. There is also the notion of sahaja[44] in the Indian tradition and that of "Holy Will," as in Kant, in the Western tradition.

The Gītā's long meditation and reflection on "action" has not been seen in the way it deserves. The Vedāntic ācārya-s[45] were not interested in it. Tilak, Gandhi, Aurobindo, and Vinoba have tried to fill this gap in their

[37] saccidānanda—being (sat), consciousness (cit), bliss (ānanda)—is an idiom used by Advaitin-s to designate the ātman. Eliot Deutsch (1969, p. 9) explains that "these are not so much qualifying attributes of the ātman, as they are the terms that express the apprehension of the ātman by the human person."

[38] Advaitin—adherent of the Advaita-Vedānta school of thought.

[39] ātman—a tentative notion denoting that which cannot be expressed through language. The notion of ātman, roughly speaking, refers to one's inner, eternal, metaphysical selfhood, above and beyond one's phenomenal, worldly aspects.

[40] yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam (Bhagavadgītā 2.50)—"Yoga is proficiency in (and not the abandonment of) action."

[41] prajñā—wisdom; a Buddhist notion, which in DK's reading is not divorced from action.

[42] pāramitā—"perfection" or "completeness"; Mahāyāna Buddhism specifies six "perfections" to be achieved by the spiritual aspirant, namely perfection in dāna (generosity), śīla (morality), kṣānti (tolerance), vīrya (effort), dhyāna (meditation), and prajñā (wisdom). DK's point is that a spiritual path, need not necessarily culminate in introversion and disengagement as the Sāṃkhyan notion of kaivalya adopted by Patañjali seems to suggest; but quite the opposite, in what he himself refers to as "enlightened action." The Buddhist notion of pāramitā is brought here as an illustration of such an approach.

[43] bodhisattva—a person motivated by compassion, who acts for the "collective liberation" of every sentient being; in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the ideal of the bodhisattva replaces the older, "negative" ideal of nirvāṇa. The notion of the bodhisattva is for DK, another illustration of "engaged spirituality."

[44] sahaja—a term which indicates, in DK's present use, an action performed spontaneously, naturally, of its own.

[45] The Vedāntic ācāryas—the guru-s or teachers of the Vedānta tradition; implied is a critique of Śaṅkara's knowledge-centered reading of the action-centered Bhagavadgītā.

different ways in modern times. But they have not seen it in the context of the Sāṃkhyan and the Advaitic analysis of the action-centric consciousness, and the problems and the bondages it creates, for the avoidance of which at the most fundamental level the elaborate praxis prescribed in the Yogasūtra was formulated, and in the context of which the Gītā was written.

The Gītā's own formulations were preceded by the long tradition of thinking on this in the Abhidhamma literature of the Buddhists. There, the same problem is formulated and analyzed in terms of the "embodied" being who is a saṃghāṭa[46] of the body, with its five senses and the sense of "bodily feeling," the mind with its insatiable desire, the intellect with its perennial questioning, reason with its eternal seeking for unity and truth, and a hundred other things that this vast literature composed over centuries contains.

The Gītā, strangely, not only talks of "karma kauśala" in the context of yoga, but also of "samatva" when it says samatvaṃ yoga ucyate.[47] Samatva suggests the equal regard for all that is worth striving for in all realms, and explains, to some extent, the Gītā's "equal" emphasis on knowledge, action, and feeling, or jñāna, karma, and bhakti as they are known in the tradition. There has always been the problem of "reconciling" these diverse and conflicting directions in the statements of the text. However, the problem arises only because these statements are not seen in the context of the comprehensive and all-embracing puruṣārtha[48] theory that takes into account all the different aspects and dimensions of man as embodied self-conscious being among other such beings, which a human being is.

The Gītā and the Abhidhamma are hesitating steps in this direction, and an adequate theory of puruṣārtha is yet to be developed, as the usual four puruṣārtha-s[49] mentioned in the tradition do not accommodate all that is worthwhile for human seeking even as we know it at present. Both the Abhidhamma and the Gītā, however, in their different ways, accept pravṛtti and do not consider it per se as "sinful" or "wrong" as the Yogasūtra and even the Nyāyasūtra appear to conceive it to be. The Gītā, however, is aware of the sociopolitical dimension of action, which the Abhidhamma seems to lack. The puruṣārtha theory in its traditional formulation focuses on dharma, but shows little awareness of the distinction between "public" and "private" or "individual" and "social," or between "social" and "political."

[46] saṃghāṭa—conglomeration.

[47] samatvaṃ yoga ucyate (Bhagavadgītā 2.48)— "yoga is sameness," or "evenness."

[48] puruṣārtha—worthy human goals, which the human person should strive to accomplish.

[49] The usual four puruṣārtha-s enumerated by the tradition are dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa—the ritualistic or "religious" aspect of one's life; livelihood; one's erotic dimension or family life; and finally, freedom in the sense of transcending one's phenomenal aspects, including the three previous human goals. For a detailed philosophical analysis of the puruṣārtha theory, with its (at least prima facie) inner contradiction, see DK's article "The Myth of the Puruṣārtha-s," in Daya Krishna (2006a), pp. 381–406.

These distinctions have always created dilemmas for any theory of action, as it is evident at a hundred places in the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, so well known to everybody, except to those who talk and write about dharma in the tradition.

In fact, the traditional theory of puruṣārtha fails to take note even of the vṛtti-s in pravṛtti, as it confines them to artha and kāma only, as if these were the only things that man seeks, or should seek, in the realm of pravṛtti. Strangely, the vṛtti-s that are there in nivṛtti have not even been thought of, except in a purely negative way, even though the Yogasūtra talks of dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and siddhi,[50] explicitly enumerating the last as many in number and, presumably, as the result of different modes of dhāraṇā and dhyāna. Pratyāhāra[51] is the negative movement of which dhāraṇā and dhyāna have to be seen as positive aspects. Both, as the tradition well knows, are, like kāma,[52] intrinsically neutral as one may concentrate on anything and meditate on it, just as one may "desire" anything.

The acts of "withdrawal" and "concentration" are known to everybody in nonspiritual contexts, suggesting that they are "normal" powers of the mind akin to "attending," "intending," and "willing" that are used in other contexts. These, then, may reasonably be regarded as the vṛtti-s of nivṛtti, since they follow pratyāhāra which is only another name for nivṛtti, or at least the first stage of it.

Citta-vṛtti nirodha, if complete, has to be a nirodha of all the vṛtti-s, no matter whether they belong to pravṛtti or nivṛtti, and thus must include dhāraṇā and dhyāna, and even pratyāhāra, as the latter is the first vṛtti arising in nivṛtti. Samādhi, then, would be only another name for the nirodha of both dhāraṇā and dhyāna, and would thus be only nirvikalpa, and never savikalpaka[53] in character. And if it is nirvikalpaka, one would not "know" what one's "svarūpa" is, as there could not be any vṛtti there, and at a deeper level, nothing to know as there is neither "sva" nor "rūpa" there.[54]

[50] dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and siddhi—dhāraṇā and dhyāna are the first two meditative stages in Patañjali's formulation. DK does not mention the third and final meditative stage, namely samādhi, since it is "purely negative" and he is in search of diversity and multiplicity within nivṛtti. The siddhi-s are yogic powers attained through saṃyama or yogic meditation. Daya Krishna, then, wants to read dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and siddhi as different vṛtti-s included within nivṛtti.

[51] pratyāhāra—withdrawal of the senses.

[52] kāma—desire.

[53] nirvikalpa and savikalpaka samādhi—meditative states which exclude and include mental activity, respectively.

[54] DK points out what he sees as a contradiction within Patañjali's formulation. In YS 1.3 the Sūtra-kāra speaks of nirodha (cessation of mental activity) as revealing one's svarūpa or "original essence" as puruṣa, as an uninvolved "witness." In YS 1.51 he speaks of objectless meditation (nirbīja samādhi, referred to by DK as nirvikalpa samādhi) as sarva-nirodha or "cessation of everything." It is implied (and reinforced in Vyāsa's bhāṣya) that nirodha and

Therefore "vṛtti-nirodha," has to be understood in a different way. It can only mean the capacity of nirodha in respect of any vṛtti whatsoever, and not the "actuality" of it in the sense that there is no vṛtti at all, or that even the possibility of any vṛtti arising has been abolished forever. Yoga would, then, mean the development of this capacity so that one can "free" oneself from the "bondage" of any vṛtti, whatever be its nature.

But, then, how shall we conceive of samādhi which is so central to yoga, as understood in the Indian tradition, and as described in the Yogasūtra? Samādhi is said to be the state where the formation of vṛtti-s has been stopped by an "act" of consciousness resulting from a "resolve" on the part of self-consciousness to "do" so. It is a reflexive activity of self-consciousness directed at consciousness itself, with the "intent" that the "movement" in it caused by "external" or "internal" factors cease altogether, so that it be "stilled" and become "itself," and be at "peace" with itself. But this is not the end of the matter, and cannot be so in principle, for a human being who strives for samādhi and attains it continues to be a human being with body, mind, memory, intellect, and the senses, and has to wake up and "return" to all these with their vṛtti-s, even if they have been reduced to the minimum possible extent by the process of yoga which he had undertaken. In fact, the body continues to function in the state of samādhi, as it is still "alive" and not "dead," and needs all that is necessary to sustain and keep it alive. The "waking" and the "return" make one acutely aware of this, and "force" on oneself the recognition that "things" are as they were before and that nothing has changed much during the time when one had stopped the vṛtti-s, except that one was not aware of that which one becomes aware of through them.

The tradition encountered this problem in the discussion centering around the question whether mukti[55] is possible while "living" or one has to "die," at least bodily, in order to attain it. Jīvan-mukti and videha-mukti[56] are the names of these in the tradition, but the problem arises only because the terms "jīvana" or "videha" have not been paid serious attention to by the thinkers concerned, as well as the relation between mukti and samādhi, which for some strange reason have been considered identical.

Samādhi may be considered as mukti from the vṛtti-s in the framework of the Yogasūtra, and if its five-fold enumeration of them is to be taken

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(nirbīja) samadhi are one and the same. In this extreme meditative state, DK observes and plays with the compound svarūpa, there is neither "sva" nor "rūpa," neither "me" (subject) nor "forms" (objects), and therefore no "knowledge" whatsoever, including "knowledge" of one's own svarūpa. As I tried to show in Chapter 3, Patañjali walks on thin ice in his attempt to "knowledgify" the yogic experience. DK rejects this attempt, as well as nirbīja (or nirvikalpa) samādhi as an instance of freedom. For him, knowledge cannot be regarded as knowledge without a knowing subject, and freedom cannot be regarded as freedom if one cannot know that one is free and do something with his freedom.

55 mukti—freedom.

56 jīvan-mukti and videha-mukti—"freedom in this life" and "bodiless freedom" or "freedom after death" respectively.

seriously, then *only* from them. The assumption that every possible vṛtti can be classified under these five, and five heads alone, seems at least prima facie, questionable. It is not clear, for example, if the author of the Yogasūtra would classify yama and niyama amongst the vṛtti-s. It would be a disaster if it were to be so, as instead of cultivating them one would have to try to stop them. In fact, the dilemma would extend to every sādhana enumerated in the second chapter. It would have to be treated as a vṛtti if it is sādhana or means to something else, and in case it is treated as such, one would have to try to stop it. In a sense, the notion of samādhi seems to mean just this, at least when it is treated as nirvikalpa in nature. Dhyāna, if it is a dhyāna, has to be savikalpa, as it is a deep and exclusive concentration on that which one had chosen as an "object" of concentration in dhāraṇā. The nirvikalpa samādhi would then have to be a nirodha of this also.

But can there possibly ever be a nirodha of that which has been described by the terms āsana and prāṇāyāma in the aṣṭāṅga-yoga[57] of the Yogasūtra? One will, perforce, continue to be "sitting" in the āsana perfected by one and "breathe" in a way that does not disturb the samādhi. Āsana and Prāṇāyāma have to continue to be there, as without them, there would be no samādhi, at least as we "know" it at the human level and as it is treated in the Yogasūtra. But just as the "living body" is there, very much there, "helping" one to be in a state of samādhi, so is the air one breathes, the earth on which one sits and all the rest which support the earth and the air in the universe. It is thus the universe as a whole which sustains and supports the state of samādhi, even though it may create the illusion that it is not so. The "return" from samādhi shatters the illusion as one finds that everything is there as before. There is the body with all its senses, and the mind and the intellect and the world—just as when one wakes up from sleep. One may return to samādhi, just as one does to sleep. The latter is, of course, natural and normal to all living beings, while the former is a rare achievement, if it is ever achieved by any human being in the fullest and most complete sense of the term. The "return," thus, is as "real" as the "withdrawal" was, and each stage in the two journeys is as "real" as all the others. Somehow, for some reason, the Indian tradition devalued all that is included under the term pravṛtti and believed there is a no "return" from nirvikalpa samādhi, as it is the same as mokṣa, that is, the "final" stage from which there is no "return" to the bondage of "life" and "death." The fact that one is an "embodied" being, who is "alive" in the ordinary biological sense of the term, should be sufficient to question this identification.

For the author of the Yogasūtra, it is kaivalya that is the final stage and, presumably, either identical with samādhi or the result of it. But in either case, it can have no relation, positive or negative, with any object

[57] Āsana, prāṇāyāma, aṣṭāṅga-yoga—yogic posture, breath control, and Patañjali's eightfold yoga scheme.

whatsoever. The puruṣa is supposed to be neither a kartā nor a bhoktā, and hence can obviously not act to avoid hiṃsā,[58] or falsity or the desire for "possessing" what is somebody else's, or the desire for a relationship with the opposite sex, not to talk of "friendliness," "compassion," "joyfulness," and "ignoring" or "underplaying" imperfections and defects in others, mentioned in sūtra 1.33.[59]

Samādhi, however, may not be seen as leading to kaivalya where, at least in the Sāṃkhyan perspective, puruṣa is supposed to be a pure dṛṣṭā, but rather to an "object-less" state of consciousness which is only another name for it, as in the Advaita Vedānta. Here even the possibility of "relationship" is negated, and if Śaṅkara's view as propounded in his bhāṣya[60] on the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad is to be believed, even ānanda[61] cannot be ascribed to it.

The trouble with all this is that it wants to see samādhi as the state of mokṣa, which the whole spiritual and cultural tradition of India has aspired for in the belief that it gives one a final release from the bondage of birth and death. But as "death" is inevitable whether one has attained samādhi or not, and as the possible actualization of the state is writ large on the traditions of Yoga in India, it has to be conceived and understood in a different way. Samādhi, as the Yogasūtra attests, is logically and experientially the last and final stage in the process of withdrawal of consciousness from all "externality," and reveals the "freedom" that it has to "withdraw" from all relationships, if it chooses to do so. But it does not take away from it its "freedom" to "relate" or "return" to the world at any level of body or mind or intellect or value or imagination, or to be with a consciousness and self-consciousness other than itself.

The Yogasūtra is a prayoga-śāstra, an anuśāsana for all human beings not to become self-enclosed, self-sufficient, isolated spiritual beings, imprisoned in their own selves, "unfree" to get out of that state and relate even to other kevalin-s[62] who are in the same predicament. The text, it is true, ends with the Kaivalya-pāda, but it does not ask what shall be the relation between these kevalin-s. The Jain-s, who also have this notion of a plurality of kevalin-s, have not asked the question either. Samādhi, thus, instead of making one "free," has resulted in the total loss of "freedom" where one becomes totally incapable of "doing" anything, let alone "helping" others

58 hiṃsā—violence.

59 Yogasūtra 1.33: Through practice of friendliness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekṣa) toward the happy, the suffering, the virtuous, and the unvirtuous (respectively), consciousness is clarified (maitrī-karuṇā-muditā-upekṣāṇām sukha-duḥkha-puṇya-apuṇya-viṣayāṇāṃ bhāvanātaś citta-prasādanam). DK refers to muditā as joyfulness and explicates the notion of upekṣa as "ignoring or underplaying imperfections and defects in others."

60 bhāṣya—commentary.

61 Ānanda—"bliss," a term used in the Vedānta tradition to depict the undepictable "feeling" of realizing one's "ātmanhood," or in Sāṃkhya-yoga terms, "puruṣahood."

62 Kevalin—a yogin who has achieved kaivalya.

on the path to yoga or anything else. Surely, the author of the Yogasūtra could not have meant this, even if he does seem to say this on a prima facie view of things. The very fact that he wrote the text to show "others" the path to yoga proves this. The "suffering" humanity has been at the center of the spiritual consciousness, and the masters have always "returned" from the "withdrawal" as the Buddha is said to have done long ago, and also so many others in the history of humanity.

But once one accepts the idea of "return" after the "withdrawal" into samādhi, one also accepts the "reality" of that to which one returns. The implications of this "acceptance" are so enormous, that they would undermine the very foundations of the basis on which the edifice of Indian spirituality has been built. The denial of the "reality" of the world, as "known" by the senses and by reason, is writ large on the Indian tradition. The recourse to the notions of māyā or līlā[63] would be of no avail, nor for that matter, the distinction between vyavahāra and paramārtha,[64] which is so fashionable among the Advaitins who try to evade the basic contradiction involved in it, leading to "dishonesty" in thought and action.[65]

But if one accepts the possibility of samādhi and also of the "return" from it, one would have to ask the crucial question: How does the attainment of the former affect the latter? One's vyavahāra cannot remain unaffected by one's adventure into the paramārtha as it would be to deny its effectivity and power, and thus its "reality" itself. There has to be nivṛtti-sāmarthya just as there is pravṛtti-sāmarthya, the two complementing, correcting, modifying, and influencing each other.

What stands in the way of the recognition of this is the widely accepted belief that samādhi is a one-time affair, that one has not to return to it again and again, that once achieved one has nothing further to do about it. Meditation is that to which one returns time and again, and samādhi is only another name for dhyāna when it has perfected itself and become an "effortless" movement of consciousness to "withdraw" into itself and be with itself whenever it so chooses and desires.

The problem of the pursuit of Yoga, or sādhana, by an embodied being, has not been paid much attention to, though it is there in the Yogasūtra. After all, the person who engages in sādhana, and for whom the sādhana is meant,

[63] māyā and līlā—notions pertaining to the phenomenal aspects of human existence as "illusion" (māyā) or "play" (līlā). The two notions, in their initial Advaitic formulation, do not imply that the world and worldliness are "not real," but that they are not "essentially real," "essential reality" belonging merely to the ātman, to one's ever-existing, metaphysical selfhood.

[64] vyavahāra and paramārtha—phenomenal existence and the ultimate, metaphysical, eternal domain respectively.

[65] The "dishonesty" which DK points at is the result of what he sees as unavoidable contradiction in terms between the notion of advaita (nonduality) and the basic dichotomy between vyavahāra and paramārtha, so keenly adopted by the "nondualists."

is a complex or saṃghāṭa, as the Buddhists put it, made of many things, each having a distinctive nature and reality of its own. The relationship between these at the human level is difficult to understand, but there can be little doubt that each has an autonomy of its own, and that each influences and is influenced by the others.

The Abhidhamma shows a deep and direct awareness of this, but it is only concerned with the nature of these relationships and whether they are kuśala, akuśala, or neither kuśala nor akuśala.[66] The nonBuddhist tradition, at least in the Upaniṣad-s, sees the problem in terms of the relationship between the individual and the world, but is also interested in their nature and reality at different levels. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad, for example, talks in its Brahmānanda Vallī of the Brahman, that is, the cosmic reality, and in its Bhṛgu Vallī of the ātman.[67] The former is that from which everything proceeds, namely ākāśa, vāyu, agni, āpaḥ, pṛthvī, anna, and puṇya,[68] all of which are anna-rasamaya.[69] This anna is bhūtānāṃ jyeṣṭam, namely the "highest" or "supreme" amongst all the bhūta-s,[70] that is, the worldly creation of Brahman which contains in it all the pañca bhūta-s,[71] and is their joint creation.

After this, the Bhṛgu Vallī talks of prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda,[72] but at every level it says tasyaiṣa eva śārīra ātmā,[73] implying thereby that the body is not just the body, but all these together, and not that it is only prāṇa or manas or vijñāna, or ānanda, as many have thought it to be. Understandably, it does not talk of ākāśa, vāyu, agni, āpaḥ, and pṛthvī, as all these are included in anna, which is the basis of prāṇa along with everything else. In fact, the Bhṛgu Vallī goes even further and says annaṃ na nindyāt[74] and annaṃ na paricakṣīta.[75]

[66] kuśala and akuśala—good and bad, skilful and unskillful, desirable and undesirable.

[67] The Taittirīya Upaniṣad is divided into three sections called Vallī-s, namely the Śikṣā, Brahmānanda and Bhṛgu Vallī-s, or the sections "on pronunciation" and "on the bliss which is Brahman," and "Bhṛgu's section."

[68] Ākāśa (space or ether), vāyu (wind), agni (fire), āpaḥ (water), pṛthvī (earth), anna (food, matter), and puṇya (merit).

[69] anna-rasamaya—the physical human body, which contains or which is the "meeting point" of all the elements.

[70] bhūta—element.

[71] The pañca bhūta-s—the five elements.

[72] prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda—life-breath, the mental faculty, "understanding" (in an existential, not merely theoretic or "mental" sense), and "bliss" respectively, depicted here as different aspects of selfhood as a totality.

[73] "This is the embodied ātman of the former"; the self is portrayed as multilayered, consisting of a "body of food" (annamayakośa), a "breathing body" (prāṇamayakośa), a "mental body" (manomayakośa), a "body of understanding" (vijñānamayakośa), and a "body of bliss" (ānandamayakośa).

[74] annaṃ na nindyāt—"Do not speak ill of food" (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 3.7.1).

[75] annaṃ na paricakṣīta—"Do not despise food" (ibid. 3.8.1).

The differences and the relationships between the cosmic reality, that is the Brahman, and the reality of the individual in the perspective of this Upaniṣad is not only that the latter depends on the former, but that it is related to it through anna which has all the elements of ākāśa, vāyu, agni, āpaḥ, and pṛthvī in it, and moreover, as it is constituted of prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda, which have their cosmic analogues as described in the Brahmānanda Vallī. Therefore neither the individual, nor the Brahman, may be thought of in terms of any of them alone, nor even in terms of ānanda, as many Advaitin-s seem to have conceived in their systems. In fact, as implied above, Śaṅkara in his commentary of the Upaniṣad, seems to deny even ānanda as characterizing the Brahman or the ātman, suggesting that in reality, they cannot be characterized at all, being without any limiting adjuncts or predicates or guṇa-s, which will make them a "this" rather than "that," and hence distinguishable and having a "difference" within themselves.[76]

The samādhi of the Yogasūtra thus can only be of a being who has not only prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda, but who is also sustained and nourished by anna, the umbilical cord that binds him to the universe. And if it is so, then the "freedom" that samādhi gives will have to be conceived in a different way, as freedom that gives "meaning" and fulfillment and flowering to all the other elements of one's being, and makes one capable of carrying out the Upaniṣadic injunction saha nau bhunaktu saha vīryaṃ karavāvahai.[77]

If samādhi makes it impossible in principle for the human person to do this, it is a travesty of samādhi, and no real samādhi at all. Yet, the Advaita of Śaṅkara and the Sāṃkhya of the Yogasūtra compel us to do just this. There can be no "saha" or "togetherness" in these perspectives and the Upaniṣadic injunction shall remain unfulfilled.

Samādhi, then, will have to be understood in a different way, and so also the Yogasūtra, even though the Sāṃkhyan and Advaitic interpretations and ideals, so well-entrenched in the tradition, had shaped and formed the Indian psyche for millennia. The deep belief in them made any alternative seem absolutely implausible.

The struggle against these interpretations and ideals, however, has also been there in the tradition. The Gītā and the epics are the prime example of

[76] In this respect, see the discussion in Sureśvara's vārttika on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya and Prof. R. Balasubramaniyan's introduction to it (*The Taittirīyopaniṣad Bhāṣya-Vārttika of Sureśvara*, edited with introduction, English translation, annotation, and indices by R. Balasubramanian, revised edition, Madras: University of Madras, 1984; Madras University Philosophical Series No. 20) [DK].

[77] "May we be nourished together, may we work together with vigor" (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.1.1).

this, just as the śāstra-s dealing with dharma, artha, kāma, and nāṭya.[78] The Yogasūtra itself may be seen as crystallizing a long tradition of Buddhist, Jain, and Upaniṣadic preachers in this regard, centered in "freeing" consciousness from its entanglements and obsessions with the world of "objects," which has a compulsive and overpowering character about it. The senses, as the Upaniṣad-s declare, are naturally "out-going" and the desire for sensuous and sensual pleasure arising from them captivates, captures, enthralls, and binds the consciousness in its silken web. The "freedom" from this, thus became the central concern of yogic practices which involved "closing" the senses to the "world," denying its reality, importance, and value and, in the process, denying the reality of "others," including those that had brought one into being, sustained, developed, and educated one. Not only this, but actually the whole "world" created by man on the basis of his senses, as in art, or on the basis of his intellect and reason, as in knowledge, was denied also. Pleasures, it was forgotten, need not be confined to the senses alone. It was also forgotten that even in respect to the senses, it is the "active" element of "building," "constructing," "creating," and "apprehending" that is important, and not just "passive" enjoyment or bhoga, as has been thought and emphasized in the tradition. The karmendriya-s[79] are central to human reality, and the jñānendriya-s[80]—it should be remembered—are not just bhogendriya-s but jñānendriya-s also.[81]

The "freedom" that yoga seeks cannot be "freedom" from creativity itself. Rather, it must be that which enhances creativity and "purifies" it from that in which it is usually enmeshed. Vṛtti-s are the heart of the matter, and the pursuit of yoga and attainment of samādhi should result in the purification

[78] The Dharma-śāstra, Artha-śāstra, Kāma-śāstra, and Nāṭya-śāstra are all textual corpuses dedicated not to mokṣa (freedom) in the sense of transcending or "leaving behind" the mundane world, but quite the opposite. These texts aim, at least in DK's reading, at contributing to a "better world." The Dharma-śāstra is all about creating the phenomenal framework, touching on the different angles of "phenomenality"; the Artha-śāstra, as DK writes elsewhere, comprises of "classical Indian thought about man, society and polity"; the Kāma-śāstra (consisting of the famous Kāma-sūtra) is not just about the erotic aspects of the human person but about "worldly desires" in a more general sense, about "desire" as the fuel of the phenomenal realm; and the Nāṭya-śāstra is dedicated to art and the aesthetic experience.

[79] karmendriya-s—The "active senses" or "outer senses"; consisting of the five "organs of action," namely the vocal chords, feet, hands, rectum, and genitals.

[80] jñanendriya-s—The "knowledge senses"; consisting of the eyes (seeing), nose (smelling), mouth (tasting), ears (hearing), and skin (touching).

[81] bhogendriya-s/jñānendriya-s—DK argues that the eyes, nose, mouth, ears, and skin, seen by the Sāṃkhya tradition as "senses" (indriya-s), are not just bhogendriya-s or facilitators of bhoga ("passive enjoyment" as DK puts it, or mundane experience in general), but also—even primarily—jñānendriya-s, facilitators of jñāna or knowledge.

of the vṛtti-s, their "release" from "self-centeredness," and not their cessation or nirodha as the Yogasūtra seems to say. They should naturally become akliṣṭa. As one walks on the path of yoga, freeing oneself and freeing others; through this mutual and collective freedom, a world of joy and friendliness and mutual helpfulness comes into being, as the Buddhist doctrine of śīla seems to imply. This would be a worthwhile goal of yoga practice, to be achieved through the development of prajñā, which is the kṣurasya dhārā,[82] the "razor's edge," determining the sense of right and wrong, good and bad, and perhaps, also of the beautiful and the ugly.

[82] DK draws on Kaṭha-Upaniṣad 1.3.14: kṣurasya dhārā niśitā duratyayā, durgam pathas tat kavayo vadanti ("Sharp as the edge of a razor and hard to cross, difficult to tread is this path—so proclaim the poets").

Concise Glossary

The glossary consists of central notions in Patañjali's Yogasūtra mentioned and worked with in the previous chapters. It is not a comprehensive glossary of the Yogasūtra, but a legend to the philosophical map sketched above. Each entry will be explained with a reference to the sūtra or sūtra-s in which it appears. The glossary also consists of several terms which are not mentioned in the Yogasūtra, but which have been repeatedly mentioned in the pages above, such as for example, the term **Sāṃkhya**. Daya Krishna in his article mentions names of philosophical schools, texts and thinkers. Some of them, such as **Abhidhamma, Nyāya, Advaita-Vedānta,** and **Yogavāsiṣṭha** are glossed here. Whenever a term is typed in bold, it means that it has an entry of its own. The glossary is arranged in English alphabetical order.

Abhidhamma (Pāli) or **Abhidharma** (Sanskrit) is the name of an early Buddhist textual body, dated approximately to the third century BC. The Abhidhamma is considered as the third "basket" (piṭaka) of the Buddhist Pāli Canon; the other textual "baskets" are the Vinaya piṭaka and the Sutta piṭaka, the monastic rules and the teachings of the Buddha. Generally speaking, the **Abhidhamma** is a philosophical commentary of the sutta-s (or sūtra-s), that is, of the Buddha's teaching.

abhiniveśa (2.3, 2.9)—clinging to life or fear of death; one of the five **kleśa**-s.

abhyāsa (1.12, 1.13, 1.18, 1.32)—repetitive practice. Patañjali's yoga procedure is twofold, consisting simultaneously of **abhyāsa** and **vairāgya**, repetitive practice and dispassion.

Advaita-Vedānta—A philosophical school, according to which a unitary metaphysical essence (the Brahman) underlies and precedes the plurality of the phenomenal mundane world.

Advaitin—Exponent of **Advaita-Vedānta**.

ahiṃsā (2.30, 2.35)—nonviolence; the foremost **yama**.

āsana (2.29, 2.46)—yogic posture; the third of the eight limbs of yoga (see **aṣṭāṅga-yoga**).

asmitā (1.17, 2.3, 2.6, 3.48, 4.4)—"I-sense"; one of the five **kleśa**-s. According to Patañjali, "I-sense" comes into being if one cannot distinguish between "the power of the seer and the power of seeing." The latter is the power of involvement in the world; the former is a potential power not-to-be-used, pertaining to **puruṣa**; in K. C. Bhattacharyya's words, the former is "the power to stand distinct from power" (also see **citi-śakti**).

aṣṭāṅga-yoga (2.29)—the eight limb "yoga body," consisting of **yama**, **niyama**, **āsana**, **prāṇāyāma**, **pratyāhāra**, **dhāraṇā**, **dhyāna**, and **samādhi**.

avidyā (2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.24)—the phenomenal perspective, without which worldly existence cannot occur, but which from a metaphysical, discerning (between **puruṣa** and **prakṛti**) point of view, is the foremost obstacle on the way to **samādhi**. Therefore it is classified by Patañjali as a **kleśa,** in fact the foremost **kleśa.**

Bhagavadgītā (or the **Gītā**)—A poem considered as a part of the Mahābhārata. Here Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna discuss the "middle" between dharma and mokṣa, the phenomenal and the metaphysical, action and inaction.

bhāṣya—commentary; primary commentary based on the root-text, not on other commentaries.

citta (1.2, 1.30, 1.33, 1.37, 2.54, 3.1, 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.19, 3.35, 3.39, 4.4, 4.5, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.21, 4.23, 4.26)—consciousness. The numerous mentions of the term reveal the fact that the Yogasūtra is an investigation into the depths of human consciousness, attempting to decipher its different modes.

citta-vṛtti (1.2)—mental activity, movements of the mind. According to Patañjali, yoga is **citta-vṛtti nirodha,** stoppage of mental activity.

citi (4.22, 4.34)—pure consciousness; content-less, objectless, "empty" mind.

citi-śakti (4.34)—the power of pure consciousness, which in a **kaivalya**-state abides in its own essence (sva-rūpa pratiṣṭhā), and in this sense is unused, or rather cannot be used in principle.

dhāraṇā (2.29, 2.53, 3.1)—the first stage of **saṃyama** or yogic meditation; depicted by Patañjali as "the fixation of consciousness on a single spot."

dhyāna (1.39, 2.11, 2.29, 3.2, 4.6)—the second stage of **saṃyama**; depicted by Patañjali as "even flow of consciousness (in the course of **dhāraṇā**) toward an object."

duḥkha (1.31, 1.33, 2.5, 2.8, 2.15, 2.16, 2.34)—suffering, pain; a notion referring to the phenomenal aspects of human existence, unavoidably interwoven with pain. The remedy suggested by Patañjali is total disengagement of the phenomenal realm.

Gītā—See **Bhagavadgītā**

guṇa (1.16, 2.15., 2.19, 4.13, 4.32, 4.34)—a quality, force, movement, or binding string; a term referring to each of the three forces which activate **prakṛti** or the phenomenal sphere. The three **guṇa**-s are **sattva, rajas,** and **tamas.** Pātañjala-yoga is all about disengaging the triguṇa (three-**guṇa**) **prakṛti** realm.

haṭha-yoga—a branch of yoga which works with body and breathing as its primary tools. The **haṭha-yoga** literature consists of the Haṭhayogapradīpikā (dated fourteenth or fifteenth century AD), as well as the Śiva-saṃhita and the Gheranda-saṃhita (dated seventeenth century AD).

īśvara (1.23, 1.24, 2.1, 2.32, 2.45)—a technical, philosophic, generic rather than personal denotation of god, the godhead, divinity.

īśvara-praṇidhāna (1.23, 2.1, 2.32, 2.45)—devotion to īśvara, or according to some commentators, meditation on īśvara; **īśvara-praṇidhāna** is one of the three components of **kriyā-yoga** (practical yoga, see YS 2.1) and one of the five **niyama**-s expounded by Patañjali.

kaivalya (2.25, 3.51, 3.56, 4.26, 4.34)—aloneness, freedom; a state in which the **guṇa**-s turn back to their source, and **puruṣa** is left "all alone," detached from **prakṛti. Kaivalya** is one of the key terms of **Sāṃkhya** metaphysics.

kleśa (1.24, 2.2, 2.3, 2.12, 4.28, 4.30)—"cause of affliction"; in the second chapter of his treatise, Patañjali enumerates five **kleśa**-s, "inner patterns" or "psychological dispositions" which activate consciousness in a phenomenal, worldly mode. The **kleśa**-s are **avidyā**, **asmitā**, rāga (attraction), dveṣa (aversion), and **abhiniveśa.**

krama (3.15, 3.53, 4.32, 4.33)—sequence consisting of **kṣaṇa**-s (moments). Patañjali is highly interested in the **krama-kṣaṇa** interplay, namely in the interlacement of time and the timeless. **Krama** is altogether different from the notion of **karma,** even if in the English formulation the two concepts might look similar. The latter notion (mentioned in YS 1.24, 2.12, 3.23, 4.7, and 4.30), literally denotes action, and refers to "impressions" or "traces" which every action creates. These karmic impressions are stored in "karmic memory," and later "ripen" and affect one's future circumstances. In this respect **karma** is a vicious circle of causes and effects, which the yogin strives to become free of.

kriyā (2.1, 2.18, 2.36)—volitional action. In YS 2.18 the term **kriyā** is a synonym of **rajas.**

kriyā-yoga (2.1)—practical-yoga expounded in the **sādhana**-pāda, the second chapter of the Yogasūtra. It consists of **tapas, svādhyāya,** and **īśvara-praṇidhana.**

kṣaṇa (3.9, 3.53, 4.33)—moment, "the other" of **krama** (sequence). According to Patañjali, timelessness or the timeless **puruṣa** is to be found in the moment, usually unnoticed within the sequences of the phenomenal realm. The task of the yogin is to ascertain the moment, the eternal moment, in the time-bound sequence.

nirodha (1.2, 1.12, 1.51, 3.9)—cessation, stoppage, suspension. This key term refers primarily to the stoppage of mental activity.

niyama (2.29, 2.32)—secondary ethical guidelines; Patañjali's fivefold **niyama**-list consists of śauca (yogic cleansing), contentment (saṃtoṣa), **tapas**, **svādhyāya,** and **īśvara-praṇidhāna**.

Nyāya—a darśana or school of thought concerned primarily with logic and language. The source text of **Nyāya** philosophy is the Nyāya-sūtra, ascribed to Akṣapāda Gautama and composed around the second or third century AD.

pariṇāma (YS 2.15, 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.15, 3.16, 4.2, 4.14, 4.32, 4.33)—change, transformation; Patañjali calls attention to the fact that a constant change takes place under the solid façade of the objective world. In YS 3.9–12 the term **pariṇāma** refers to transformations at the consciousness level which occur in the course of meditation.

prajñā (1.20, 1.48, 1.49, 2.27, 3.5)—"yogic insight" or even "yogic knowledge," which according to Patañjali replaces phenomenal knowledge based on sense-perception, reasoning and reliable testimony, as one enters the meditative domain.

prakṛti (1.19, 4.2, 4.3)—the manifest and nonmanifest dimensions of the world and worldly existence. **Prakṛti** is "the other" of **puruṣa**, one's metaphysical core. The twist is in the fact that the mental faculty and the psychological substratum belong to **prakṛti**, not to **puruṣa**. In the same way, the whole of the yogic process takes place in the realm of **prakṛti**.

prāṇāyāma (2.29, 2.49)—breath control, or "suspension of the flow of inhalation and exhalation" (YS 2.49). An interesting question would be what the link between breath-retention and mental stoppage is. The former, in my reading, is an illustration of the latter.

pratyāhāra (2.29, 2.54)—withdrawal of the senses, disengagement at the level of the senses, cutting off the "natural" sense-object connection. **Pratyāhāra** is the fifth of the eight limbs of yoga (see **aṣṭāṅga-yoga**).

puruṣa (1.16, 1.24, 3.36, 3.50, 3.56, 4.18, 4.34)—Selfhood, one's metaphysical core above and beyond the physical or more precisely biological, mental, emotional and even psychological aspects, all belonging to the **prakṛti** realm. Interestingly **Sāṃkhya,** as also Patañjali, acknowledges a multiplicity of **puruṣa**-s, unlike the unitary ātman (selfhood) picture projected by **Advaita-Vedānta.**

rajas—one of the three **guṇa**-s or forces which activate **prakṛti** or the consciousness in a "**prakṛti**-mode." **Rajas** is characterized by heat, passion, and activity. The term **rajas** is not mentioned in the Yogasūtra, and is replaced by the term **kriyā**.

sādhana—praxis; the path to freedom (from **duḥkha**); the title of the second chapter of the Yogasūtra.

śakti (2.6, 2.23, 3.21, 4.34)—power, capacity, potentiality. An intriguing question is how the terms **śakti** and **siddhi** relate to each other in Patañjali's formulation.

samādhi (1.20, 1.46, 1.51, 2.2, 2.29, 2.45, 3.3, 3.11, 3.38, 4.1, 4.29)—both a generic name for yogic meditation or for yoga as meditation, and the third and last component of **saṃyama** (following **dhāraṇā** and **dhyāna**). **Samādhi** is defined in YS 3.3 as follows: "When the object alone shines forth (in consciousness, in the course of **dhyāna**), as if (consciousness) is empty of its (subjective) essence, this is **samādhi**."

samāpatti (1.41, 1.42, 2.47, 3.43)—"Merging of the knowing mind (**citta**) into the object known . . . [It] is the essence of **samādhi**" (Yoga Kośa p. 299).

saṃskāra (1.18, 1.50, 2.15, 3.9, 3.10, 3.18, 4.9, 4.27)—"karmic impression" which follows an action or **vṛtti** (mind-movement); the **saṃskāra**-s are psychological content which determines the on-the-surface reality.

saṃyama (3.4, 3.16, 3.17, 3.21, 3.23, 3.27, 3.36, 3.42, 3.43, 3.45, 3.48, 3.53)—yogic meditation, consisting of **dhāraṇā, dhyāna,** and **samādhi** together.

Śaṅkara—the famous eighth century exponent of **Advaita–Vedānta**.

Sāṃkhya—a darśana or school of thought which distinguishes between **puruṣa** and **prakṛti**, the metaphysical core and everything else. Discerning gaze (**viveka-khyāti**) which distinguishes between the two is the key to **kaivalya**, or freedom from the worldly domain. By and large, Patañjali adopts the **Sāṃkhya**n narrative and its terminology.

sārūpya (1.4)—identification, involvement in the phenomenal world.

sattva (2.41, 3.36, 3.50, 3.56)—one of the three **guṇa**-s; a consciousness-state of transparency, clarity, and quiescence.

siddhi (2.43, 2.45, 3.38, 4.1)—power, yogic attainment, fruit or result of a particular effort or meditation.The siddhi-s enumerated in chapter 3 of the Yogasūtra are supra-ordinary capacities achieved or developed through certain **saṃyama**-s or object-centered meditations. However, it is implied in YS 3.38 and 3.51 that these capacities, powers, "miracles," are divertive, even obstructive on the path to **samādhi/kaivalya**.

sthūla (3.45)—gross, external, antonym of **sūkṣma**.

sūkṣma (2.10, 2.50, 3.26, 3.45, 4.13)—subtle, internal. The process of yoga can be described as a journey at the level of consciousness from **sthūla** to **sūkṣma**, gross to subtle. The subtle-most is of course **puruṣa**.

svādhyāya (2.1, 2.32, 2.44)—daily recitation or study of texts. In this respect Vyāsa mentions the mokṣa-śāstra, the texts pertaining to mokṣa or freedom. **Svādhyāya** can also be seen as referring to mantra-recitation, as in YS 2.44. It is depicted by Patañjali as one of the three components of **kriyā-yoga** and as one of the five **niyama**-s.

svarūpa (1.3, 1.43, 2.23, 2.54, 3.3, 3.45, 3.48, 4.34)—the "original essence," namely **puruṣa** as the essence of the human person, which according to Patañjali precedes any worldly identification (**sārūpya**).

tamas—literally darkness; one of the three **guṇa**-s, characterized by inertia, weariness, and passivity. The term **tamas** is not mentioned in the Yogasūtra; instead, Patañjali uses the term sthiti.

tapas (2.1, 2.32, 2.43, 4.1)—literally: heat, or generation of heat. Originally the term pertains to the heating of the sun and to the role of fire in the Vedic sacrificial ritual. The yogin is a renouncer of sacrifices, renunciation that can be interpreted as internalization of the ritual. In this respect he no longer uses external fire, but instead works with internal fires in the course of meditation. This is the yogic meaning of **tapas**. Patañjali enumerates tapas as one of the three components of **kriyā-yoga** and as one of the five **niyama**-s. In Vyāsa's bhāṣya of YS 2.1, the term **tapas** is glossed as referring to purificatory activity undertaken to "burn" the doṣa-s (impurities). In his commentary of YS 2.32 he mentions fasting as an illustration of such an activity.

vāsanā (4.8, 4.24)—Along with the terms **kleśa** and **saṃskāra**, the notion of **vāsanā** pertains to the "psychological load" stored at the inner layers of consciousness, determining one's phenomenal existence. In his gloss of the term **abhiniveśa** (YSb 2.9), Vyāsa uses the notion of **vāsanā** as referring to "karmic memory" of experiences which occurred in previous births.

vairāgya (1.12, 1.15, 3.51)—dispassion toward the objective world, the **guṇa**-s and ultimately even toward the process of yoga itself. Patañjali's prescribed method for achieving **nirodha** consists of **abhyāsa** and **vairāgya** together.

vikalpa (1.6, 1.9)—verbal construction; one of five **vṛtti**-s enumerated in Patañjali's **citta-vṛtti** (mental activity) scheme in chapter 1 of his treatise. The term **vikalpa** refers to the intrinsic short-handedness of language when it comes to subtleties, and sheer helplessness with regard to the subtle-most **puruṣa**.

viveka (2.26, 2.28, 3.53, 3.55, 4.26, 4.29)—discernment between **prakṛti** and **puruṣa.**

viveka-khyāti (2.26, 2.28, 4.29)—yogic discernment which distinguishes **prakṛti** from **puruṣa**. **Viveka-khyāti** is the "antidote" of **avidyā**.

vṛtti (1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.10, 1.41, 2.11, 2.15, 2.50, 3.44, 4.18)—activity, vibration, movement, fluctuation (as in **citta-vṛtti**).

yama (2.29, 2.30)—primary ethical guideline, vow, precept. Patañjali's fivefold **yama**-list consists of **ahiṃsā**, **asmitā**, asteya (nonstealing), brahmacarya (celibacy), and aparigraha (nonpossessiveness).

yoga (1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.28)—Patañjali's definition of yoga is unequivocal: yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ or "yoga is the cessation of mental activity" (YS 1.2). Dasgupta (1996 pp. 44–5) and others touch on the meaning of the word **yoga** as expounded by Pāṇini the great linguist. According to Dasgupta, "[Pāṇini] distinguishes between the root 'yuj' in the sense of concentration (samādhi), and 'yujir' in the sense of joining or connecting." **Yoga** in the sense of samādhi coincides with Vyāsa's definition of the term in YSb 1.1.

Yogavāsiṣṭha—another yoga text, besides the **Bhagavadgītā** mentioned above and the Yogasūtra. Traditionally the **Yogavāsiṣṭha** is attributed to Vālmīki, the (mythological?) author of the Rāmāyaṇa. According to most scholars, the text was composed between the ninth and the twelfth centuries AD in Kashmir. It is written in the form of a dialogue between sage Vāsiṣṭha and prince Rāma, and consists of a labyrinth of stories interspersed with philosophical exegesis influenced by Kashmir Śaivim.

Appendix I
Introduction to the Yogasūtra translation, or: why another translation?

The Yogasūtra is one of the most translated texts in the world. There are dozens of translations into English alone, including translations by famous scholars (such as Georg Feuerstein, I. K. Taimni, Barbara Stoler-Miller, T. S. Rukmani, G. J. Larson, and Edwin Bryant, to mention but a few). The obvious question is why another translation? Why not rely on translations by prominent scholars? What is the uniqueness of the translation offered here? What is the novelty of the present effort? In the following lines, I will attempt to answer these questions, that is, to elucidate what the incentive was, and what rationale lies behind adding another translation to the already overpacked shelf of Yogasūtra translations. I will introduce the translation, highlight its distinctive features, and explain how to "use it." I recently encountered an amusing anecdote about Kumāravyāsa, a fourteenth century Kannada poet, who chose to write a new version of the Mahābhārata, because he claimed to have heard the cosmic serpent who upholds the earth on his head groaning under the burden of the numerous Rāmāyaṇa poets.[1] Nowadays, it is perhaps the weight of the Yogasūtra translations which burdens the cosmic serpent. I hope that the following paragraphs will convince the reader that it is worthwhile to add more weight, in the form of yet another translation, to the literary load already carried by the old serpent.

1. Every translation, as I argued throughout the chapters above, is an interpretation, a svīkaraṇa, a text "made mine," written with my own pen, chiseled with my own creativity. This is especially true with regard

to the Yogasūtra, which is not merely an ancient text rooted in a different cultural and textual milieu, but even more so a sūtra, that is text written in "shorthand," in extremely short yet very condensed sentences, which "inherently" invites interpretation. The sūtra style of Patañjali's text (as well as of the other sūtra-s) has procreated a long tradition of commentaries, first in Sanskrit, and today—or at least this is my contention—in every translation of the text to whichever language. The present translation, then, is my own reading of the Yogasūtra. While writing the above chapters, I felt that unless I appended a Yogasūtra translation, they would remain unclear, incomprehensible, and not coherent enough. The chapters above are based on my reading of Patañjali, that is, on the Yogasūtra as translated here. The present translation, then, is the prasava-bhūmi or "breeding ground," from which the chapters of the present study have emerged. I see the translated text as a process (in tune with the discussion in Chapter 4). I have been reading-thinking-translating the Yogasūtra for years. As my thoughts are continuously changing, developing, deepening, so is "my Yogasūtra." Here I recall Sri Aurobindo's effort in writing and rewriting his Savitri for many years. He repeatedly "translated" this famous story (and episode of the Mahābhārata) into a long poem in English, in which he conveys his own vision of the yogic process. For me, it was not merely the perfectionism of a poet which kept Aurobindo "in the text" for so long, and resulted in several versions of "his Savitri," but rather, the repeated writing and rewriting were in effect his yogic abhyāsa or practice. On abhyāsa and its counterpart vairāgya (dispassion) I wrote at length in Chapter 1. At present I am trying to depict the ongoing reading process as corresponding with the yogic notion of abhyāsa. Following Daya Krishna's "text as a process" approach, I would further emphasize that the present translation is not a final product, but a stopover in a continuous philosophical journey. For the benefit of Sanskritists and Sanskrit students, who wish to read the translation or my thoughts and analysis chapter by chapter opposite "the original," I also attached the Yogasūtra in Sanskrit, transliterated into roman letters.

2. I have chosen not to translate basic concepts of Pātañjala-yoga. I do not translate them since they are not, at least to my mind, translatable. Puruṣa is neither "soul" or "spirit," nor even "pure subject." All these English terms do not capture or reflect the meaning of the Sanskrit notion (not to mention their Christian and Western-philosophical overtones). It is the same with notions such as prakṛti, kaivalya, saṃskāra, kleśa, guṇa, samādhi, saṃyama and so forth. I explain (or endeavor to explain) each notion in its first textual appearance, as well as in the glossary. My aim is to create a "jargon," as in every other discipline. I consider this study, including the Yogasūtra in translation, as a dialogue with the reader. This dialogue requires (at least initial) acquaintance with basic Yogasūtra terminology.

I know of merely two other Yogasūtra translations, in which the basic terms are consistently left untranslated: Saugata Bhaduri's (2006) and Christopher Chapple's (2008). Bhaduri composed and published his translation as a part

of the “śāstra group project” at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The project, he explains in his forward, and Kapil Kapoor reinforces in his preface to Bhaduri’s book, was established to produce translations of classical Indian texts (from Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra to Patañjali’s Yogasūtra) intended for Indian readers who are familiar with many of the notions used in these texts through their mother tongues (namely modern Indian languages which draw on Sanskrit), but—as Bhaduri puts it—“are not comfortable enough with Sanskrit grammar” to make sense of the original.[2] Elsewhere,[3] Bhaduri interestingly depicts his work as “nontranslation as translation.” In the present endeavor, I apply Bhaduri’s method merely to what I consider as key terms of Patañjali’s text. I find Bhaduri’s work and the rationale behind the “śāstra group project” intriguing. The needs and the capacity of modern Indian readers of a Sanskrit text translated into English—keeping in mind that English functions as the present-day pan-Indian language, having replaced Sanskrit in this significant role—are indeed different than the capacity and needs of readers unacquainted with Sanskrit terminology. Unlike Bhaduri, I do not presuppose such acquaintance (even though I do hope that even “acquainted readers” will find interest in the following translation). Nevertheless I do presuppose willingness on the part of the reader to listen to and work with the “foreign sound” of Sanskrit mixed into familiar English “music.” A similar approach, namely translation which is attentive to the Sanskrit source, and which leaves the key terms of the text untranslated, is to be found in Christopher Chapple’s recent work. “This translation,” he explains, “is designed for those interested in making direct contact with the Sanskrit text.”[4] However, despite our similar method, a deep abyss separates the two translations, Chapple’s and mine. Each of us offers a different reading of the Yogasūtra, especially of its central junctions, such as YS 1.2. Chapple reads and translates Patañjali’s text through his own “yoga as involvement in the world” prism, and highlights sūtra-s which he interprets as supporting his thesis. In my reading, as the chapters above indicate, Patañjali’s treatise is all about disengagement.

3. In the Yogasūtra translation offered here, special emphasis is given to chapters 3 and 4 of the Yogasūtra. Chapter 3 deals with the siddhi-s or “yogic powers,” and the meditative techniques which enable their attainment, all falling under the category of object-centered (as opposed to objectless) meditation. Having read other Yogasūtra translations, I often felt that the translator “gives up” on certain sūtra-s in chapter 3, since the general idea (meditation resulting in “powers”) is clear, whereas the details (what exactly the object of each meditation is) are vague, and often not elucidated by the classic commentators (due to lack of interest, since the siddhi-s are less philosophical or seen as marginal compared with the ideal of kaivalya; lack of knowledge; or since what seems vague now was for them [or for some of them, since they do not form a homogeneous group, belonging as they are to different periods and philosophical traditions] crystal-clear to the extent that it needs not be explained). Some Yogasūtra translators try to “neutralize”

the siddhi-sūtra-s, to make them more abstract and philosophical, to hide their "shamanistic" character. Using intertextual clues and of course the vast commentarial body, my attempt is not to "give up" on any sūtra, but instead to offer (and explain) more than one option of translation with regard to the more enigmatic sūtra-s. Chapter 4 of the Yogasūtra is more philosophical than the previous chapters of the text, as I endeavor to demonstrate in the present translation. I underscore, for example, Patañjali's debate with the Buddhists (YS 4.19–21), and his deep interest in the kṣaṇa-krama (moment-sequence) dialectic discussed in Chapter 1 above.

4. The translation offered here includes extensive explanatory footnotes. One such footnote is dedicated, for example, to the just-mentioned debate between Patañjali and the Buddhists. Furthermore, I believe that certain sūtra-s in Patañjali's text can simply not be understood without (at least a minimal) philosophical background. Take for example YS 2.19, a "Sāṃkhyan verse" which cannot be translated without acquaintance with the Sāṃkhyan narrative, without familiarity with notions such as aliṅga, liṅga-mātra and so forth. These terms (and many others) have a specific technical meaning within the Sāṃkhyan scope. In a footnote, I attempt to explain and to map these notions in their "natural philosophical surrounding." Without the Sāṃkhyan narrative, the translation of this sūtra would be partial, hardly touching on the meaning of the text. Without it, Patañjali's deep commitment to the Sāṃkhyan framework reflected in this sūtra and in other "Sāṃkhyan sūtra-s" in his work cannot be conveyed. Whenever a commentator raises an interesting point, I mention it in a footnote (for example, Vyāsa's wonderful articulation in YSb 3.52 of a "dangerous celestial invitation," which has the capacity of distracting an advanced yogin). I also refer the reader, in footnotes, to related sūtra-s. Take, for instance, sūtra-s 1.9, 1.42 and 3.17, which together reflect Patañjali's standpoint with regard to the inherent ambiguity of language, or sūtra-s 2.9 and 4.10 both dealing with clinging-to-life, even if this natural tendency is conveyed by two different Sanskrit notions, abhiniveśa and āśiṣ respectively. Moreover, if a certain sūtra can be translated coherently in more than one way, I discuss the different possibilities in a footnote instead of choosing one and hiding other options from the reader's eye. The notion of utkrānti, for example, in YS 3.40, denotes "levitation" and/or "determining the time of one's death at will." Each of these plausible possibilities gives a different meaning to the sūtra; hence I do not dismiss any of them, but rather bring forth and discuss both alternatives. My endeavor is to bring the reader as close as possible to the text, not to stand between her and the Yogasūtra. I attempt to direct an English projector onto a Sanskrit text, not to wrap the Sanskrit original with opaque English cellophane. The footnotes are therefore an open invitation for the reader to join me in fitting the pieces of the Yogasūtra jigsaw-puzzle together.

5. The novelty of the translation offered here is also to be found in specific sūtra-s, which I translate differently than other translators whose

work I have examined.[5] Take, for example, sūtra-s 2.46 and 2.47, in which I underscore the simultaneity of sthira and sukha (stability and comfort) and of prayatna and śaithilya (effort and relaxation), as an echo of the simultaneity of abhyāsa and vairāgya (practice and dispassion, YS 1.12). Another example is my "nontranslation as translation" (however, with an explanatory footnote) of the phrase kāya-rūpa in YS 3.21. Here I offer an alternative to the common literal translation of the phrase, more in tune with the consecutive sūtra, namely 3.22. It should also be noted that the present translation is philosophical in nature, in the sense that it highlights philosophical junctions in the Yogasūtra, and moreover, in the sense that it spotlights fundamental questions, without necessarily providing answers.

6. Throughout the translation, I clarify in brackets minimalist statements of Patañjali, based on Vyāsa or/and other commentators. Take, for example, YS 4.3, translated by me, following Vyāsa, as "Incidental causes (nimitta) do not activate prakṛti, but merely remove obstacles, like a farmer (who irrigates his field by removing obstacles which block the natural flow of the water)." Without explanatory brackets the text would be incomprehensible. As said above, I see Patañjali's text as "inherently inviting" these "interventions," or rather, I believe that the sūtra genre is composed in "shorthand" not just for technical reasons such as easier oral transmission, but as an invitation to the reader (and the translator, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak once said, is the most intimate of readers) to participate in authoring the text, to take part in the "text as a process." Some argue that a "clean" text, without "interventions" is closer to the "original." I take issue with such argument. For me, as I have claimed and reclaimed, every translation is an interpretation, with or without "brackets" or "interventions." My translation of YS 4.3 further demonstrates my habit of often "preserving" the translated Sanskrit term (in this case nimitta) in brackets, to keep the translation as close as possible to the Sanskrit text, and to provide "footholds" or reference-points for those familiar with Patañjali's text and for Sanskrit-readers in general.

7. In the process of translation I often consulted the *Yoga Kośa* (yoga dictionary) compiled in the Philosophico Literary Research Department of Kaivalyadhama S.M.Y.M Samiti, Lonvala, Pune (see bibliography). To understand a technical philosophical text such as the Yogasūtra, one needs either to be closely acquainted with the textual corpus of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, or to have access to a technical dictionary composed by someone with this very capacity. Such is the abovementioned yoga dictionary. Whenever a question arose during my reading of the Yogasūtra, one of the first sources I consulted was the *Yoga Kośa*.

8. Finally, one should tell the readers what he translated, that is what the "source text" of the present "target language" translation is. Amazingly, almost none of the Yogasūtra translators whose work I consulted provide this information. By not stating explicitly what their source text is, they all

imply that they have translated "the text," "the Yogasūtra," as if there is only one, unified and accepted by all version of the text. Among those who do not clearly specify which Sanskrit text (or texts) they worked with, are (in alphabetical order) Āraṇya (Mukerji), Bangali Baba, Bryant, Chapple, Feuerstein, Gherwal, Grinshpon, Karambelkar, Larson, Rāma Prasāda, Taimni, Verma, and Woods. The only one who is lucid enough to indicate which text she has worked with is T. S. Rukmani. In the introduction to each of her two "grand translations," of Vijñānabhikṣu's Yogavārttika and of the Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa, she mentions which "original text" she was using. This source text (or three texts she was "traveling" between, in the case of Vijñānabhikṣu), consists not merely the commentary under focus, but also the YS and YSb. In the case of the Vivaraṇa, for instance, she used the first published edition of the text (P. S. Rāma Śāstri and S. R. Krishnamurthi Śāstri, Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-bhagavatpāda, Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1952).[6] The problem with the 1952 edition is not merely the unavoidable inconsistency between the Vivaraṇa and Vyāsa's bhāṣya (owing to the fact that the Vivaraṇa-kāra must have read a different version of the bhāṣya than the one available today). The problem is also that "the fact that published editions agree with each other [in this case, the 1952 edition and its reproduction by Rukmani], does not mean that the readings were text-critically established."[7] This is to say that the authority of the Yogasūtra text, as provided (with slight differences) by its numerous translators/ commentators, is paradoxically established not through scrutiny of manuscripts and early printed editions (which are not easily accessible), but through its repetitive production in book after book. The same point is reinforced by Wezler, who has investigated the wording of YS 2.22 in 26 editions of the text (the first from 1867, the last from 1998). According to him, "the total mutual agreement [in all these editions] regarding the wording of YS 2.22 is caused at least to some, if not even to a large extent, by dependence of the latter editions on the former ones."[8] He himself offers an alternative wording, based on the reading of the Vivaraṇa-kāra. Implied is certain arbitrariness in determining the Yogasūtra text. This arbitrariness and the complexity of ascertaining "the original" are spotlighted in Philipp Maas's eye-opening article "On the Written Transmission of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra" (2010). Having investigated 22 printed editions of what he refers to as Pātañjalayogaśāstra (namely the YS and YSb together) and 25 manuscripts "in seven scripts from different regions of the Indian subcontinent," he reports that in the first chapter alone, "the witnesses are at variance in nearly 2180 cases, of which about 900 are substantial."[9] When Maas speaks of this huge number of variant readings, he refers to bhāṣya, not sūtra, even if he believes that the sūtra and the bhāṣya share a common author.[10] Wezler's reflection on YS 2.22 shows that even the mūla-text is not absolutely homogeneous. Maas, in his article, touches on the politics of formatting a text. He sketches a narrative of "northern" and "southern" manuscript "groups," each consisting of texts in different scripts. This division he dates towards the end of the ninth century. He further elucidates how in the course of time, the "northern group"

gained the status of a "normative recension."[11] He tells the fascinating story of a text transmission which involves copying, editing, correcting, without always marking one's own amendments. He narrates a hardly told tale of lively, creative historical processes which "bubble" underneath the present-day façade of a "unitary" Yogasūtra.

What have I translated then?

I translated the Sanskrit text of Swāmi Hariharānanda Āraṇya's *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali*, third edition, University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1981. According to Potter's bibliography, the first edition of the Sanskrit text, with Āraṇya's Bengali translation and annotation was published in 1910.[12] The first edition of the text with P. N. Mukerji's translation from Bengali into English was published by the University of Calcutta in 1963. Choosing the third edition of Āraṇya's Yogasūtra with Mukerji's translation as my "source text" is not unproblematic, if one takes into account the philological concerns raised by Wezler, Maas, and Harimoto. My choice was almost accidental, and I have not checked the amendments from Āraṇya's early editions (1910, 1911) to the first, second and third editions with Mukerji's translation. Āraṇya, in the edition used by me, provides the same wording of YS 2.22 as the Vivaraṇa-kāra, that is kṛta-arthaṃ prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭaṃ tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt.[13]

I annexed to Āraṇya's text sūtra 3.22 (etena śabda-ādy antardhānam uktam), which according to the commentators is not an "original" sūtra, and therefore not included in Āraṇya's Yogasūtra. Only Bhojarāja treats it as integral in Patañjali's text. I followed him, and reproduced the sūtra as it appears in Verma's edition of the Yogasūtra (Varanasi: Chaukhamba, 2010). I included the sūtra in "my Yogasūtra" not because I believe that it is "original." I am not in search of the "original Yogasūtra," but interested in a multivocal text which can be the basis of a fruitful philosophical discussion. Hence the inclusive approach. For me, this "extra" sūtra is not more explanatory in essence than YS 3.20, accepted by the commentators and included in almost every edition of the Yogasūtra. The next sūtra (sa-upakramaṃ nir-upakramaṃ ca karma tat-saṃyamād apara-anta-jñānam ariṣṭebhyo vā) is numbered here 3.23 and not 3.22 as in editions which do not include the sūtra which Bhojarāja, Verma, and myself, among others, have added.

9. In closure I would like to quote Walter Benjamin, who in his extremely insightful "The Task of the Translator" writes:

> A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, it does not block its light.[14]

I have taken Benjamin's statement as the motto of my work, which is intended as said above to facilitate a saṃvād or "close encounter" between the reader and Patañjali's often enigmatic text, which is far more philosophical than one would expect of a "practical manual". It is my hope that this question-

(rather than answer-) centered translation is indeed "transparent" in Benjamin's sense of the word. Interestingly, his statement corresponds with Patañjali's "cleansing narrative," the aim of which is to enable the yogin to develop a clear, discerning vision (viveka-khyāti), through which something altogether different from the familiar, "something" which following the Sāṃkhya tradition he refers to as puruṣa, can be "seen" or "realized." In sūtra-s 2.52 (dealing with prāṇāyāma) and 3.44 (dealing with a meditative state called mahāvideha, "the great disembodiment"), Patañjali speaks of dissolving (kṣaya) of the covering of the inner-light (prakāśa-āvaraṇa); covering created by avidyā or the "phenomenal mode" of consciousness, which the yogic process aims at "undoing." Following Benjamin's statement, and in tune with Patañjali's own "cleansing narrative," the translation offered here is an effort in the direction of allowing the "inner-light" of the Yogasūtra to break through the numerous coverings imposed on it by every "closed," "final," "answer-providing," "question-hiding," "otherness-suppressing" translation of the text.

Notes

1 Ramanujan (1991), p. 24.
2 Bhaduri (2006), p. v.
3 Bhaduri (2008).
4 Chapple (2008), p. 139.
5 See bibliography and Raveh (2008).
6 Rukmani (2001a), vol. 1, p. ix.
7 Harimoto (2004), p. 177.
8 Wezler (2001), p. 294.
9 Maas (2010), p. 89.
10 Maas (2009), p. 264
11 Maas (2010), p. 90.
12 No. 328 in Potter (1970), p. 19; according to Potter, the first edition includes the Sanskrit text of the Yogasūtra with translation into Bengali (Jessore, 1910). The next edition (Calcutta, 1911), no. 331 in Potter's bibliography, also includes "Vyāsa's Vārttika" and Āraṇya's Sāṃkhyatattvāloka, all translated into Bengali.
13 Wezler (2001) finds more sense in this wording of YS 2.22, than in the more common, according to him, kṛta-arthaṃ prati naṣṭam tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt, which he has found in 26 editions of the Yogasūtra. However he mentions Āraṇya (1922) and Karambelkar (1998) among these editions. Every edition which I have checked, including Āraṇya (1981) and Karambelkar (2008), as well as Miśra (1998), Karnatak (1992), Rukmani (1983, 2001), Feuerstein (1989), Taimni (1993), Ranganathan (2008), Larson (2008), and Brynat (2009), to mention just a few, shares the rendering of the Vivaraṇa-kāra and Wezler, hence it has become the standard wording of sūtra 2.22. It seems that the wording of YS 2.22 has been amended from Āraṇya (1922) checked by Wezler to Āraṇya (1981) used by me.
14 Benjamin (2007), p. 179.

Appendix II
The Yogasūtra in transliteration

Chapter 1: samādhi-pādaḥ

1. atha yoga-anuśāsanam
2. yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ
3. tadā draṣṭuḥ sva-rūpe ‘vasthānam
4. vṛtti-sārūpyam itaratra
5. vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ
6. pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ
7. pratyakṣa-anumāna-āgamāḥ pramāṇāni
8. viparyayo mithyā-jñānam a-tad-rūpa-pratiṣṭham
9. śabda-jñāna–anupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ
10. abhāva-pratyaya-ālambanā vṛttir nidrā
11. anubhūta-viṣaya-asaṃpramoṣah smṛtiḥ
12. abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṃ tan-nirodhaḥ
13. tatra sthitau yatno ‘bhyāsaḥ
14. sa tu dīrgha-kāla-nairantarya-satkāra-āsevito dṛḍha-bhūmiḥ
15. dṛṣṭa-ānuśravika-viṣaya-vitṛṣṇasya vaśīkāra-saṃjñā vairāgyam
16. tat-paraṃ puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam
17. vitarka-vicāra-ānanda-asmitā-rūpa-anugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ
18. virāma-pratyaya-abhyāsa-pūrvaḥ saṃskāra-śeṣo ‘nyaḥ
19. bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām

20. śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti–samādhi-prajñā-pūrvaka itareṣām
21. tīvra-saṃvegānām āsannaḥ
22. mṛdu-madhya-adhimātratvāt tato ‘pi viśeṣaḥ
23. īśvara-praṇidhānād vā
24. kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvaraḥ
25. tatra niratiśayaṃ sarva-jña-bījam
26. pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālena-anavacchedāt
27. tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ
28. taj-japas tad-artha-bhāvanam
29. tataḥ pratyak-cetanā-adhigamo ‘py antarāya-abhāvaś ca
30. vyādhi-styāna-saṃśaya-pramāda-ālasya-avirati-bhrānti-darśana-alabdha-bhūmikatva-anavasthitatvāni citta-vikṣepās te ‘ntarāyāḥ
31. duḥkha-daurmanasya-aṅgam-ejayatva-śvāsa-praśvāsā vikṣepa-sahabhuvaḥ
32. tat-pratiṣedha-artham eka-tattva-abhyāsaḥ
33. maitrī-karuṇā-muditā-upekṣāṇāṃ sukha-duḥkha-puṇya-apuṇya-viṣayāṇāṃ bhāvanātaś citta-prasādanam
34. pracchardana-vidhāraṇābhyāṃ vā prāṇasya
35. viṣayavatī vā pravṛttir utpannā manasaḥ sthiti-nibandhanī
36. viśokā vā jyotiṣmatī
37. vīta-rāga-viṣayaṃ vā cittam
38. svapna-nidrā-jñāna-ālambanaṃ vā
39. yathā-abhimata-dhyānād vā
40. parama-aṇu-parama-mahattva-anto ‘sya vaśīkāraḥ
41. kṣīṇa-vṛtter abhijātasya-iva maṇer grahītṛ-grahaṇa-grāhyeṣu tat-stha-tad-añjanatā samāpattiḥ
42. tatra śabda-artha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ saṃkīrṇā savitarkā samāpattiḥ
43. smṛti-pariśuddhau sva-rūpa-śūnyā-iva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā
44. etayā-eva savicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-viṣayā vyākhyātā
45. sūkṣma-viṣayatvaṃ ca-aliṅga-paryavasānam
46. tā eva sabījaḥ samādhiḥ
47. nirvicāra-vaiśāradye ‘adhyātma-prasādaḥ
48. ṛtam-bharā tatra prajñā
49. śruta-anumāna-prajñābhyām anya-viṣayā viśeṣa-arthatvāt
50. taj-jah saṃskāro ‘nya-saṃskāra-pratibandhī
51. tasya-api nirodhe sarva-nirodhān nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ

Chapter 2: sādhana-pādaḥ

1. tapaḥ svādhyāya-īśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyā-yogaḥ
2. samādhi-bhāvanā-arthaḥ kleśa-tanū-karaṇa-arthaś ca
3. avidyā-asmitā-rāga-dveṣa-abhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ
4. avidyā kṣetram uttareṣāṃ prasupta-tanu-vicchinna-udārāṇām
5. anitya-aśuci-duḥkha-anātmasu nitya-śuci-sukha-ātma-khyātir avidyā
6. dṛg-darśana-śaktyor eka-ātmatā-iva-asmitā
7. sukha-anuśayī rāgaḥ
8. duḥkha-anuśayī dveṣaḥ
9. sva-rasa-vāhī viduṣo 'pi tathā-rūḍho 'bhiniveśaḥ
10. te pratiprasava-heyāḥ sūkṣmāḥ
11. dhyāna-heyās tad-vṛttayaḥ
12. kleśa-mūlaḥ karma-āśayo dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa-janma-vedanīyaḥ
13. sati mūle tad-vipāko jāty-āyur-bhogāḥ
14. te hlāda-paritāpa-phalāḥ puṇya-apuṇya-hetutvāt
15. pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ
16. heyaṃ duḥkham anāgatam
17. draṣṭṛ-dṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heya-hetuḥ
18. prakāśa-kriyā-sthiti-śīlaṃ bhūta-indriya-ātmakaṃ bhoga-apavarga-arthaṃ dṛśyam
19. viśeṣa-aviśeṣa-liṅga-mātra-aliṅgāni guṇa-parvāṇi
20. draṣṭā dṛśi-mātraḥ śuddho 'pi pratyaya-anupaśyaḥ
21. tad-artha eva dṛśyasya ātmā
22. kṛta-arthaṃ prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭaṃ tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt
23. sva-svāmi-śaktyoḥ sva-rūpa-upalabdhi-hetuḥ saṃyogaḥ
24. tasya hetur avidyā
25. tad-abhāvāt saṃyoga-abhāvo hānaṃ tad-dṛśeḥ kaivalyam
26. viveka-khyātir aviplavā hāna-upāyaḥ
27. tasya saptadhā prānta-bhūmiḥ prajñā
28. yoga-aṅga-anuṣṭhānād aśuddhi-kṣaye jñāna-dīptir ā viveka-khyāteḥ
29. yama-niyama-āsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo 'ṣṭav aṅgāni
30. ahiṃsā-satya-asteya-brahmacarya-aparigrahā yamāḥ
31. jāti-deśa-kāla-samaya-anavacchinnāḥ sārva-bhaumā mahā-vratam

32. śauca-saṃtoṣa-tapaḥ-svādhyāya-īśvara-praṇidhānāni niyamāḥ
33. vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhāvanam
34. vitarkā hiṃsā-ādayaḥ kṛta-kārita-anumoditā lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā mṛdu-madhya-adhimātrā duḥkha-ajñāna-ananta-phalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam
35. ahiṃsā-pratiṣṭhāyāṃ tat-saṃnidhau vaira-tyāgaḥ
36. satya-pratiṣṭhāyāṃ kriyā-phala-āśrayatvam
37. asteya-pratiṣṭhāyāṃ sarva-ratna-upasthānam
38. brahmacarya-pratiṣṭhāyāṃ vīryam-lābhaḥ
39. aparigraha-sthairye janma-kathaṃtā-saṃbodhaḥ
40. śaucāt sva-aṅga-jugupsā parair-asaṃsargaḥ
41. sattva-śuddhi-saumanasya-eka-agrya-indriya-jaya-ātma-darśana-yogyatvāni ca
42. saṃtoṣād anuttamaḥ sukha-lābhaḥ
43. kāya-indriya-siddhir aśuddhi-kṣayāt tapasaḥ
44. svādhyāyād iṣṭa-devatā-saṃprayogaḥ
45. samādhi-siddhir īśvara-praṇidhānāt
46. sthira-sukham āsanam
47. prayatna-śaithilya-ananta-samāpattibhyām
48. tato dvandva-anabhighātāḥ
49. tasmin sati śvāsa-praśvāsayor gati-vicchedaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ
50. bāhya-abhyantara-stambha-vṛttir deśa-kāla-saṃkhyābhiḥ paridṛṣṭo dīrgha-sūkṣmaḥ
51. bāhya-abhyantara-viṣaya-ākṣepī caturthaḥ
52. tataḥ kṣīyate prakāśa-āvaraṇam
53. dhāraṇāsu ca yogyatā manasaḥ
54. sva-viṣaya-asaṃprayoge cittasya sva-rūpa-anukāra iva-indriyāṇāṃ pratyāhāraḥ
55. tataḥ paramā vaśyatā-indriyāṇām

Chapter 3: vibhūti-pādaḥ

1. deśa-bandhaś cittasya dhāraṇā
2. tatra pratyaya-eka-tānatā dhyānam
3. tad-eva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsaṃ sva-rūpa-śūnyam iva samādhiḥ
4. trayam ekatra saṃyamaḥ
5. taj-jayāt prajñā-ālokaḥ

6. tasya bhūmiṣu viniyogaḥ
7. trayam antar-aṅgaṃ pūrvebhyaḥ
8. tad api bahir-aṅgaṃ nirbījasya
9. vyutthāna-nirodha-saṃskārayor abhibhava-prādur-bhāvau nirodha-kṣaṇa-citta-anvayo nirodha-pariṇāmaḥ
10. tasya praśānta-vāhitā saṃskārāt
11. sarva-arthatā-ekāgratayoḥ kṣaya-udayau cittasya samādhi-pariṇāmaḥ
12. tataḥ punaḥ śānta-uditau tulya-pratyayau cittasya-ekāgratā-pariṇāmaḥ
13. etena bhūta-indriyeṣu dharma-lakṣaṇa-avasthā-pariṇāmā vyākhyātāḥ
14. śānta-udita-avyapadeśya-dharma-anupātī dharmī
15. krama-anyatvaṃ pariṇāma-anyatve hetuḥ
16. pariṇāma-traya-saṃyamād atīta-anāgata-jñānam
17. śabda-artha-pratyayānām itara-itara-adhyāsāt saṃkaras tat-pravibhāga-saṃyamāt sarva-bhūta-ruta-jñānam
18. saṃskāra-sākṣāt-karaṇāt pūrva-jāti-jñānam
19. pratyayasya para-citta-jñānam
20. na ca tat sa-ālambanaṃ tasya-aviṣayī-bhūtatvāt
21. kāya-rūpa–saṃyamāt tad-grāhya-śakti-stambhe cakṣuḥ-prakāśa-asaṃprayoge 'ntardhānam
22. etena śabda-ādy antardhānam uktam
23. sa-upakramaṃ nir-upakramaṃ ca karma tat-saṃyamād apara-anta-jñānam ariṣṭebhyo vā
24. maitrī-ādiṣu balāni
25. baleṣu hasti-bala-ādīni
26. pravṛtty-āloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam
27. bhuvana-jñānaṃ sūrye saṃyamāt
28. candre tārā-vyūha-jñānam
29. dhruve tad-gati-jñānam
30. nābhi-cakre kāya-vyūha-jñānam
31. kaṇṭha-kūpe kṣut-pipāsā-nivṛttiḥ
32. kūrma-nāḍyāṃ sthairyam
33. mūrdha-jyotiṣi siddha-darśanam
34. prātibhād vā sarvam
35. hṛdaye citta-saṃvit

36. sattva-puruṣayor atyanta-asaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyaya-aviśeṣo bhogaḥ para-arthatvāt sva-artha-saṃyamāt puruṣa-jñānam
37. tataḥ prātibha-śrāvaṇa-vedanā-ādarśa-āsvāda-vārtā jāyante
38. te samādhāv upasargā vyutthāne siddhayaḥ
39. bandha-kāraṇa-śaithilyāt pracāra-saṃvedanāc ca cittasya para-śarīra-āveśaḥ
40. udāna-jayāj jala-paṅka-kaṇṭaka-ādiṣv asaṅga utkrāntiś ca
41. samāna-jayāj-jvalanam
42. śrotra-ākāśayoḥ saṃbandha-saṃyamād divyaṃ śrotram
43. kāya-ākāśayoḥ saṃbandha-saṃyamāl laghu-tūla-samāpatteś ca-ākāśa-gamanam
44. bahir-akalpitā vṛttir mahā-videhā tataḥ prakāśa-āvaraṇa-kṣayaḥ
45. sthūla-sva-rūpa-sūkṣma-anvaya-arthavattva-saṃyamād bhūta-jayaḥ
46. tato 'ṇima-ādi-prādur-bhāvaḥ kāya-saṃpat-tad-dharma-anabhighātaś ca
47. rūpa-lāvaṇya-bala-vajra-saṃhananatvāni kāya-saṃpat
48. grahaṇa-sva-rūpa-asmitā-anvaya-arthavattva-saṃyamād indriya-jayaḥ
49. tato mano-javitvaṃ vikaraṇa-bhāvaḥ pradhāna-jayaś ca
50. sattva-puruṣa-anyatā-khyāti-mātrasya sarva-bhāva-adhiṣṭhātṛtvaṃ sarva-jñātṛtvaṃ ca
51. tad-vairāgyād api doṣa-bīja-kṣaye kaivalyam
52. sthāny-upanimantraṇe saṅga-smaya-akaraṇam punar-aniṣṭa-prasaṅgāt
53. kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoḥ saṃyamād viveka-jaṃ jñānam
54. jāti-lakṣaṇa-deśair anyatā-anavacchedāt tulyayos-tataḥ pratipattiḥ
55. tārakaṃ sarva-viṣayaṃ sarvathā-viṣayam akramaṃ ca-iti viveka-jaṃ jñānam
56. sattva-puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam iti

Chapter 4: kaivalya-pādaḥ

1. janma-oṣadhi-mantra-tapaḥ-samādhi-jāḥ siddhayaḥ
2. jāty-antara-pariṇāmaḥ prakṛty-āpūrāt
3. nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ varaṇa-bhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrika-vat
4. nirmāṇa-cittāny asmitā-mātrāt
5. pravṛtti-bhede prayojakaṃ cittam ekam anekeṣām

6. tatra dhyāna-jam anāśayam
7. karma-aśukla-akṛṣṇaṃ yoginas tri-vidham itareṣām
8. tatas tad-vipāka-anuguṇānām eva-abhivyaktir vāsanānām
9. jāti-deśa-kāla-vyavahitānām apy ānantaryaṃ smṛti-saṃskārayor eka-rūpatvat
10. tāsām anāditvaṃ ca-āśiṣo nityatvāt
11. hetu-phala-āśraya-ālambanaiḥ saṃgṛhītatvād eṣām abhāve tad-abhāvaḥ
12. atīta-anāgataṃ sva-rūpato ‘sty adhva-bhedād dharmāṇām
13. te vyakta-sūkṣmā guṇa-ātmānaḥ
14. pariṇāma-ekatvād vastu-tattvam
15. vastu-sāmye citta-bhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ
16. na ca-eka-citta-tantraṃ vastu tad-apramāṇakaṃ tadā kiṃ syāt
17. tad-uparāga-apekṣitvāc cittasya vastu jñāta-ajñātam
18. sadā jñātāś citta-vṛttayas tat-prabhoḥ puruṣasya-apariṇāmitvāt
19. na tat sva-ābhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt
20. eka-samaye ca-ubhaya-anavadhāraṇam
21. citta-antara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher-atiprasaṅgaḥ smṛti–saṃkaraś ca
22. citer apratisaṃkramāyās tad-ākāra-āpattau sva-buddhi-saṃvedanam
23. draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-uparaktaṃ cittaṃ sarva-artham
24. tad-asaṃkhyeya-vāsanābhiś citram api para-arthaṃ saṃhatya-kāritvāt
25. viśeṣa-darśina ātma-bhāva-bhāvanā-vinivṛttiḥ
26. tadā viveka-nimnaṃ kaivalya-prāg-bhāraṃ cittam
27. tac-chidreṣu pratyaya-antarāṇi saṃskārebhyaḥ
28. hānam eṣāṃ kleśavad uktam
29. prasaṃkhyāne ‘py akusīdasya sarvathā viveka-khyāter dharma-meghaḥ samādhiḥ
30. tataḥ kleśa-karma-nivṛttiḥ
31. tadā sarva-āvaraṇa-mala-apetasya jñānasya-ānantyāj jñeyam alpam
32. tataḥ kṛta-arthānāṃ pariṇāma-krama-samāptir guṇānām
33. kṣaṇa-pratiyogī pariṇāma-apara-anta-nirgrāhyaḥ kramaḥ
34. puruṣa-artha-śūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ sva-rūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti

Appendix III
The Yogasūtra in translation

Chapter 1: samādhi (Meditation)

1. This is the yoga handbook.
2. Yoga is the cessation (nirodha) of mental activity (citta-vṛtti).
3. Then (when mental activity ceases) the seer is established in his[1] "original essence" (svarūpa).
4. Otherwise, there is identification with mental activity.
5. Mental activity is fivefold and is afflictive or nonafflictive.[2]
6. (Mental activity consists of) valid knowledge (pramāṇa), invalid knowledge (viparyaya), verbal construction[3] (vikalpa), sleep (nidrā), and memory (smṛti).
7. Valid knowledge is based on sense-perception, inference and reliable testimony.
8. Invalid knowledge is false perception of an object, not as it is.
9. Verbal construction (vikalpa) is reference-less (vastu-śūnya), and based merely on verbal proficiency (śabda-jñāna–anupātī).
10. Sleep is mental activity based on the experience of something which does not exist.
11. Memory is conservation of an object experienced in the past.
12. The cessation of these (vṛtti-s or instances of mental activity) is accomplished through repetitive practice (abhyāsa) and dispassion (vairāgya).
13. Abhyāsa is the effort to achieve stability (of "empty," motionless mind).

14. It is firmly grounded if performed attentively and ceaselessly for a long period of time.
15. Dispassion (vairāgya) is thirstlessness toward objects seen and heard, which is a sign of control (vaśīkāra-saṃjñā).[4]
16. Ultimate vairāgya is thirstlessness toward the guṇa-s,[5] arising from the vision of puruṣa (puruṣa-khyāti).
17. Cognitive (saṃprajñāta) samādhi (or cognitive yogic meditation) consists of vitarka (absorption in sthūla or concrete objects), vicāra (absorption in sūkṣma or subtle objects), ānanda (feeling of joy), and asmitā ("I-sense").
18. In the other (type of samādhi, i.e. asaṃparjñāta or "noncognitive" samādhi[6]), achieved through repetitive practice of the cessation of mental activity, only the saṃskāra-s ("karmic impressions") remain.
19. (In the case of) videha ("bodiless") and prakṛti-laya ("merged in prakṛti" yogin-s, samādhi) occurs from birth.[7]
20. The others (attain asaṃprajñāta samādhi) through certainty (śraddhā, that it is attainable), power (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti)[8], (saṃprajñāta) samādhi, and yogic insight (prajñā).
21. (Asaṃprajñāta samādhi) is nearer to (those who practice) most intensely.
22. As (the intensity in practice can be) mild, medium or extreme, there is a difference (in the yogin's proximity to asaṃprajñāta samādhi).
23. Or (samādhi may be accomplished) through devotion to īśvara.[9]
24. īśvara is a special puruṣa untouched by the kleśa-s ("causes of affliction"), by action and its fruits, and by "long-term karmic imprints" (āśaya).
25. In him, the unequaled seed of omniscience is rooted.
26. He is the guru of even the yogin-s of the past, being unbound by time.
27. His sound is praṇava (the syllable OM).
28. Its repetition arouses devotion to him whom it denotes (namely īśvara).
29. Then the consciousness turns inwards, and the obstacles disappear.
30. The obstacles (antarāya-s) are illness, dullness, doubt, carelessness, laziness, lack of dispassion,[10] delusion,[11] failure in attaining a certain stage, and instability (in an attained stage).
31. Pain (duḥkha), mental pain (daurmanasya), trembling limbs, and (unregulated) inhalation and exhalation accompany these distractions.
32. To counteract these (distractions, the yogin's) abhyāsa (repetitive practice, should focus) on one principle (eka-tattva).

33. Through practice of friendliness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekṣa) toward the happy, the suffering, the virtuous, and the unvirtuous (respectively), consciousness is clarified.
34. Or, through exhalation and retention of breath.
35. Or, through the activation of subtle sense-perception (viṣaya-vatī), stability of mind (is established).
36. Or, through sorrow-less illumination.
37. Or, through a mind free from attachment.[12]
38. Or, through knowledge attained during sleep while dreaming.
39. Or, through meditation (dhyāna) on a desired object.
40. The mastery (of a yogin who has attained stability of mind) extends from the minutest particle to the largest entity.
41. In the case of (a yogin whose) mental activity has decreased, (whose consciousness is as clear) as a transparent jewel, a merging (samāpatti) of perceiver (grahītṛ), perception (grahaṇa), and perceived object (grāhya) takes place.
42. savitarkā samāpatti ("contemplative meditation" centered on sthūla or concrete objects) is mixed with verbal construction (vikalpa) consisting of sounds (or words), objects (or referents), and ideas (jñāna).[13]
43. nirvitarkā (samāpatti) ("meditation beyond contemplation") occurs when memory is purified (i.e., emptied of its contents), consciousness as if emptied of its (subjective) nature, and the object (of meditation) alone shines forth.
44. In the same way, (two other samāpatti-s or meditation-types), centered on sūkṣma or subtle objects, are explained: savicārā ("reflective meditation") and nirvicārā ("meditation beyond reflectivity").
45. The objects can be subtle to the extent of being without-qualities (aliṅga).[14]
46. All these (types of meditation) are included within the object-centered (sa-bīja) samādhi category.
47. When (the meditative state called) nirvicāra becomes lucid, clarity emanating from the inner-self occurs.
48. In this (clarity), prajñā (yogic insight) is truth-bearing (ṛtam-bharā[15]).
49. (ṛtam-bharā prajñā or truth-bearing yogic insight) is essentially different from knowledge based on reliable testimony and inference as it touches on particulars.

50. The saṃskāra ("karmic impression") produced by it (by truth-bearing yogic insight) counteracts other saṃskāra-s.
51. When there is cessation even of this (saṃskāra), with the cessation of everything (of every vṛtti and saṃskāra), this is objectless (nir-bīja) samādhi.

Chapter 2: sādhana (Praxis)

1. Practical yoga (kriyā-yoga) consists of tapas,[16] daily recitation (svādhyāya),[17] and devotion to īśvara (īśvara-praṇidhāna).
2. Its purpose is to bring about samādhi and diminish the kleśa-s ("causes of affliction").
3. The kleśa-s are avidyā,[18] "I-sense" (asmitā), attraction (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and clinging to life (or fear of death, abhiniveśa).
4. avidyā is the breeding-ground of the other kleśa-s, whether they are dormant (prasupta), weak (tanu), interrupted (vicchinna), or stimulated (udāra).
5. avidyā is misidentification of the impermanent as permanent, the impure as pure, the painful as joyous, and nonselfhood as selfhood.
6. "I-sense" (asmitā) comes into being when the power of the seer (dṛk-śakti) and the power of seeing (darśana-śakti) appear to be one and the same.
7. Attraction (rāga) follows pleasure.
8. Aversion (dveṣa) follows pain.
9. Clinging to life (abhiniveśa) is a natural inclination rooted even in the wise.[19]
10. In their subtle form, they (the kleśa-s) can be overcome by involution (pratiprasava).[20]
11. In their (gross) active form, they (the kleśa-s) can be overcome through meditation (dhyāna).
12. (The consequences of) the "karmic storage" (karmāśaya), of which the kleśa-s are the root, are felt in this or in the following lifetimes.
13. As long as the root (mūla) exists, it is bound to bear fruits in the form of birth, life-span, and nature of experiences.
14. These fruits are pleasant or painful on account of pure or impure cause (i.e., according to the "stored karma").
15. Owing to the suffering inherent in change, in pain (tapas), in the (ripening of) saṃskāra-s and in the strife of the fluctuating guṇa-s, all is suffering for the discerning.
16. Suffering which has not yet come can be prevented.

17. The conjunction (saṃyoga) of seer (draṣṭṛ) and seen (dṛśya) is the cause of that which is to be prevented (i.e., the cause of suffering).
18. The seen consists of brightness, action, and inertia[21]; the elements (bhūta) and the sense organs (indriya) are its essence; worldly experience (bhoga) and release from it (apavarga)[22] are its (dual) purpose.
19. The layers of the guṇa (or prakṛti realm) are the particularized (viśeṣa), the unparticularized (aviśeṣa), the "mere designator" (liṅga-mātra), and the unmanifest (aliṅga).[23]
20. The seer (draṣṭṛ) is pure seeing (dṛśi-mātra). Although pure (i.e., content-less), he "sees" mental activity.
21. The essence of the seen is just for his (the seer's, puruṣa's) sake.
22. Even though "she" (prakṛti, the seen) ceases to exist in respect of "him" (a certain puruṣa) for whose sake "her" purpose has been achieved, "she" continues to exist for others (for other puruṣa-s who are still afflicted by avidyā), being as "she" is of a common nature.
23. The conjunction (saṃyoga, of seer and seen, puruṣa and prakṛti) brings about understanding with regard to the (separate) powers of the "property" (prakṛti) and its "owner" (puruṣa).
24. The cause (of this conjunction) is avidyā.
25. When (avidyā) ceases to exist, the conjunction also ceases. This is yogic cessation (hāna), the aloneness (kaivalya) of pure seeing (dṛśi).
26. Steady (aviplava) yogic discernment (viveka-khyāti, namely awareness of the absolute difference between prakṛti and puruṣa) is the means of cessation.
27. The sevenfold yogic insight (prajñā) arises in him (who has attained steady viveka-khyāti).[24]
28. Through the practice (anuṣṭhāna) of the limbs of yoga (yoga-aṅga), with the annihilation of impurity, the light of knowledge shines toward viveka-khyāti.
29. The eight limbs are yama (primary ethical guidelines), niyama (secondary ethical guidelines), āsana (yogic posture), prāṇāyāma (breath control), pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the senses), dhāraṇā (meditation phase I), dhyāna (meditation phase II), and samādhi (meditation phase III).
30. The yama-s (primary ethical guidelines) are nonviolence (ahiṃsā), truthfulness (satya), nontheft (asteya), celibacy (brahmacarya), and nonpossessiveness (aparigraha).
31. Observing these (yama-s), irrespective of birth, place, time, circumstances, or even a sense of duty,[25] is "the great vow" (mahāvrata).

32. The niyama-s (secondary ethical guidelines) are yogic cleansing (śauca), contentment (saṃtoṣa), tapas, daily recitation (svādhyāya), and devotion to īśvara (īśvara-praṇidhāna).
33. To stop thoughts which contradict the yama-s, one should cultivate their opposite.
34. To cultivate the opposite is (to reflect upon the fact) that thoughts which contradict the yama-s, such as violent thoughts and so on, whether executed, planned to be executed, or even approved, whether driven by greed, anger, or delusion, whether mild, moderate, or intense, result in endless suffering (duḥkha) and ignorance (ajñāna).
35. In the presence of (a yogin) firmly established in ahiṃsā (nonviolence), violence ceases.
36. For (a yogin) firmly established in satya (truthfulness), the fruit (of action) is in the action itself.
37. (A yogin) firmly established in asteya (nontheft, is rewarded with) jewels appearing from every direction.
38. (A yogin) firmly established in brahmacarya (celibacy, acquires) power.
39. (A yogin) firmly established in aparigraha (nonpossessiveness, acquires) knowledge of the why and how (kathaṃtā) of (previous and future) births.[26]
40. Śauca (yogic cleansing) results in disgust with respect to one's own body and avoidance of contact with others.
41. And (also results) in sattva-śuddhi (sattvic purity), cheerfulness (saumanasya), one-pointedness, control over the sense organs and the capacity of ātma-darśana (self-vision).
42. saṃtoṣa (contentment) brings about unsurpassed joy.
43. tapas results in perfection of the body and the senses, owing to the destruction of impurity.
44. As a result of mantra recitation (svādhyāya, the yogin can) contact a chosen deity.
45. As a result of devotion to īśvara, samādhi is attained.[27]
46. āsana (yogic posture) is comfortably stable.
47. (It is perfected through) relaxation within effort, and meditation (samāpatti) on the infinite.[28]
48. Then (the yogin) is not affected by opposites (or dualities, dvandva-s).
49. Following (āsana), prāṇāyāma which is suspension of the flow of inhalation and exhalation (is practiced).

50. (prāṇāyāma is) external (bāhya, i.e., suspension of respiration after exhalation, when the lungs are empty), internal (abhyantara, i.e., suspension of respiration after inhalation, when the lungs are full) and stationary (stambha, i.e., suspension of respiration "midway," when the lungs are neither necessarily empty nor full). It is regulated by bodily location, time, and counting, and is long and subtle.
51. (prāṇāyāma of the) fourth kind exceeds the scope of external and internal.
52. Then the covering of (the inner) light dissolves.
53. And the mind is ready for meditation (dhāraṇā).
54. pratyāhāra is a state in which the sense organs as if follow the "original essence" of the mind by disconnecting themselves from their objects.
55. Then there is absolute control over the senses.

Chapter 3: vibhūti (Powers)

1. dhāraṇā is the fixation of consciousness on a single spot (or object).
2. dhyāna is even flow of consciousness (in the course of dhāraṇā) toward it (toward the object meditated upon).
3. When the object alone shines forth (in consciousness, in the course of dhyāna), as if (consciousness) is empty of its (subjective) essence, this is samādhi.
4. The three together (dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi are called) saṃyama.
5. By mastery of that (mastery of saṃyama), yogic insight (prajñā) arises.
6. It (saṃyama) is to be applied at every stage (of practice).[29]
7. The three (meditative yoga-limbs) are more internal than the preceding limbs.
8. However these limbs are external compared to objectless samādhi.
9. When vyutthāna-saṃskāra-s (activating the citta or consciousness in external, object-centered mode) are overpowered, and nirodha-saṃskāra-s (enabling consciousness to turn inwardly) emerge, this is nirodha-pariṇāma (nirodha-transformation), characterized by (increasing) moments of nirodha (cessation or "no-mind").
10. A flow of silent (consciousness, or a "continuous moment" of cessation) (praśānta-vāhitā) is brought about by (nirodha-) saṃskāra-s.

11. When there is a decrease of the (tendency of consciousness) to disperse in different directions and an increase of (its capacity of) one-pointedness, this is samādhi-pariṇāma (samādhi-transformation).
12. Then, when the content of consciousness (or the object of meditation as "projected" on the "screen" of consciousness) remains exactly the same in two consecutive instances (śānta-uditau), this is ekāgratā-pariṇāma (transformation of one-pointedness).
13. In the same way, dharma-pariṇāma, lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma, and avasthā-pariṇāma (transformations of form, time-variation, and condition)[30] are explained, at the (external level of the) elements (bhūta) and the senses (indriya).
14. A dharmin ("form-bearer"[31]) is "he" whom a series of past, present, and future (śānta-udita-avyapadeśya) dharma-s ("forms") belong to.[32]
15. Variation at the (inner level of) krama (sequence, which the yogin alone can perceive)[33] is the cause of variation at the (external level of) pariṇāma.[34]
16. Through saṃyama (yogic meditation) on the three pariṇāma-types, knowledge of past and future is obtained.
17. The mutual superimposition (adhyāsa) of sound (or word), object (or referent), and idea creates confusion. Through saṃyama on the distinction between these (language-components), knowledge of the sounds of every living creature is obtained.
18. Through sākṣāt-karaṇa (direct yogic perception) of the saṃskāra-s, knowledge of previous births is obtained.[35]
19. (Through sākṣāt-karaṇa) of mental content (pratyaya), knowledge of (the content of) other minds is obtained.
20. This (knowledge) does not include (other factors) which determine (the content of the mind looked into), since they are not the object (of sākṣāt-karaṇa).
21. Through saṃyama on the kāya-rūpa,[36] when the capacity of the body to be perceived is suspended and the contact between the eyes (of other people) and the light (which the body reflects) is cutoff (the yogin acquires) invisibility.
22. In the same way (the yogin's capacity) to conceal (his) sound etc.[37] is explained.
23. karma is of two types: sa-upakrama and nir-upakrama ("with nearness" and "without nearness" respectively, namely quick or slow in bearing fruits). Through saṃyama on that, or by omens (ariṣṭa), foreknowledge of death is obtained.
24. (Through saṃyama) on friendliness etc.,[38] (the yogin acquires) powers.

25. (Through saṃyama) on powers (the yogin acquires) powers such as that of an elephant etc.[39]
26. By focusing the light of (extraordinary) sense-activity, knowledge of the subtle, hidden and remote is attained.
27. Through saṃyama on the sun,[40] knowledge of the universe[41] is attained.
28. (Through saṃyama) on the moon, knowledge of the arrangement of the stars is attained.
29. (Through saṃyama) on the pole star, knowledge of their movement (the movement of the stars) is attained.
30. (Through saṃyama) on the navel wheel (or navel cakra), knowledge of the arrangement of the body is attained.
31. (Through saṃyama) on the cavity below the throat (kaṇṭha-kūpa), cessation of hunger and thirst is attained.
32. (Through saṃyama) on the "tortoise channel" (kūrma-nāḍī),[42] steadiness is attained.
33. (Through saṃyama) on the light at the top of the head (mūrdha-jyoti), vision of the siddha-s (the accomplished yogin-s of the past) is attained.
34. Or through prātibha (yogic illumination), everything (is known).
35. (Through saṃyama) on the heart, knowledge pertaining to consciousness (citta-saṃvit) is obtained.
36. Phenomenal experience (bhoga) is based on nondistinction between the radically distinct sattva[43] and puruṣa. Through saṃyama on (the fact that sattva, or the citta, or prakṛti is) for the sake of "the other" (puruṣa), as opposed to (puruṣa's) self-sufficiency (sva-artha), knowledge of puruṣa is obtained.
37. Hence prātibha and extraordinary senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting, and smelling arise.
38. These are obstacles to samādhi, but nevertheless attainments when consciousness is directed outwardly (to the world).
39. By loosening the causes of bondage (to one's body) and through pracāra-saṃvedana (knowing the technique of moving the prāṇa or vital force in the body and out of it at will[44]), the mind (citta) can enter another body.
40. Through mastery of the udāna (up-breath or speech-breath, the yogin is) not attached to water, mud, thorns, and so on, and (is capable of) levitation (utkrānti).[45]
41. Through mastery of the samāna (mid-breath or digestive-breath, the yogin's body becomes) radiant.

42. Through saṃyama on the relation between ear and space, divine hearing is attained.
43. Through saṃyama on the relation of body (kāya) and space (ākāśa), and samāpatti[46] on the lightness of cotton, the capacity of moving freely in space is obtained.
44. A state in which the (citta or consciousness) functions spontaneously (akalpitā)[47] outside the body is called mahāvideha (great disembodiment).[48] It results in the elimination of the covering of the (inner) light.
45. Through saṃyama on the gross (sthūla), intrinsic (svarūpa), subtle (sūkṣma), relational (anvaya) and purposive (arthavattva) aspects of the elements—mastery over them (bhūta-jaya) is attained.
46. Then the capacity of miniaturizing the body (aṇiman) and so on,[49] as well as perfection of the body and immunity to dharma-s (natural constituents such as fire, water, wind etc. is also attained).
47. Bodily perfection means beauty, grace, strength, and solidity such as that of a diamond.
48. Through saṃyama on the perceiving (grahaṇa), intrinsic (svarūpa), individual (asmitā), relational (anvaya), and purposive (arthavattva) functions of the sense organs-mastery over them (indriya-jaya) is attained.
49. Hence quickness of mind,[50] perception without the aid of the senses and mastery over the pradhāna (prakṛti, the objective world) are obtained.
50. (A yogin) fully absorbed in discernment (khyāti) of the difference between sattva and puruṣa obtains omniscience and mastery over every state of existence.
51. Dispassion (vairāgya) even toward this,[51] with destruction of the doṣa (impurity) seeds, results in kaivalya (aloneness, freedom).
52. If invited by "higher beings" (sthānin-s, dwellers of "celestial regions"), neither pride nor desire should arise (in the yogin), lest unwanted attachments recur.[52]
53. Through saṃyama on moment (kṣaṇa) and sequence (krama), knowledge born of discernment (viveka-jaṃ jñānam) is obtained.
54. Hence awareness (pratipatti) of (the distinction between) similar things, which cannot be distinguished by origin, characteristics, or location, is attained.[53]
55. Knowledge born of discernment is nonsequential (akrama), all-encompassing (sarva-viṣaya), eternal (sarvathā-viṣaya), and liberative (tāraka).
56. When sattva and puruṣa are of equal purity, this is kaivalya.

Chapter 4: kaivalya (Aloneness, Freedom)

1. Yogic achievements (siddhi-s) are attainable by birth, or through herbs (or drugs), mantra, tapas, or samādhi.
2. The passage from one birth to another is due to the potency of prakṛti.
3. Incidental causes (nimitta) do not activate prakṛti, but merely remove obstacles, like a farmer (who irrigates his field by removing obstacles which block the natural flow of the water, explains Vyāsa).[54]
4. Phenomenal consciousness (or individual consciousness, nirmāṇa-citta) emanate from asmitā-mātra ("pure asmitā").[55]
5. (Even though each phenomenal consciousness has its own) distinct activity, it is the "one consciousness" (cittam-ekam)[56] which originates all the rest (the multiple phenomenal consciousnesses).
6. Among these, consciousness born of meditation (dhyāna) is without latent (karmic) deposit.
7. The action of a yogin is neither white nor black. The action of the others is of three types (white, black, white and black).
8. Thereof vāsanā-s (inborn karmic tendencies) arise according to their fruition (the fruition of each action-type).
9. Since memory[57] and saṃskāra-s are one in essence, there is a causal relation (between action and its fruition), even if they are separated in terms of birth, place, and time.
10. (Saṃskāra-s) are beginning-less because the desire for continuity (āśiṣ)[58] which sustains them is eternal.
11. Since (vāsanā-s) are intrinsically related to cause and effect, to (the citta or consciousness as) their substratum and to objects of consciousness (ālambana, toward which they are directed)—when these cease to exist, they (the vāsanā-s also) cease to exist.
12. Past and future exist (in the present) in their special form ("stored" in "karmic memory"). Owing to the time difference (adhva-bhedāt), their properties (dharma-s) are different.
13. The essence of these (properties)—whether manifest (in the case of the present) or subtle (in the case of past and future)—is the guṇa-s.
14. The suchness of an object[59] is due to the consistency of its pariṇāma.[60]
15. The object remains the same despite the multiplicity of consciousnesses as the two (object and consciousness) belong to separate levels of existence (panthan-s).

16. Moreover, the object does not depend on a single consciousness. (If that were the case), what would have happened to it (to the object) when not perceived by it (by that single consciousness)?[61]
17. An object is known or unknown as much as the citta (consciousness) is "colored" by it (or acquires its form).
18. Mental activity (citta-vṛtti) is always known to its "master" (prabhu, namely puruṣa), owing to the unchangeability of puruṣa (or since puruṣa is "pariṇāma-less").
19. It (the citta) is not a light-to-itself (i.e., the citta perceives objects but not itself), as it is seen (or "perceived" by puruṣa).
20. Furthermore, both cannot be perceived simultaneously.[62]
21. Had one consciousness (citta) been perceived by another, it would have lead to infinite regression (atiprasaṅga) from one consciousness (buddhi) to another,[63] and to intermixture of memories.
22. When the motionless "pure consciousness" (citi, namely puruṣa) takes the shape of that (of the citta, of phenomenal consciousness), "perception" (saṃvedana) of its own buddhi ("intellect," i.e., "perception" of the citta and its vṛtti-s) takes place.
23. Owing to the fact that it is "colored" both by the seer (puruṣa) and the seen (objects), consciousness can disperse (i.e., perceive multiple objects simultaneously).[64]
24. Although variegated by innumerable vāsanā-s, (consciousness) is for the sake of the other (puruṣa), owing to "collaborated activity" (saṃhatya-kāritvāt).[65]
25. In the case of a viśeṣa-darśin (a yogin who sees the distinction between the citta and puruṣa), the pondering over one's states of being (ātma-bhāva-bhāvanā) ceases.[66]
26. Then, inclined toward discernment (viveka), the consciousness gravitates toward kaivalya.
27. In the interstices of this (as the consciousness approaches kaivalya), other mental content (may arise) from the saṃskāra-s.
28. The cessation (hāna) of these (saṃskāra-s) is said to be like (the cessation of) the kleśa-s.[67]
29. (A yogin) who takes no interest whatsoever even in prasaṃkhyāna,[68] achieves through yogic discernment (viveka-khyāti) the samādhi-stage of dharma-megha ("cloud of dharma").[69]
30. Then follows the cessation (nivṛtti) of kleśa-s and karma.[70]
31. Then, due to the endlessness of knowledge from which every covering of impurity has been removed, that which remains to be known is little.[71]

32. Then, having fulfilled their purpose, the sequence of change in the guṇa-s comes to an end.
33. Krama (sequence) is "the other" of kṣaṇa (moment),[72] and is ascertained at the moment of the termination of change (pariṇāma-apara-anta).
34. kaivalya is the turning back of the guṇa-s to their source, once (their work) for the sake of puruṣa is accomplished; or, it is the power of pure consciousness (citi-śakti) abiding in its own essence.

Notes

1 His- the seer (draṣṭṛ) is puruṣa, the trans-phenomenal "I." As the word in Sanskrit is in the masculine form, I have translated "his."

2 Afflictive (kliṣṭa) mental activity contributes to one's involvement in the world and originates from the kleśa-s (see YS 2.3–9). Nonafflictive (akliṣṭa) mental activity contributes to the yogic internalization and occurs in the initial stages of meditation (see YS 1.17, 1.42, and 1.44).

3 I translated the term vikalpa as "verbal construction" following Larson (2008), p. 162.

4 The term saṃjñā (sign) can be also translated as "consciousness," "understanding," "knowledge." If such is the case, the sūtra should be translated as: Dispassion is thirstlessness toward objects seen and heard, arising from consciousness of vaśīkāra, namely consciousness of one's control over one's attraction and attachment to objects. The commentators from Vyāsa onward speak in this respect of worldly (i.e., grasped by the senses) and other-worldly (i.e., explicated in the scriptures) objects. In the latter category, Vyāsa mentions svarga ("heaven") as well as yogic states such as "bodilessness" (videha) and "merging in prakṛti" (prakṛti-laya) [see YS 1.19].

5 The guṇa-s are subterranean forces, which are constantly in motion under the seemingly solid façade of the objective world.

6 Asaṃprajñāta samādhi is depicted as "the other" of saṃprajñāta or "cognitive samādhi," but it is not exactly "noncognitive." Rather, as Patañjali explains, it is devoid of vṛtti-s or mental activity, but still consists of saṃskāra-s, or "karmic impressions," or psychological material, which are also "cognitive" but in a different, more subtle sense.

7 Videha and prakṛti-laya: Patañjali refers here to a category of yogin-s who attain samādhi spontaneously, by birth (see also YS 4.1), not through sādhana or praxis like his own vivekin ("discerning yogin"). Some commentators explain that those referred to as videha and prakṛti-laya are free of ahaṃkāra, that is, free of unconscious identification with the "phenomenal I." However, such freedom is not yet full-fledged accomplishment of oneself as puruṣa, or "real" kaivalya. Others depict those who belong to these two categories as suprahuman entities or even devatā-s (divinities). Others again portray them as pseudo-yogin-s or "mediums" that can see beyond the phenomenal surface to a certain extent, but are not "genuine yogin-s."

8 Smṛti is initially memory. However in YS 1.6 Patañjali lists memory among the vṛtti-s, or as a part of mental activity which the process of yoga aims at suspending. Several commentators try to solve the problem by suggesting that in the present case, the term smṛti is synonymous with dhyāna, a preliminary state of meditation which paves the way to samādhi. Therefore I translate smṛti as mindfulness.

9 The particle "or" (in Sanskrit vā) goes back to YS 1.12. There, Patañjali suggested that yoga (i.e., cessation of mental activity) takes place through repetitive practice (abhyāsa) and dispassion (vairāgya). Here he adds: Or, through devotion to īśvara. In my reading, the word "or" implies an acknowledgment of another yogic method besides of Patañjali's own abhyāsa and vairāgya. Īśvara is a technical philosophical term referring to divinity in a general sense.

10 Avirati—according to the Yoga Kośa (p. 41), avirati is the antonym of vairāgya.

11 Bhrānti-darśana — delusion with regard to one's own yogic achievements (Yoga Kośa, p. 217).

12 According to Vyāsa, in this case stability of mind is gained by meditating on (i.e., taking as object of meditation) another mind which is free from attachment.

13 See YS 3.17.

14 According to the commentators, the "quality-less-ness" mentioned here is the Sāṃkhyan aliṅga or "unmanifest," a notion denoting the most subtle layer of prakṛti, consisting of a not yet manifest primeval matter. See also YS 2.19.

15 Ṛta—in the Vedic context the notion of ṛta refers to the cosmic order. Here the term undergoes "introversion" and denotes "inner order" revealed through yogic insight.

16 Tapas—literally: heating. Here it refers to "heat-generating practice," or yogic meditation at large.

17 Daily recitation (svādhyāya)—Vyāsa speaks of the study of mokṣa-śāstra (mokṣa-texts). Taking into account YS 2.44, the term svādhyāya can also refer to mantra-recitation.

18 The notion of avidyā is explicated by Patañjali in YS 2.5; the other kleśa-s are discussed in YS 2.6–9.

19 See also YS 4.10.

20 I translate the term pratiprasava as "involution" following Feuerstein (1989, p. 65).

21 Brightness, action, and inertia (prakāśa, kriyā, and sthiti) are the three guṇa-s, namely sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively.

22 According to the Yoga Kośa (pp. 216–17), the term bhoga refers to any experience which takes place through the prism of asmitā or phenomenal "I-sense."

23 YS 2.19 is a "Pātañjala Sāṃkhya" verse, which is a part of a whole "Sāṃkhya section" of the Yogasūtra (YS 2.15–27) focusing on terms such as puruṣa (the seer), prakṛti (the seen), the guṇa-s, avidyā, viveka-khyāti, and kaivalya. Prakṛti is depicted here as four-layered: aliṅga or "the unmanifest" is its most subtle layer, consisting of a not yet manifested primeval matter. The notion of aliṅga corresponds with the Sāṃkhyan terms avyakta and mūla-prakṛti. Out of the "unmanifest" emerges the liṅga-mātra or "mere designator" (in

this case, I adopt Whicher's translation [2000, pp. 65–6]). It is a first cosmic manifestation, a first movement, a first differentiation in prakṛti, still extremely subtle and sattvic, still preceding the emergence of any specific object. The notion of liṅga-mātra corresponds with the Sāṃkhyan term mahat. From the "mere designator" emerges the "unparticularized" (aviśeṣa), consisting of the tanmātra-s ("the five subtle elements") and the asmitā-mātra or "pure I-sense." The most external layer of prakṛti is the "particularized" (viśeṣa), emerging from the "unparticularized" and consisting of the five bhūta-s or elements, ten indriya-s or bodily organs (five karma or action-organs and five jñāna or sense organs), and finally the mind (manas).

24 According to Vyāsa the sevenfold prajñā consists of the following consecutive insights: (a) there remains no doubt that duḥkha or suffering can be eliminated; (b) avidyā is made inactive; (c) the nature of the hāna (of the saṃsāra or the phenomenal existence which is to be disengaged) is seen in samādhi; (d) viveka-khyāti or yogic discernment is applied as hānopāya or means of disengagement; (e) the buddhi or "intellect" has fulfilled its function; (f) the guṇa-s lose their grip and regress into a state of sheer potentiality; (g) puruṣa abiding in its "original essence," is a light to itself and a kevalin ("alone," detached from prakṛti).

25 Vyāsa pleads for the universality of the yama-s. Even a sense of duty, he exemplifies, such as to sacrifice animals in the case of a Brahmin, or to fight a war in the case of a kṣatriya, does not justify nonobservance of ahiṃsā (nonviolence), the foremost yama.

26 See also YS 4.25.

27 The present sūtra repeats YS 1.23.

28 The infinite—in Sanskrit: ananta. Ananta is also the name of a mythological serpent that carries the world on his numerous hoods and symbolizes perfect stability. It is possible that the meditation mentioned here is not on abstract infinity, but on the concrete image of Ananta, or on the stability which he symbolizes.

29 Since yoga is depicted as a process consisting of gradual stages, Vyāsa seems to be answering the "when" question, that is, when should the yogin proceed from one stage (bhūmi) to the next, stating (or quoting from another source) that "yoga itself is the teacher" (yoga eva-upādhyāyaḥ). Hence the answer is to be "carved out" in the process itself. Vyāsa's statement is extremely refreshing in the present age of guruism and lack of self-assurance.

30 The term pariṇāma here conveys the constant change (of form, time, and condition) inherent in the objective realm.

31 I draw on Feuerstein (1989, p. 103).

32 According to the Yoga Kośa (p. 150), the dharma-s of the dharmin are the objects which take any form in which the dharmin can exist. In this way, both niruddha and vyuthitta citta-s (motionless and active consciousness) are dharma-s of the citta; the citta itself is the dharma of asmitā-mātra ("pure I-sense"), hence asmitā-mātra is the dharmin of the citta. Asmitā-mātra is the dharma of the liṅga-mātra ("mere designator"), and so on. Aliṅga ("the unmanifest") is the last dharmin, which is not a dharma of any other dharmin. In this respect see also YS 2.19; J. H. Woods (1998, p. 224) translates the terms śānta, udita, and avyapadeśya referring to the past, present, and future, more literally, as the quiescent, the uprisen, and the indeterminable.

33 See YS 4.33.
34 Patañjali sketches a multilayered picture of change in the prakṛti sphere: pariṇāma (which takes place in the elements, the senses, and consciousness) is the outermost layer of change (itself divided into several layers). The term krama pertains to an inner stream of change, underlying the changes designated by the term pariṇāma. Innermost, and located "between the lines" of krama, is the kṣaṇa (moment) wherein the "unchangeable" (transcending the prakṛti-realm) is to be found.
35 See also YS 2.39.
36 Kāya-rūpa—literally: the form or physique of the body. According to the Yoga Kośa (p. 87) the term kāya-rūpa refers to the light reflected by the body. Another possibility, more in tune with YS 3.22, which Bhojarāja alone acknowledges as belonging to the Yogasūtra text, is that the saṃyama (yogic meditation) expounded in YS 3.21–2 is on a certain tanmātrā in the body. The theory is that a subtle form of matter known as tanmatrā is located in each sense organ and facilitates its response to a matching stimulus. In this way, for example, external sounds stimulate the ear and cause the experience of sound. The tanmātrā-s are rūpa (YS 3.21, in the eye), śabda (YS 3.22, in the ear), rasa (in the tongue), gandha (in the nose), and sparśa (in the skin). Therefore saṃyama on a specific tanmātrā results, we are told, in the capacity of concealing one's body, sound, taste, smell, and touch.
37 The phrase etc. refers to the yogin's capacity to conceal his smell, touch, and taste.
38 Friendliness etc.—Patañjali refers here to YS 1.33; etc.—namely compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekṣa).
39 Of an elephant etc.—According to Vyāsa, through saṃyama on the elephant's power, the yogin acquires elephant's power; through saṃyama on the power of the wind, he acquires wind's power, and so on.
40 Sun—most of the commentators believe that the term sūrya (sun) refers to the sūrya-dvāra, the "sun gate" in the region of the navel. They explain that saṃyama (yogic meditation), as prescribed in sūtra-s 3.27–33 and 3.35, is on different dhyāna-sthāna-s (spots for meditation) in the human body. If such is the case, then the moon and the pole star in the following sūtra-s refer not to external celestial bodies, but to internal centers of energy to be meditated upon.
41 Knowledge of the universe—here Vyāsa provides a list of seven worlds (loka-s) which the (mythological) universe, as known in his time, consists of.
42 Kūrma-nāḍī- It seems to be one of the many nāḍī-s or channels through which the prāṇa or vital force circulates, even if the commentators are disputed about its exact location. P. N. Mukerji (Āraṇya 1981, p. 307) translates the phrase kūrma-nāḍī as bronchial tube, and Āraṇya suggests that the saṃyama expounded here is on the bronchial tubes below the trachea.
43 Sattva—one of the three guṇa-s. According to the Yoga Kośa (p. 293) the term is used here as a synonym of citta (consciousness) because of the predominance of the sattva-guṇa in it.
44 Yoga Kośa, p. 187.
45 Utkrānti—According to the commentators, there are two meanings to the term utkrānti: levitation (compatible with detachment from water, mud, and thorns), and determining the time of one's own death at will.

46 Saṃyama and samāpatti are two notions referring to yogic meditation. The fact that Patañjali uses both notions in a single sūtra indicates, in my reading, that these are two distinct meditation-types, two different techniques prescribed together. Vyāsa in his bhāṣya suggests that having acquired lightness such as that of cotton, the yogin can walk on water, cobweb, and rays of light.

47 Here I draw on the Yoga Kośa, pp. 204–5.

48 Vyāsa explains that mahāvideha is a citta-vṛtti (mental activity) which is a part of dhāraṇā. Most commentators depict mahāvideha as a state in which the citta enters another body. Bhojarāja (Śāstri [1982], p. 155) suggests that it is a meditative state in which the yogin loses any bodily sense, or is totally free of identification with- or ownership of the body.

49 Vyāsa lists eight mahā-siddhi-s (great yogic attainments), of which aṇiman is the first, and the rest are designated by the particle ādi (etc.): aṇiman (the capacity of miniaturizing the body), mahiman (the capacity of magnifying the body), laghiman (the capacity of levitation), prāpti (the capacity of reaching anywhere; of touching the moon with one's fingertips, Vyāsa exemplifies), prākāmya (irresistible will which enables the yogin, Vyāsa further illustrates, to pass through solid surfaces), vaśitva (mastery over the elements), īśitṛtva (the capacity of creating something out of nothing or causing something to disappear), and finally, kāmāvasāyitva (the power of wish-fulfillment).

50 In his bhāṣya, Vyāsa suggests that Patañjali speaks of attainment of physical speed equivalent to the quickness of the mind. If so, then the sūtra should be read as suggesting that "Hence quickness such as that of the mind . . . is obtained."

51 Dispassion even toward this (tad vairāgyād)—the reference is to the siddhi mentioned in the previous sūtra (omniscience and mastery over every state of existence), or perhaps to the aforementioned siddhi-s at large. Vijñānabhikṣu suggests that it is dispassion toward the khyāti (discernment) mentioned in the previous sūtra, which he glosses as viveka-khyāti, and its siddhi-s.

52 A yogin who has developed immunity to worldly temptations, explain the commentators, can still be taken by other-worldly temptations. In the present sūtra he is warned against the fatal consequences of such temptations. In his bhāṣya, Vyāsa provides a picturesque depiction of a dangerous celestial invitation, and of the yogin's appropriate, nonconsenting response:

> bho ihāsyatām iha ramyatāṃ kamanīyo 'yam bhogaḥ kamanīyeyaṃ kanyā, rasāyanam idaṃ jarāmṛtyuṃ bādhate, vaihāyasam idaṃ yānam, amī kalpadrumāḥ, puṇyā maṇḍākinī, siddhā maharṣaya, uttamā anukūlā apsaraso, divye śrotracakṣuṣī vajropamaḥ kāyaḥ, svaguṇais sarvam idam upārjitam ayuṣmatā pratipadyatām idam akṣayam ajaram amarasthānaṃ devānāṃ priyam ity evem abhidhīyamānāḥ saṅgadoṣān bhāvayed ghoreṣu saṃsārāṅgāreṣu pacymānena mayā jananamaraṇāndhakāre viparivarttamānena kathañcid āsāditaḥ kleśatimiravināśī yogapradīpas tasya caite tṛṣṇāyonayo viṣayāvayavaḥ pratipakṣaḥ. so khalv ahaṃ labdhālokaḥ katham anayā viṣayamṛgatṛṣṇayā vāñcitas tasyaiva punaḥ pradīptasya saṃsārāgner ātmānam indhanīkūryām iti . . . svasti vaḥ svapnopamebhyaḥ kṛpanajanaprārthanīyebhyo viṣayebhya ity evaṃ niścitamatiḥ samādhiṃ bhāvayet.

"Hello!"—a sthānin or "dweller of a celestial region" addresses the yogin—"Come sit down here. Come and enjoy yourself sexually here. This is a lovely place. And this young woman is beautiful. Here is a magic potion that will counteract the effects of old age and death. And here is a carriage that flies through the air. Here are trees that fulfill all your wishes. Here is the holy Maṇḍākinī River. Here are great sages who have all attained magic powers. And here are unrivalled Apsara-s [celestial beauties] willing (to make love). Your hearing and your vision will become supernatural. Your body will become like a diamond. All this you have earned by your very own merits. Stay in this place, for it is deathless, it is indestructible, there is no old age here and the gods themselves love it." Thus addressed, the yogin should reflect upon attachment and its defects. He should say to himself: "I have been cooked in the terrible coals of saṃsāra. I have been willy-nilly whirled about in the darkness of (the cycle of) birth and death. Somehow I have managed to acquire the lamp of yoga which destroys the darkness of suffering. And now these dangerous enemy winds of sensual enjoyment coming from the skies of desire have arisen to threaten it. How can I, who have found illumination, allow myself to be deluded by this mirage of sensual enjoyment and even to further offer myself as fuel to the fire of saṃsāra which will once again flare up? I wish you good fortune, O sensual objects. I bid you farewell. You are to be sought by pathetic people, for you are no better than dreams. This is how he should become convinced in his heart, and he should realize samādhi." [I quoted J. Moussaieff Masson's fantastic translation (1980b, p. 131) of Vyāsa's fantastic anecdote].

53 As we are approaching YS 3.56 which defines kaivalya in terms of the similarity and difference between sattva and puruṣa, I would say that puruṣa and sattva are the foremost example of "similar things," which cannot be distinguished, except by a discerning yogin. The commentators in their gloss speak of the yogic gaze as capable of seeing minute differences between similar objects in the world, which the conventional eye cannot see.

54 Incidental causes (nimitta) as opposed to intrinsic causes (upādāna). In the farmer's illustration, the actions he takes are merely incidental causes of the fact that water flows into his field. The intrinsic causes relate to the nature of water, that is, flowing from a higher place to a lower one, and so on. Rukmani (2001c, p. 57) prefers "efficient cause" and "material cause" for nimitta-kāraṇa and upādāna-kāraṇa respectively.

55 Asmitā-mātra, in Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, belongs to the aviśeṣa ("unparticularized") layer of prakṛti. It is "pure asmitā" which precedes individualization, or in other words, primeval matter which takes the innumerable forms called citta-s.

56 The "one consciousness" is not puruṣa (which is rather "empty consciousness"), but the generic, primordial asmitā referred to in YS 4.4 as asmitā-mātra.

57 Memory—smṛti; It seems that in the present case, the term smṛti refers not to the conventional memory, but to a deeper "karmic memory" in which the residue of past actions and vṛtti-s is stored in the form of vāsanā-s, "waiting" to be aroused and effective.

58 The term āśiṣ is synonymous with- or at least closely related to abhiniveśa (see YS 2.3 and 2.9).

59 The suchness of an object, namely the fact that we identify it as one and the same despite its constant change, at the outer level of its properties as well as at the inner guṇa-level.

60 See also Yogasūtra 3.13; Patañjali is preoccupied with the relationship between the changing and the unchanged. The external layer of change, inherent in everything belonging to prakṛti, is referred to by Patañjali as pariṇāma. The inner, hidden from the eye, constant change at the level of the guṇa-s, he refers to as krama. In the present sūtra, Patañjali underscores the consistency or regularity (ekatva) of the perpetual change which prakṛti in its manifest (vyakta) form undergoes.

61 Patañjali takes issue (as the Vivaraṇa-kāra and Vijñānabhikṣu explicitly acknowledge) with the idealist position of the Vijñāna-vāda or Citta-mātra ("Mind Only") school of Buddhism.

62 The citta or consciousness cannot perceive both an object and itself simultaneously. Therefore, it perceives objects and is "perceived" by puruṣa (and as the next sūtra suggests, not by another citta or other citta-s).

63 Patañjali's debate with the Buddhists is as follows:

> Buddhists: Patañjali's premise according to which puruṣa illuminates or perceives both itself and the consciousness is not necessary. Instead, it can be argued that consciousness grasps both itself and objects simultaneously.
>
> Patañjali (in YS 4.20): Consciousness is incapable of perceiving both itself and an object simultaneously.
>
> Buddhists: In this case, it can be argued that one consciousness perceives another, and there is no need of postulating a "meta-entity" such as puruṣa as a "meta-perceiver" of each and every consciousness.
>
> Patañjali (in the present sūtra): Your argument (implying a network of consciousnesses perceiving one another) leads to a fallacy in the form of an infinite regression: if one consciousness perceives another, we must postulate a third consciousness to perceive the second, a fourth to perceive the third and so on and so forth.

64 The notion of sarvārtha (dispersion) refers to the capacity of consciousness to perceive multiple objects simultaneously. The antonym of sarvārtha is ekāgratā or one-pointedness.

65 Owing to "collaborated activity" (saṃhatya-kāritvāt)—the activity of consciousness consists of multiple components and forces. It is implied that collaborated activity is for the sake of something beyond the collaborating components, and in the case of consciousness, for the sake of puruṣa. Vyāsa exemplifies: As a house made of different sections is not for its own sake, or for the sake of any of its sections, but for the sake of its owner, so consciousness with its different components is for the sake of puruṣa.

66 According to Vyāsa this pondering consists of questions such as: Who was I? How was I? What is this (birth)? How is this (birth)? What shall we be? How shall we be? These are exactly the "why and how" questions which he articulates in his gloss of YS 2.39 which deals with the siddhi of aparigraha.

67 See Yogasūtra 2.10–11.

68 Prasaṃkhyāna—“realization that everything prākṛtika (which belongs to prakṛti) is other than puruṣa, and that even the realizing citta is not the real self” (Yoga Kośa, p. 197).

69 Please note Patañjali’s language game or bi-textual rendition: the word prasaṃkhyāna also means payment. The word akusīda (no interest) can also be read in a financial sense. Hence the sūtra can be taken to imply that a yogin, who has paid his karmic “debt” with no “interest” remaining, is entitled to a dharma-megha samādhi “bonus.”

70 According to Vyāsa, when the kleśa-s and the karma cease, the yogin attains jīvan-mukti, mokṣa or freedom in one’s lifetime (kleśa-karma-nivṛttau jīvanneva vidvān vimukto bhavati).

71 It is implied that the yogin is not far from omniscience (sarva-jñāna) and in this respect “that which remains to be known is little” (jñeyam-alpam). However Vācaspatimiśra offers a slightly different reading. The rays of the sun in the autumn, he illustrates, shine brightly in every direction when revealed from behind obstructing clouds. The light of the sun is so overwhelming, that water-jars and other objects illuminated by it become minute or insignificant compared with the light itself. In the same way, the knowledge revealed to the yogin in this exalted sattvic meditative state, when every covering of impurity has been removed, surpasses the knowable, namely that which can be known in its light.

72 “The other” of kṣaṇa—kṣaṇa-pratiyogī; the term pratiyogin can be translated as counterpart, counter-correlate, rival, partner. Bhojarāja in his commentary suggests that the phrase kṣaṇa-pratiyogī means kṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇaḥ, “different than kṣaṇa.”

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Index